University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
1-1-2013

Youth Citizenship, Civic Education, and Spaces of Belonging In
Tallinn, Estonia
Catherine Michelle Cottrell
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Geography Commons

Recommended Citation
Cottrell, C. M.(2013). Youth Citizenship, Civic Education, and Spaces of Belonging In Tallinn, Estonia.
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/2514

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

YOUTH CITIZENSHIP, CIVIC EDUCATION, AND SPACES OF BELONGING IN
TALLINN, ESTONIA
by
Catherine Michelle Cottrell
Bachelor of Science
Florida State University, 2005
Master of Arts
University of Miami, 2006

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Geography
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2013
Accepted by:
Caroline Nagel, Major Professor
Amy Mills, Committee Member
Kara Brown, Committee Member
Doyle Stevick, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Catherine Michelle Cottrell, 2013
All Rights Reserved.

ii	
  

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This doctoral dissertation has been made possible by a Doctoral
Dissertation Research Improvement grant from the US National Science
Foundation and a Foreign Language Area Studies fellowship from the US
Department of Education. I received research assistance grants from several
departments of the University of South Carolina, including the Department of
Geography, the Russian and Eurasian Studies program, and the Walker Institute.
I am indebted to these organizations for making my fieldwork possible through
their generosity. I have also been supported through research and teaching
assistantships in the Department of Geography.
This dissertation would not have happened without the schools, teachers,
and students of Tallinn, Estonia. They were uniformly gracious and generous in
the time and effort they gave to my project. I would also like to thank the Estonian
Ministry of Education, the Tallinn Department of Education, and the Estonian
Migration and Integration Foundation for their assistance with and participation in
my research. The Tallinn University Department of Interpreting and Translation
and its graduate students were integral to this research and provided excellent
interpreting services, without which this dissertation would not have come to
fruition.

iii	
  

I am indebted to many departments and officials of the European Union
that assisted me at various stages of this research project. Mr. Krzysztof Kania of
the European Commission’s Directorate General of Education and Culture
volunteered his time and expertise, without which my understanding of EU policy
and procedure would have been seriously lacking. Several other officials in the
European Commission, including Mr. Ronald Hall, Mr. Jiri Svarc, and Mr. Samu
Tuominen, were instrumental in putting me in contact with the proper people and
resources within the EU. Finally, the initial impetus for this dissertation came from
my experience at the European Union Center of Excellence at the University of
Miami (FL). I am particularly indebted to the Jean Monnet Chair of the EUCE and
my former professor, Dr. Joaquin Roy, for his guidance and instruction
throughout my graduate career.
I am also thankful for the many people who have supported and
encouraged me intellectually throughout my graduate career, particularly in the
past year of fieldwork and writing. I have been blessed with a brilliant and
encouraging doctoral dissertation committee that has taught me how to grow as
a researcher and writer. Special thanks goes to my advisor Caroline Nagel, a
scholar whose brilliance is only surpassed by her patience and compassion.
Caroline and the other faculty members in the Department of Geography and
Department of Education always encouraged me to think a different way, do the
thing that I did not think I could do, and tackle the challenges I did not think I was
capable of tackling. I am also grateful to my former professors who gave me a
strong academic and intellectual foundation on which to build my doctoral

iv	
  

studies, in particular Dr. Bill Woodyard, Dr. Ruth Reitan, Dr. Roger Kanet, and
Dr. Ambler Moss. I am also indebted to my Estonian language teacher, Lili Pilt,
for her encouragement and guidance in learning what can charitably described
as a difficult language to learn. Last but not least I am eternally grateful to Dr. Bill
Quirk for his levelheaded guidance, especially during the writing phases of this
dissertation.
I would be remiss if I did not thank my fellow graduate students in the
Department of Geography who have become my friends. I am thankful beyond
words that I have made lifelong friendships with my fellow grads, from whom I
continually drew inspiration, encouragement, and strength. In particular I would
like to thank Larianne for always letting me vent my frustrations in her office; Will
for convincing me to take a break when I was on the verge of burning out; Ben
and Ronnie for their theoretical knowledge; Manali for always providing a calm,
realistic perspective on things; and Amelia for pilfering sweets in order to
maintain sanity in the throes of writing. I would not have made it through this
process without the loyal friendship of each of you.
My deepest gratitude is for my family, who have loved me when I have
been unlovable, believed in me when I have not believed in myself, supported
me in all ways when logic dictated otherwise, and constantly prayed me through
both good times and bad. Aunt Wyleene planted this seed in my heart and mind.
Becky Keenum made the seed grow. Gran (Mary D. Camp) protected it from
blight and drought. Above all others my parents, Raymond and Stella, deserve

v	
  

credit for helping me to achieve this and so many other goals. This dissertation is
a product of their work as much as my own.

vi	
  

ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigated the ways that young people in Tallinn,
Estonia conceptualize citizenships, identities, and belongings in national and
post-national communities. Focus groups were conducted with 29 students from
ethnic Estonian and Russophone backgrounds in their final year of secondary
school; in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 civic education teachers from
the students’ schools. Theories of citizenship and nationalism, as well as civic
education research, were used to explore the ways in which young people
conceptualize the terms of belonging and negotiate cultural difference as they
move within and through their everyday spaces, particularly in the school.
The study demonstrated that young people encounter, negotiate, and
contest multiple and often competing discourses of national, multicultural, and
post-national citizenships in their everyday lives, and that these coexist and
interact complexly rather than existing as discrete entities at separate scalar
hierarchies. The complex interaction of these discourses is thrown in to sharp
relief in the Estonian context because of the country’s persistent socio-spatial
division between ethnolinguistic groups at the national level and its membership
in the European Union. In Tallinn, young people attempt to navigate cultural
diversity through the liberal democratic framework of multiculturalism but
concomitantly engage in Othering practices to structure the terms of belonging
and exclusion in society. The results of this study suggest that future research
vii	
  

should consider the simultaneity of multiple discourses of citizenships and how
they produce and are produced by myriad political identities and relationships.
The findings further imply that while theoretical conceptualizations of divided
societies should recognize persistent socio-spatial divisions, they should also
consider the complicated narratives that work to blur the lines of those divisions
and to create a reality of societal divisions that are not as black-and-white as they
may first appear.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“I hope that in the future everything will change and there won’t be
so much hate in society. For example, I know my friend, an
Estonian, learns Russian. And it may feel strange, but it is—it’s
happening. I think that in the future when you speak Russian, this
won’t draw any special attention because this is the European way
of treating different nationalities…”
(Pushkin Boy 3, focus group participant,
Tallinn, Estonia, 2012)
This Russian-speaking student’s narrative about belonging and identity in
Estonia illuminates the complex, multi-sited reality of citizenships for young
people in contemporary Europe. In a few simple sentences, this young man
contends with nationalist, multicultural, and post-national discourses as he
negotiates identity and belonging in Estonian society. His statement is illustrative
of the multiple configurations of citizenship that young people in Tallinn, Estonia
are confronted with—and must contend with—on an everyday basis. This
dissertation explores the ways in which young people in Tallinn, Estonia
understand societal membership in a nation-state that is both a society divided
along ethnolinguistic lines and a liberal democratic member state of the
European Union. In their everyday, mundane spaces, young people in
contemporary Estonia encounter discourses of national, multicultural, and postnational citizenships that conceptualize community, and the terms of belonging in
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that community, in varying and often contrasting ways. Recognizing young
people as active agents in the construction of their own political subjectivities,
this study examines the ways that youths in Estonia understand and negotiate
citizenship, identity, and belonging as they move through and within the everyday
spaces of their personal geographies. In doing so, this study aims to interrogate
how politicized identities and multi-scalar citizenship discourses interact to
structure and re-structure the terms of membership in society.

Theoretical Questions
What are the everyday contexts in which young people develop an awareness
and understanding of societal membership(s)? What role does civic education
play in the citizenship imaginaries of young people? And what is the significance
of everyday urban space and place in the development of young people’s
cognizance of belonging and exclusion in the context of a divided society?
In this study I investigate conceptions of identity, citizenship, and
belonging amongst ethnic Estonian and Russian-speaking youths in Tallinn,
Estonia. In contemporary societies, identity, citizenship, and belonging are bound
together in multiple ways. Modern citizenship has traditionally established and
codified the relationship of the individual and the state through a language of
universal rights and responsibilities; at the same time, it has been understood to
denote membership in a national community that is defined in terms of particular
cultural norms and values, and in some cases, historical ethnocultural markers
(Janoski and Gran 2002; Hall 1996; Heater 1999).

	
  

2

While legal status may be universal within a nation-state, individuals or
groups who are viewed as “unassimilated” or “unassimilable” into the national
community may have different access to rights, different abilities to participate in
public life, and a different sense of belonging in the wider community of citizens
(Isin 2002). Such tensions and differentiations of citizenships are perhaps most
visible in “divided societies”—those societies characterized by persistent sociospatial polarization (Ansorg, Haass, and Strasheim 2012; Dobbernack and
Modood 2011).
Even as patterns of exclusion remain salient, modern citizenship and
national communities have been reconfigured through a number of pressures
and processes. Trends in post-World War II Western societies have caused
citizenship to be both reconfigured at the national level and broadened beyond it
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010). Multiculturalism has played a steady but contentious
role in the sociopolitical discourses of liberal democracies as cultural diversity
and difference have altered the ways that nationhood is articulated and
negotiated. Furthermore, contemporary processes of transnational migration,
European integration, and human rights regimes continue to challenge traditional
notions of citizenship rights and responsibilities, locating identities and spaces of
belonging above and across state lines and forming “post-national citizenships”
(Soysal 1997; Benhabib 2007; K. Mitchell 2007). Assessments of these trends
vary considerably. Some studies, for instance, have couched multicultural and
post-national citizenships as institutions of universal equality and rights that can
overcome the exclusionary politics inherent in nationalist projects (Soysal 1997;
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Kymlicka 2007; Banks 2008) Others, in contrast, have demonstrated that
particularisms undergird all citizenship regimes and discourses, belying wider
claims of universal access and status (Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Benhabib
2002). From this latter perspective, the nation-state remains the primary
guarantor of citizenship and therefore continues to be a significant focal point in
theoretical discussions of citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Desforges,
Jones, and Woods 2005; Faas 2011).
This study takes a different approach to contemporary citizenships—that
these citizenship discourses have not had fully transformative effects, but rather,
have formed multiple layers of citizenship discourse that people negotiate in their
everyday lives. This study aims to examine how multiple citizenship discourses
circulate within divided societies by engaging with the wider body of citizenship
literature that has dealt with multiculturalism and post-nationalism, in contrast to
divided societies literature that has tended to focus solely on the nationalisms
that mediate socio-spatial divisions (Boal 2002; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).
Furthermore, by engaging with both multicultural and post-national theories, this
study brings the simultaneity of multiple citizenships in liberal-democratic
societies.
Different forms of ideas about citizenship circulate within societies. Layer
upon layer of citizenship ideals with different rights (or conceptions for rights) flow
from these discourses. This is particularly true in Europe, where both resurgent
ethnonationalist projects and European Union (EU) integration processes have
been present in the wake of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The youngest
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generations in Europe’s post-Soviet nation-states have been raised amongst
competing discourses, particularly within civic education curricula, of
nationalisms aimed at reasserting titular majority hegemony and European
multiculturalisms focused on these countries’ “return” to Europe and democratic
value systems (Delanty 2006; Kolossov 2003; Hughes 2005). Empirical studies
suggest that in such contexts, young people’s understandings and negotiations
of belonging and citizenship are highly fraught processes that take place in the
spaces of everyday life, from schools and neighborhoods to places of work and
recreation (Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010; Weller 2003; Reed-Danahay 2007;
Michaels and Stevick 2009).
This study examines the relationships between youth conceptions of
citizenship and belonging and the multi-scalar discourses of identity. As such, the
aims of this dissertation are to investigate (1) the ways in which configurations
and conceptualizations of citizenships are mediated by multiple, varied, and
sometimes conflicting discourses of identity and belonging; (2) how young people
encounter, negotiate, and contest the terms of identity and belonging in their
everyday geographies; and (3) the ways in which young people’s positionalities
in national communities mediate and inform their ideas of citizenship and their
citizenship practices.
The complex interaction of varying discourses of belonging and identity is
particularly visible in divided societies that experience cleavages along
ethnonational lines. Estonia is one such divided society. This dissertation
engages with these theoretical approaches to citizenship through in-depth focus
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groups and interviews with young people in their last year of secondary school,
and through interviews with civic educators in Tallinn, Estonia. The study
participants were recruited from both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium
secondary schools. Formal focus groups and interviews were conducted over a
three month period in the autumn of 2012. Participant observation was also
carried out in secondary schools, where I interacted informally with students and
gave talks on the 2012 US presidential election, religion in America, and higher
education.
The decision to focus on young people in Estonia was made in order to
engage with changing modalities of citizenship in a group that has only recently
generated interest in geographic literatures on citizenship. Traditionally, young
people have been viewed as “citizens-in-the-making” who are the passive
objects, rather than active subjects, of the discourses of citizenship and
nationalism (Weller 2003, 154). But recent research trends in multiple disciplines,
including geography, have centered young people as political agents who
construct their own understandings of identity and actively negotiate discourses
of citizenship (Skelton 2010; Leonard 2006). Young people in Estonia, in
particular, are in a unique position of encountering and contending with many
and varied discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging because their
society is both socio-spatially divided along ethnonational lines and situated
within a multicultural, pan-European space that is “united in diversity.” To further
demonstrate why this generation of young people in Tallinn is a compelling group
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within which to examine citizenship, identity, and belonging it is necessary to
briefly discuss the historical contexts in which Estonian society is situated.

Historical Contexts of Belonging in Contemporary Estonia
On February 24, 1918 the Republic of Estonia declared its independence after
several centuries under German, Swedish, Danish, and finally Russian rule. After
fighting a War of Independence against both the Soviet Red Army and German
forces with the help of British, Danish, Finnish, and Swedish allies, the Republic
of Estonia was established when its first constitution was ratified and parliament
elected in 1920. Estonia remained a sovereign nation-state until it was
conquered by the Soviet Union in 1939 and later annexed, along with the other
Baltic states, in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Molotov Ribbentrop Pact, which
was best known in the West for invading and partitioning Poland. Estonia was
occupied by the Soviets from 1939-41, followed by Nazi German troops from
1941-44, and Soviet troops again from 1944-1991 (Raun 1987).
During the Soviet era large-scale migrations (forced and otherwise) saw
an influx of Russians and Russian-speakers into Estonian territory. In the years
leading up to World War II, Estonia was quite ethnically homogenous, with
almost 90 percent of the population listed as ethnically Estonian, eight percent
Russophone, and two percent other nationalities. By the end of the Soviet era in
1991, however, Estonia’s population was 61 percent ethnic Estonian and 35
percent Russophone (Statistics Estonia 2013). The in-migrations of
Russophones was not uniform throughout the territory, however, such that Harju
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County (centered by the capital city, Tallinn) and Ida Virumaa County in the
northeast (centered by the industrial city of Narva) were the only areas with
sizable Russophone populations. Since its re-declaration of independence in
1991, Estonia has retained a large Russophone minority that constituted 29
percent of the population in 2011 (Statistics Estonia 2011). Moreover, the sociospatial divisions in the country continue to reflect those of the Soviet era. The
Russophone population almost exclusively reside in Tallinn/Harju County and
Narva/Ida Virumaa County (Tallinn City Office 2012; Statistics Estonia 2011;
Statistics Estonia 2013).
In addition to the large influx of Russophones during the Soviet era,
Estonia was also subject to Sovietization and Russification policies and
processes. Russian became the lingua franca for government, industry, and
many parts of everyday life. Educational curricula were dictated by Moscow, and
Soviet histories, policies, and ideologies permeated civics, history, geography,
and language lessons (Ahonen 2001). The era also involved attempts to
suppress local cultures throughout the USSR, and as such Estonian traditions
and language were relegated to the private realm while Soviet Russian culture
was reflected in public spaces, places, and landscapes (Raun 1987; Merritt 2000;
Zeigler 2002; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).
The Soviet era was also marked by physical violence and brutality that
included exiles, deportations, disappearances, forced conscription into the Red
Army, and executions. Important to note, however, is that these brutalities were
inflicted by the Soviet regime on Russians and Russophones just as they were
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on the titular populations of USSR republics and satellite nations. But for ethnic
Estonians the Soviet legacy of physical, political, and cultural violence was
associated with Russophones broadly construed, an outlook that had major
implications for the Estonian nation-state after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
Upon re-establishing independence in 1991, Estonian nationalist elites set
about “establishing social structures aimed at perpetuating cultural distinctions”
between the titular majority and Russophone minority, which was cast as a group
of interlopers who did not belong—simply a remnant of the illegal Soviet
occupation (Kolossov 2003, 252; Laitin 2003). The marginalization of
Russophone culture and language was legitimized by the new Estonian
government through discourses of righting historical wrongs, acting for the selfdetermination and sociocultural preservation of the Estonian people, and
“stressing the European nature of Estonian identity, a natural westward tilt that
for 40 years had been forcibly bent to Moscow’s will” (Merritt 2000, 247). The
socio-spatial division of ethnic Estonians and Russophones very notably
continues today, for instance, through the country’s school system, which, as
alluded to above, provides both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium primary
and secondary education to accommodate the large Russophone enclaves in its
society.
The key elements of the Estonian nation-building project have been
language policy and citizenship laws. Estonian replaced Russian as the lingua
franca throughout society, and the use of the Russian language was considered
a threat to the stability and integrity of the Estonian state (Pavlenko 2008;
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Kolossov 2003). The new Estonian citizenship laws dovetailed with language
policy through the new parameters established for naturalization, which included
an Estonian language exam.
When the USSR dissolved, so did Soviet citizenship. But citizenship in the
newly independent nation-states that emerged from the USSR was not
automatically extended to all residents of these new countries. Estonian
citizenship, for instance, was automatically extended to any resident who could
prove that their family resided in the Republic of Estonia before the Soviet and
Nazi occupations of World War II. This policy immediately legally and politically
alienated the majority of the Russophone population whose families moved to
Estonia during the Soviet years (often as a result of forced migration and
population transfer policies) and therefore were left with no citizenship at all. The
result was that 32 percent of Estonia’s population in 1992 was rendered
“stateless” (“Citizenship in Estonia” 2013). Residents of Estonia who could not
prove their family’s pre-war status would have to go through the naturalization
process to obtain legal citizenship, which included examinations “demonstrating
proficiency in the Estonian language and knowledge of the Estonian Constitution
and Citizenship law” (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006). Because of the dominance
of Russian and subsequent lack of need for the Estonian language during the
Soviet era, the majority of the stateless Russophone population had little or no
Estonian skills and therefore could not pass such naturalization exams easily or
soon after Estonia’s redeclaration of independence.
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Estonia’s Citizenship Law and language policies caused great concern in
international circles, especially in Brussels, (as Estonia was an EU candidate
country in the 1990’s and early 2000’s), for encroaching upon the rights of the
Russophone minority (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Brosig 2008). Thus,
“constrained by international oversight [and] political reality” Estonia began
making legislative moves to liberalize policy. In 1998, significantly, the Estonian
parliament amended the Citizenship Act to allow parents who are stateless but
had lived in the country for at least five years to request citizenship through
naturalization for any children born after 26 February 19921.
Shortly thereafter, the Estonian government implemented the first
Estonian State Integration Programme, which ran from 2000 to 2008 (Laitin
2003, 197). The chief goal of the first Integration Programme was to address the
issue of statelessness amongst Estonian residents (“Integration in Estonian
Society” 2013). Specifically, citizenship and naturalization legislation was altered
to reduce the amount of time required to process citizenship applications and the
government made reimbursement for the cost of Estonian language lessons
available to at least 3,000 people per year. The most significant legislative move
for young people in Estonia was the bestowal of citizenship at birth to any child
with at least one Estonian citizen parent. This was followed by the second phase
of the State Integration Programme, which has run from 2008-2013, and which
aims to “ensure rapid modernization of society in the context of accession to the
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Children who are naturalized under this amendment are not subject to the exam requirements
of the Citizenship Law.
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European Union, while preserving both stability and commitment to the protection
and continued development of Estonian culture.”
While the effectiveness of the Integration Programmes has been debated
(Brosig 2008; Kulu and Tammaru 2004), the number of naturalized citizens in
Estonia has increased noticeably since 2000. However, the presence of 84,494
stateless residents (6.5 percent of the population) in 2011 “indicates the
persistence of a major unresolved problem” (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006,
651). These mixed assessments of the first two phases of the State Integration
Programme, together with the Estonian government’s announcement of a third
phase of the State Integration Programme (2014-2018), demonstrates that
integration in Estonia is an uneven process, subject to the vagaries of individual
experiences with multiple discourses of identity and belonging and contemporary
Estonia.
The Integration Programmes have focused heavily on primary and
secondary education in Estonia. Although the education system is still divided
between Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools, the Integration
Programmes have implemented a controversial “60 percent” rule that requires 60
percent of all classes in secondary schools, regardless of language medium,
must be taught in the Estonian language. According to the Estonian government
this policy is “demand driven” and necessary to ensure that “all permanent
residents of Estonia, irrespective of their ethnic origin… are able to lead a
fulfilling life by participating in the societal, economic, and cultural life of the
country” (“Integration in Estonian Society” 2013). Furthermore, the policy dictates
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that all secondary school history and civics courses must be taught in Estonian.
The “60 percent” rule has caused friction between the Estonian government and
Russophone population for several reasons. First, many teachers in Russianmedium schools were pedagogically trained in the Soviet era and therefore do
not have the Estonian language skills to teach the required courses in Estonian.
The Estonian government has provided language training for Russophone
instructors, but the problem persists (Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Brosig 2008;
Toots 2003). Furthermore, although Russian-medium primary schools are
required to teach Estonian as a second language to its students, the lengthy and
uneven implementation of such policies, combined with teacher language skill
issues, has resulted in many Russophone students entering secondary school
without the Estonian skills needed to effectively absorb 60 percent of their
curricula in Estonian.
Despite Estonia’s efforts to liberalize citizenship laws, promote integration
of majority and minority populations, and comply with European Union
regulations regarding minority rights in member states, socio-spatial divisions
remain present in Estonian society. The complex interaction of varying
discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging are particularly evident in
Tallinn because it is home to 30 percent of Estonia’s entire population and is the
only city to have sizable numbers of both the Estonian titular majority and
Russophone minority. Ethnocultural tensions have flared in Tallinn, most recently
and violently during the Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007. Riots and looting erupted
in Tallinn’s city center in the middle of the night on 26 April 2007 when the
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Estonian government dismantled and relocated the Bronze Soldier War
Memorial, a Soviet-era monument commemorating the Red Army’s “liberation” of
Estonia from Nazi Germany. The issue of whether the USSR “liberated” or
“occupied” Estonia at the end of WWII remains a highly contentious issue
between the Estonian and Russophone communities. Many, if not most,
Estonians viewed the Bronze Soldier’s presence in Tallinn’s city center as an
incorrect, illegitimate public display of Soviet “victory” that was no more than an
occupation. The Estonian government’s previous discussions of relocating the
monument, which is also a gravesite for Red Army soldiers who perished in
Tallinn during World War II, generated intense resistance amongst the
Russophone community because of the Bronze Soldier’s “importance…as a
place of Russian national honor and symbol of victory” (Kattago 2009, 159). The
Estonian government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier in April 2007 to
the Defense Forces Cemetery, a “less controversial place,” turned out to be an
extremely controversial decision that highlighted the complex interaction of the
many and varying discourses of citizenship, identity, and belonging that exist on
a daily basis in Tallinn.
These political, cultural, and social histories are the contexts in which
belonging, identity, and citizenship are negotiated in contemporary Estonia. The
national conflicts that emerged after the breakup of the USSR have attracted
significant scholarly attention in the 1990’s and 2000’s (Pavlenko 2008; Megoran
2004; Kolossov 2003; Berg 2000; Skalnik Leff 1998; G. Smith and Wilson 1997).
This dissertation builds on that research while broadening the discussion beyond
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the question of post-Soviet identity. It considers how this process has been
shaped in part by a wider set of processes in Europe relating to the acceptance
of multicultural discourse and the reconfiguration of rights and identities through
the EU. Tallinn’s young people represent fertile ground for addressing theoretical
issues of belonging, identity, and citizenship within a society that is divided along
ethnocultural lines, subject to competing historical memories, and negotiating
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism on a daily basis.

The Arguments
While over nearly of the student respondents and every teacher
respondent hold Estonian (and therefore EU) citizenship, they exhibit remarkably
diverse understandings of what identities are associated with substantive
national citizenship. Broad patterns and similarities in the responses, however,
can be detected along the ethnolinguistic lines that socio-spatially divide Estonia.
The conceptual framework developed in this dissertation draws on the
complexities of the study population’s responses to demonstrate and explain the
following theoretical points:

1. The tensions between the universalism of liberal-democratic citizenship
and the particularisms of the Estonian nation-building project permeate,
and are permeated by, post-national and multicultural modes of
citizenship. Discourses of post-national and multicultural citizenship, which
aim to address cultural diversity and alleviate conflicts between majority
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and minority groups, actually complicate and multiply the particularisms
that delineate belonging and citizenship. This calls into question whether
the inherent tensions between universalisms and particularisms can be
alleviated at all.
2. Young people are subject to multiple and often contradictory discourses of
citizenship and identity in their everyday spaces, particularly in the school.
Teacher attitudes serve to mediate the manner in which discourses of
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism are presented to young
people in the classroom. Importantly, however, the discourses and
experiences that young people encounter in their everyday personal
geographies, such as homes, neighborhoods, and city landscapes, are
equally influential. Young people are more likely to demonstrate
internalization of discourses that they have meaningfully experienced in
multiple spaces rather than what they are taught in school.
3. Urban space is particularly significant to the delineation of belonging,
identity, and citizenship in divided societies. Memorialized landscapes,
displays of banal nationalism, and the ascription of meanings to particular
neighborhoods perpetuate and mediate the projection of hegemonic
narratives and identities and the marginalization of minority narratives and
identities.
4. Young people’s positionalities within the nation-state as members of the
majority or minority group affects the way in which European Union
citizenship and European identity is conceptualized, understood, and
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asserted. In other words, the sociopolitical inclusion or exclusion that
young people experience based on their ethnolinguistic identity tempers
whether EU citizenship, Europeanness, and the attendant rights and
opportunities are couched in terms of either supplementing or substituting
for their Estonian citizenships. These varying postionalities of young
people influence the way they plan for and think about future plans to
migrate within Europe, implying that citizenships are intersecting rather
than one form of citizenship simply replacing another.

These theoretical points suggest that national, post-national, and
multicultural citizenships coexist and interact in complex ways with each other
rather than existing as discrete entities at different scales. Citizenships, from this
perspective, are dynamic political relationships, ideals, and discourses that affect
and are affected by each other. Moreover, this complex interaction indicates that
individuals’ negotiations of their various citizenships will depend upon their
unique experiences at and perceptions of the urban, national, and post-national
levels. Subsequently, theoretical abstractions of citizenship, identity, and
belonging must consider diverse individual conceptualizations that occur within
broad patterns identified amongst groups.
This dissertation focuses on the ways that young people conceive of and
ascribe identities, conceptualize citizenships, and understand the terms of
belonging at multiple scales as a result of their movements within and through
the everyday spaces and places of their personal geographies. The joint
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examination of the coexistence and interaction of multi-scalar citizenship and
identity discourses diverges from existing theoretical engagements which tend to
address national, post-national, and multicultural discourses separately from one
another and view these as trends that have definitively reconfigured “modern
citizenship.” This study moves beyond the views of proponents and skeptics of
these various discourses by showing the simultaneity of multiple forms, ideals,
and discourses of citizenship, painting a much murkier picture than what can be
found in some of the contemporary literature. The analysis presented in this
dissertation suggests that young people’s conceptualizations of various
citizenships and identities neither develop discretely from each other nor evolve
in one space, but are established via complicated interactions of multi-scalar
discourses within and through multiple spaces, including those of the everyday.

Organization of this Dissertation
Chapter Two of this dissertation reviews theoretical approaches to
citizenship, identity, civic education, youth geographies, cultural landscape, and
urban geographies from multi-scalar perspectives including the national, postnational, supranational, and multicultural. This review of the literature constructs
the theoretical framework that guides the analysis of this empirical study.
Chapter Three provides a methodological overview of the study. This
chapter discusses the qualitative methods used to gather and analyze the data
collected during fieldwork. It also discusses the characteristics of the study
population and the methods used to recruit the study participants. It also briefly
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addresses researcher reflexivity and power dynamics between the interviewer
and interviewee(s), and how these issues influence data collection and analysis.
Chapters Four, Five, and Six draw on focus groups and interviews to
examine the ways that young people’s encounters with different discourses in
different spaces inform and are informed by their conceptualizations of
citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonian society. Chapter Four investigates
the complicated ways that the tensions between discourses of nationalism, postnationalism, and multiculturalism manifest themselves in the space of the school
and in students’ narratives of identity and belonging in Estonia. It pays special
attention to the teachers’ descriptions of how they present citizenship discourses
in their classrooms and compares them to the students’ narratives of how they
understand citizenships and belongings. This chapter discusses how the things
that students are taught in school about citizenship and belonging are mediated
by their experiences in other everyday spaces. Chapter Five extends this
analysis by addressing bordering practices that the student participants engage
in while navigating everyday spaces. It focuses in particular on how language
spaces interact with the built environment of the city to shape students’
encounters with and negotiations of belonging and citizenship in Tallinn. Young
people, it is demonstrated, actively conceptualize and contest citizenship and
identity in Tallinn through their varied experiences in the divided spaces of the
city. Finally, Chapter Six investigates the student participants’ engagements with
EU discourses of supranational citizenship and identity. It examines the students’
perceptions of their EU citizenships through the lens of their positionalities in the
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national community as part of either the Estonian majority or the Russophone
minority.
Taken together, these three chapters suggest that young people’s
conceptualizations of citizenships and identities are negotiated in the context of
inherent tensions between universalisms and particularisms that are present in
multi-scalar discourses of citizenships and belongings. Although multiculturalism
(framed as tolerance) is present in the student descriptions of terms of belonging
and exclusion in Estonia, Europe, and the city of Tallinn, particularisms pervade
their narratives of everyday negotiation of the spaces of citizenship in a sociospatially divided society. While the space of the school is a crucial site for the
development and understanding of citizenships and identities for young people, it
must be situated within the wider context of young people’s personal
geographies outside of the classroom in order to render a comprehensive,
thorough assessment of youth conceptualizations of belonging at multiple scales.
In particular, the mediation of young people’s ideas of national and post-national
citizenships takes place within and through urban spaces on a daily basis,
indicating that the citizenships at various scales are not neatly stacked in a
hierarchy, but coexist complexly at many scales.
A concluding chapter summarizes the theoretical arguments made in the
dissertation and draws out suggestions made by this analysis for understanding
youth geographies of citizenship, identity, and belonging in divided societies
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This dissertation explores how different modes of citizenship in
contemporary Europe intersect and shape the lives of young people. I start with
the premise that despite the language of universalism, the parameters of
citizenship are defined by particularisms that marginalize and exclude certain
individuals and groups. The particularisms of a society’s dominant group become
naturalized and are therefore framed as the “universal” traits of citizens. The
universalization of the dominant group’s culture and customs creates an impetus
for minority groups to adopt assimilatory practices or be subject to sociopolitical
marginalization, exclusion, and alienation. In this dissertation I use this premise
to investigate the identities of young Estonians not only in terms of belonging to
their national community, but also to the European community.
Young people in Estonia, and indeed throughout Europe, are implicated in
multiple political projects with varying objectives. Discourses of national, postnational, and multicultural identities and citizenships circulate within and through
young people’s everyday spaces, especially the space of the school. These
varied and often contradictory discourses are normally examined as discrete
processes, but this dissertation argues that discourses of nationalism,
Europeaness, and multiculturalism in fact operate simultaneously and are thrown
together in different contexts. As a result, young people must sort through and
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assemble multiple conceptions of citizenship and social membership. This
dissertation discusses the nature of the varying discourses of citizenship that
Estonian young people encounter, the spaces in which they are encountered,
and the ways in which the interplay of different discourses shape young people’s
articulations of belonging and identity. The discussion is aimed at contributing to
wider discussions of young people’s understandings of belonging and identity
and contemporary modalities of citizenship in Europe.
In the modern nation-state era citizenship and national identity have often
overlapped to the extent that the terms are taken to be synonymous.
Conceptions of nation and national identity have often drawn upon ethnocultural
markers, accentuating some social divisions while diminishing others already
present in societies. The granting of citizenship along the lines of such national
identities has given these societal divisions legal and political dimensions,
resulting in the further marginalization of non-assimilating minority groups. In
recent decades configurations of national identity and citizenship have shifted,
becoming de-coupled from ethnicity. These configurations, developed largely in
the context of post-World War II Western Europe and America, have increasingly
tied citizenships to residency, rather than to membership in an ethnocultural
group. This shift has taken place in the context of the creation of supranational,
transnational, and global/cosmopolitan identities and citizenships. Policy-makers,
EU leaders, educational professionals, and scholars assert ideas of
multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism as essential in a globalized and globalizing
world. However, ethnonationalisms have never disappeared, compelling scholars
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to investigate the ways in which groups, individuals, and states navigate and
negotiate multiple and, sometimes, conflicting conceptions of belonging, identity,
and citizenship in divided societies.
Academic studies of citizenship and identity have often implicitly focused
on adults and the implications of exclusionary citizenship forms and practices
affecting access to employment, housing, and social services. In the past
decade, however, scholars have begun to address more explicitly and
specifically the active role young people play in the development of their own
identities and conceptions of citizenships. This small but growing body of work
argues for the recognition of young people as capable, active agents rather than
passive ‘citizens in waiting’ that are dictated to by adults. Within the framework of
political geography theory, studies of youth geographies focus on the sites and
spaces in which young people learn about and encounter and experience
identity, belonging, and the meaning of citizenship. The roles of civic education
and school spaces are, along with the home, crucial sites of learning and
performing identities and community membership. As such, much of the analysis
of youth political geographies is centered on the spaces of formal education. But
the personal geographies of youths outside of school and the home are also
beginning to be recognized as critical sites of identity formation and
performances of citizenship—thus, analyses of the urban space are being folded
in to the broader examination of young people’s worlds.
This review weaves together theories of citizenship, identity, belonging,
civic education, and urban spatiality, providing a theoretical framework to
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examine young people’s development and maintenance of identity and
citizenship in divided societies. Insights about citizenship and belonging provided
by young people are unique because youths encounter and engage multiple
discourses while they are in the world of adults, but not entirely of it. Young
people are situated within political communities where their capacities for formal
political and legal interaction are dependent upon adults.
But formal limits on young people’s political agency do not remove their
ability to negotiate, interpret, and contest the discourses they encounter in the
adult world. Young people contend with discourses set by adults—such as their
families, educational officials, and policy-makers—but actively negotiate and
interpret these discourses within the context of their own lives and for their own
purposes. This negotiation results in the performance of different, highly
contextualized identities and citizenships that are influenced by the discourses of
adults but reflected through the prism of young people’s lives. In examining the
spatiality of young people’s lives, we can develop a better understanding not only
of how youths come to conceive of belonging, identity, and citizenship, but also
of how citizenship in general forms and is formed by complexly interacting
discourses of societal membership. Finally, it pays particular attention to the
multi-scalar nature of the sites and spaces in which young people encounter
discourses of belonging, identity, and citizenship.
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Identity, Citizenship, and the Politics of Belonging
Theories of identity and of citizenship are bound up together, informing by
one another. Identity and citizenship are both inclusionary and exclusionary
constructs that delineate insiders and outsiders as well as what attributes define
those who belong and those who do not. Citizenship theories, traditionally
concerned with the narrow parameters of formal membership in a bounded
political territory, especially rights and responsibilities, have expanded in recent
decades to include discussion of socio-cultural identities and the ways these
mediate access to and exercise of rights that exist on levels other than the
nation-state. Therefore, understanding identity formation has become central to
understanding the construction of citizenship.
Contemporary scholarship understands identity to be a social construction
rather than an a priori characteristic (Paasi 2001; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012)
and to be both performative and discursive in nature- that is to exist in the realm
of language and ideology and in the realm of social, spatial, and institutional
practices (Jenkins 2000; Paasi 2003; Newman and Paasi 1998; Entrikin 1999;
Merritt 2000). Identity, at a fundamental level, is a relational concept: it involves
defining oneself in relation to some “other”, “us” in relation to “them” (Browning
and Christou 2010; Kolossov 2003; Paasi 2002; Jenkins 2000; Delanty 2006;
Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). Groups uphold such distinctions through borders
and bordering practices that are simultaneously spatial, social, temporal, and
discursive (Newman and Paasi 1998). Borders, in this sense, are instruments of
power that make the inclusion of “insiders” and exclusion of “outsiders” visible
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and real (Paasi 2001; Delanty 2006). As products of human agency, borders can
achieve a degree of fixity, but they also shift over time, re-shaping the
identity(ies) of those included and excluded, as well as relationships and
interactions between groups (Delanty 2006).
The construction of an identity is a process of binding people together and
creating solidarity between them. The ways in which identities are learned,
accepted, and ascribed are myriad. Families are one important sphere of identity
formation; as Jenkins states “we know who we are…because, a long time
ago…other people told us” (Jenkins 2000, 15). Identities are also continuously
produced and reproduced through education systems and curricula, in historical
narratives, public rituals and monuments, art, literature, and other media
(Newman and Paasi 1998; Kolossov 2003; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004; Berg
and Oras 2000; Delanty 2006; Murphy 2002). Dominant identities come to
saturate societies, becoming so ubiquitous that they seem natural and banal
(Billig 1995). Those who do not assimilate, whether by choice or discrimination,
face the disciplinary power of dominant groups. At times though, the
subordinated and the unassimilated can challenge exclusionary practices and
alter identities from within. In short, while identities uphold systems of privilege,
they can also be mobilized to press claims for inclusion. Identities, in this sense,
are not static or singular, but dynamic, multiple, and context dependent.
Identities are given material and symbolic structure through their
geographies (Rose 1997). Individuals and groups use discourses and narratives
to spatialize the definitions of identity and, subsequently, understand the terms of
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belonging and exclusion through space, place, and landscape (Keith and Pile
1993). The discourses of “power ridden social relations” produce “particular
spatialities” that articulate identities “by giving them spatial form” (Rose 1997, 2).
Discourses of “‘race,’ gender, sexuality, and nation (and by extension, class,
ablebodiedness and so on)” (Rose 1997, 2) produce multiple identities and,
subsequently, spatialities of identities. Individuals, then, have “multiple and
sometimes contradictory subject positions, and are sometimes torn between
identifications, often moving between identifications in different situations and
places” (Pratt 1998, 27; Yuval-Davis 2006; K. Anderson 1987; Mahtani 2001)
The processes of power relations work to produce spaces and places
where identities are enacted and negotiated in different ways by different
individuals and groups (Massey 1995; Pratt 1998). Hegemonic discourses
manifest hegemonic entities and work to organize space, privileging dominant
identities and relegating minority identities to the margins of society. The power
relations that “produce bounded areas” of identity have marked implications for
“those who are contained and enact their identities within” those spaces (Pratt
1998, 31). Discourses of power and the politics of identity mark the spatialities of
dominant identities as spaces of belonging, thereby organizing spaces—and
access to them—according to hegemonic identity processes. Dominant
discourses and identities, however, are processes that can be challenged and
contested by. Spaces of belonging, like the identities associated with them, are
“dynamic process[es], not reified fixities,” and may be “stable, contested, or
transient” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199).
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As individuals ascribe multiple identities to themselves and to others, they
are often negotiating multiple spaces of belonging simultaneously. Individuals
and groups perform many identities simultaneously as they move through the
spaces of their everyday lives, but the politics of identity will affect how each
individual or group performs these identities (Keith and Pile 1993). Several
scholars have observed how “different aspects of identity come to the fore in
different contexts” and spaces (Pratt 1998, 32). Empirical studies have
demonstrated that people’s “concrete social locations are constructed along
multiple axes of difference” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 200), and that they will
emphasize or suppress certain aspects of their identities, such as class (Pratt
1998), ethnocultural heritage (Leonard 2006; Secor 2003), and religion (K.
Mitchell 2006a) in order to navigate and cross the borders of spaces of belonging
and exclusion.
The contemporary literature on identity has demonstrated that the
complexity of the interactions between power relations and social boundaries
account for the changeable nature of identities and their spatialities. But the fact
that identity can be said to be an always-becoming, dynamic process does not
negate the realities of boundaries in space and place that are crucial to identity
formation “and its complement, the production of difference” (Pratt 1998, 27).
Geraldine Pratt (1998, 27, 35) describes the spatialities of various identities as
“grids of difference” that are complexly situated at varying scales. These grids
are bounded places that “can stabilize identities or, alternatively, open up the
potential” for cross-boundary movement and communication (Pratt 1998, 44).
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Individuals’ movements within and across the borders of grids of difference, she
argues, illustrate the complex nature of identity as both located and mobile, and
the complex nature of bounded spaces of belonging/exclusion as both palpable
and changeable. People’s negotiations within and through grids of difference
may serve to challenge or reinforce boundaries of identity spaces, promote
progressive change or protect the status quo, and fragment identities or solidify
them. The concept of grids of difference provides a framework within to
acknowledge both the structure of identity spaces and the potential for those
structures to be shaped and reshaped by power relations.
Pratt’s conceptualization of grids of difference as the spaces and places
where identities are enacted and subjectivities negotiated demonstrates how
crucial identities and their spatialities are to understandings of citizenship. The
recognition that identities become associated with spaces of belonging and
exclusion, the center and margin, and insider/outsider status illuminates the ways
in which societies become divided and the ways in which the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship are accessed and demanded. Recognizing the
processes by which citizenship itself serves as a particular form of identity that is
bound up with state power and access to rights allows for a more nuanced and
comprehensive understandings of how individuals and groups are included or
excluded from accessing rights in contemporary nation-states.
Many types of identities figure with people’s claims to rights and political
membership in nation-states. The processes and performances of myriad
identities—national, ethnic, class, and religious, among many others—that
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structure individuals’ and groups’ social locations take place within the politicallegal framework of the contemporary nation-state. Examining the ways in which
young people develop and understand notions of belonging and exclusion in
terms of citizenship reveals the ways in which their movements within and
through grids of difference and their performances of varying identities both
shape, and are shaped by, political structures of the nation-state that permeate
daily life. The following sections address the ways in which citizenship, as an
identity, is configured in the contemporary world, how it structures the ways in
which people navigate their daily geographies, and the ways in which it affects
peoples’ access to political, social, and civil rights.

Citizenship
From the ancient Greek polis and the Roman Republic to the modern
nation-state system and globalizing world, citizenship has been an institution that
confers rights on and demands duties from members of a political community.
Historically, citizenship has been connected to the territorial space of a bounded
political unit—i.e. the rights and duties of citizenship are both established and
acted upon within the space of a sovereign, bounded polity (Painter and Philo
1995).
Traditionally, citizenship implied politico-legal rights that entitled the bearer
to protections within the polity and demanded politico-legal duties (of widely
varying degrees) to society (R. Smith 2002; Dagger 2002; Schuck 2002;
Lefebvre 2003; Isin and Turner 2002; Heater 1999; Isin 2002). Academic
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literature in the twentieth century conceptualized citizenship as a body of rights
including civil and social rights and duties in addition to political ones (Marshall
1964); citizenship has often been seen as becoming more expansive over time,
encompassing more rights and applying more widely across society. National
citizenship configurations in Western liberal democratic societies have contended
with and extended beyond-political rights inconsistently and unevenly throughout
the history (Marston 1990; Yuval-Davis 2006; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004). But
the concept of a comprehensive space of citizenship rights and obligations is
ubiquitous enough that a number of policy makers and scholars “equate genuine
citizenship with full possession of all three types of rights: civil, political, and
social” (R. Smith 2002, 110).
Contemporary theorizations of citizenship have moved beyond a rightsfocused discussion to interrogate the scales at which communities are defined
and the ways in which membership in communities is defined, regulated, and
applied (Hobsbawm 1990; Billig 1995; Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005;
Staeheli 2008; R. Smith 2002). The contemporary body of scholarship on
citizenship represents myriad conceptualizations of the nature of community,
rights, and duties, but the concern common to these scholars is the examination
of the how power, politics, and identity interact to include and exclude individuals
and/or groups from access to rights.
The concept of citizenship has always implied an entitlement to rights, an
expectation of duties, and “participatory practices and contestations in the public
sphere” that allow citizens to make claims (Soysal 1997, 510; R. Smith 2002;
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Heater 1999; Painter and Philo 1995). Citizenship has always been presented as
a status that not only connotes that the bearer possesses rights and duties
(Marston 1990; Yegen 2008), but also that those without that status do not
possess those rights and duties (Bosniak 2000; Marshall 1964; Hughes 2005).
Citizenship defines “us here” from “them there” requiring both difference and
space for its constitution (Isin 2002; Painter and Philo 1995; Desforges, Jones,
and Woods 2005). As an inherently spatial institution, citizenship dictates access
to the space of rights, the nature of rights and duties within that space (Marshall
1964; Soysal 1997), and the nature of the community guaranteeing the rights
(Benhabib 2007; Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Staeheli 2008).
Because citizenship is membership of a particular community, defining
what the characteristics of a community member are (and are not) is a crucial
and fundamental process in the creation citizenship. Establishing which
individuals and/or groups are included within the community requires the
delimiting of “the community.” In other words, creating the identity of a community
creates the identity of the citizen (Painter and Philo 1995). As the contemporary
world political system is separated into nation-states, the most influential process
of creating the identity of the citizen has been the creation of nations and national
identity.

Identifying the Citizen: Nations and Nationalism
The construction of nations is a contentious, political process that involves
the ideological production of cultural sameness in a context of modern state
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formation. Benedict Anderson (2006) has argued that the establishment of
common consciousness between individuals in a modern era of print capitalism
and mass communication created “imagined communities.” Anderson argues that
such communities are “imagined” in the sense that individuals feel connected to
past, present, and future inhabitants of a territory they have not met and cannot
possibly meet. These imagined communities initially formed around common
language and then began to include ethnic, cultural, and heritable characteristics
that created a sense of commonality between members of the group. In
understanding themselves to be part of a nation, people view their commonality
as stretching across time and space—as rooted in the past and as continuing
into the future.
National communities establish identities via emphasis on the
commonality between its members that simultaneously bind them together and
distinguish the community from other groups. Michael Billig (1995) illuminates the
importance of the “Othering” process in nation-building, arguing that nations are
made real when they are defined against other national communities. National
communities are not stand alone entities, but rely on the presence of Other
national groups to define their space of existence. The commonality that is the
foundation for community is derived from myriad social, cultural, economic, and
political factors that interact within that community. Nationality is simultaneously
the “marker of inclusion” in a community and the “justification for exclusion” from
it (Staeheli 2008, 9). The processes of masking difference and promoting the
image of a homogenous polity are crucial not only to essentialize the identity to
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the national community, but also to naturalize its connection to the territory it
occupies. For that reason, these processes of identity construction are constantly
operating activities, rather than one-off actions that often call upon specific
readings of history to naturalize the connection between national identity,
citizenship, and the state.
We can gather from the theories of Anderson and Billig that nation is
inherently spatial because it implies place as well as a community of people.
Historical accounts of a national community inhabiting a territory provide
justification for that nation’s sovereignty and political control over the territory
(Agnew 2001). As a result of historical narratives, political control over territory
becomes essentialized as a fundamental part of a nation. These “constitutive
stories” naturalize the presence of the nation and give it legitimacy (R. Smith
2002, 109). National histories use social, cultural, and political elements to
naturalize the geography of national community and impart a spatial quality to
national identity. Because memory and history are hegemonically produced and
maintained, the group in power determines the “official” history of a nation (K.
Mitchell 2003). The ways in which a national history is cast will have great impact
on the territory the nation exercises sovereign political control over.
Historical narratives play a vital role in the conflation of the nation and the
state because they construct an intrinsic connection between the nation and
sovereign control of territory. This connection tends not only to naturalize
categories of belonging, but subsequently, also entitlement to political rights from
the state (Murphy 2002). The importance of national identity is realized in this
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essentialization because any individual with the proper identity markers of the
ruling nation will automatically be included in the political community. Political
membership in a state has therefore often hinged on the identity markers of the
nation, such as language, ethnicity, and race (Billig, 1995).

Political Rights and National Citizenship
It is readily apparent from the literature that both the conception of a
nation based on common ethnocultural, heritable traits and the definition based
on common ideas for governance of the people have had, and continue to have,
real and lasting effects on the granting, performance, and maintenance of
national citizenship. The critical literature on nationalism exposes the highly
contested and complex nature of national identities and establishes that national
consciousness emerges neither quickly nor easily (Hall 1996; Billig 1995; Till
2005; Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004). National identities are far from stable,
homogenous characterizations, but are rather constantly subject to competing
historical narratives, internal power politics, contradictions of performance, and
cross-cutting allegiances (Hall 1996). However, while the nation is constantly in
flux there is a concerted effort by contemporary liberal democratic states to
naturalize identities and give them the appearance of universality. It is at this
point that national identity, as defined by those in power, intersects with the
status of citizenship to naturalize, essentialize, and enfranchise some individuals
and groups while excluding, alienating, and marginalizing others.
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Universal Citizenship and Particular Identities
By the late nineteenth century the linkage between national identity and
citizenship had become well established, as had the use of universal, inclusive
terms to obscure the highly particular, exclusionary practices of citizenship
(Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). Universalist vocabularies of
citizenship have always been central to liberal democratic citizenship (Lefebvre
2003; Ipperciel 2007). Post-War sociopolitical developments in the West
compelled marginalized and politically alienated groups to assert their right to
“full citizenship status—that is, equal political and civil rights” with increasing
frequency and fervor (Young 1989, 250). As discussed by Marshall (1964), these
post-War conditions prompted the expansion of rights and their extension to
previously marginalized groups such as women, working classes, and minorities.
However, the achievement of full formal national citizenship status has not
translated into freedom and equality for all individuals and groups, compelling
scholars to interrogate and challenge the extent to which universal citizenship is
actually universal.
“The ideal of universal citizenship” has driven the “emancipatory
momentum of modern political life” and assumes that the status of citizen not
only entitles fundamental rights to the bearer, but also that the bearer will have
equal access to the spaces of said rights (Young 1989, 250). Young’s
classification of universal citizenship as an ideal rather than an objective reality
stems from the fact that unfettered access to political, civil, and social rights and
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the ability to interact meaningfully in a shared public sphere remains to be
realized (S. J. Smith 1989).
Universality of citizenship is a “core tenet of liberal citizenship theory”
(Bosniak 2000, 377) that conceives citizenship in individualistic, rights-based
terms (Schuck 2002). IM Young (1989, 250) has argued that the “universal”
assumption in modern conceptions of citizenship is “citizenship for all.” If all
members of a political community have the same citizenship then:
“that citizenship status transcends particularity and difference.
Whatever the social or group differences among citizens, whatever
their inequalities of wealth, status, and power in the everyday
activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status
as peers in the political public.”
This universal equality that comes with citizenship status is an “equality
conceived as sameness”—an equality that is based on generality and
commonality amongst citizens rather than particularity and difference. Moreover,
such a universal citizenship implies that rights and duties within the political
community, such as laws and rules, are “blind to individual and group difference”
and as such are impartially applied to everyone (Young 1989, 250; Young 1990;
Yuval-Davis 1997; Yegen 2008).
Equality conceived as sameness is necessary to the modern Western
political system because it works toward achieving a homogenous citizenry that
has a unified general will for the polity (Yuval-Davis 1997; R. Smith 2002). Both
liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship cast difference as a threat to
freedom and stability in society (Calhoun 1997; Schuck 2002; R. Smith 2002),
holding that “the particular can only corrupt the universal” (Laclau 1992, 84;
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emphasis in original) or at least fragment it. In the modern nation-state
‘homogenous citizenry’ is built upon the foundation of the national community
(Yuval-Davis 1997; B. Anderson 2006; Yegen 2008), which exposes the
inherently exclusionary nature of the ostensibly “universal” and equal national
citizenship. Because national identity and citizenship are both built upon
exclusionary practices, such that claims of universality and inclusiveness are in
fact obscuring foundations of particularity and difference (Painter and Philo 1995;
Jenkins 2000; Entrikin 1999; Laclau 1992; Lefebvre 2003).
Theoretical debates regarding the universality of citizenship have informed
and been informed by empirical studies exploring the alienation of certain
individuals and groups in Western liberal capitalist societies (Wemyss 2006;
Aasland and Flotten 2001; Isin 2002; Laclau 1992; Marston 1990; S. J. Smith
1989; Young 1989; Young 1990; Yuval-Davis 1993; Secor 2007; Staeheli 2008).
This literature raises significant points regarding the ways that the ideal of
universality of citizenship subsumes social and cultural difference under the
paradigm of equality and works to perpetuate the marginalization of Others
through the politics of identity and belonging.
Firstly, and as previously noted, this literature reveals the ways in which
citizenship is a status and membership that is bestowed upon those with the
accepted identity markers. Within political communities, the particular traits of the
dominant group in society become naturalized and universal (Laclau 1992;
Young 1989). These naturalized identities come to be taken for granted as
“inherent” to members of the political community, making the bestowal of
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citizenship status contingent upon performance of the particularities of a
hegemonic group. The gendered, racialized, ethnicized, and religious
considerations that construct the borders between insiders and outsiders, those
who belong and who do not, are asserted as neutral, universal markers of a
citizen’s identity (R. Smith 2002; Marston 1990). The result of such politics of
identity is that the ideal of universal citizenship becomes a mechanism through
which hegemonic ideologies are advanced (Young 1990) and those deemed “too
different” or “unassimilable” are positioned outside of the boundaries of
citizenship and, thus, unable to fully access the space of rights in a community.
A second point raised by this literature is that the universal extension of
formal citizenship rights in liberal democracies maintains the appearance and
assumption that not only are those rights substantively distributed (Holston 2008,
7), but also that all citizens are “in a position to avail themselves of these rights in
a meaningful way” (Bosniak 2000, 378; emphasis mine). This assumption
obscures the ways in which the politics of identity and belonging intercede to
alienate certain individuals and groups based on ethnic, cultural, gender,
religious, social, and/or class-based differences (Yuval-Davis 2006; Yegen
2008).
Lastly, several scholars note that nationalism becomes “the most
frequently troubling instance of identity politics writ large” (Calhoun 1997, 80)
because of its “historical alliance” with the “discourse of citizenship” (Yegen
2008, 103). The identity politics of ethnonationalisms may seem more overtly
exclusionary because of their bounding of the nation-state along ethnocultural
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and heritable lines (Aasland and Flotten 2001; Hughes 2005), but civic
nationalisms that are based on common adherence to political practices and
ideas also serve to exclude individuals and groups from the community (Dagger
2002; Ipperciel 2007; Lefebvre 2003). Nationalisms are actively constructed as
the particular ideologies of dominant groups become universalized as the
ideologies of the community, subsequently, the citizen.
This literature has generated attention to the outcomes of identity politics
in national communities. Such scholarship not only deconstructs hegemonic
identity politics as they relate to national citizenship, but also reexamines the
constant contestation and negotiation of identities and belongings that
characterizes modern societies.
For individuals and groups who hold formal citizenship but fall outside of
the dominant group’s identity parameters, substantive citizenship often remains
elusive. The inequality that survives within nation-states in spite of a universal
extension of formal political citizenship is what Young describes as the “paradox
of democracy” (1989, 259). In large part due to the naturalization and
essentialization of the dominant group’s identity and its equation with the identity
of the citizen, certain citizens are simply more powerful than others even when
political rights are universal. This is an imbalance of social power where, as
George Orwell’s pigs assert, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more
equal than others” (Orwell 1997, 92).
The result of persistent imbalances between citizens is what Holston
(2008) describes as a “differentiated citizenship,” where differences, rather than
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commonalities, are emphasized through the dominant group’s appropriation of
spaces of meaningful citizenship for only those individuals who possess the right
identities. Holston’s extensive research in Brazil demonstrates that configurations
of citizenship that are “universally inclusive in membership and massively
inegalitarian in distribution” are particularly conducive to the reproduction of the
inequalities of substantive power within nation-states (Holston 2008, 7). In nationstates where the blend of civic nationalism and ethnonationalism is particularly
fraught, social and ethnocultural differences are used to “distribute different
treatment to different categories of citizens” (Holston 2008, 7)
In such nation-states social differences, such as education and
occupation, are affected and reproduced based on ethnocultural differences like
language. The interplay of such social and ethnocultural differences can
sometimes form a negative feedback loop that replicates majority/minority group
identities, further complicating any attempt to rectify differences in access to the
spaces of social, civil, and political rights (Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Secor 2007;
Faas 2011). The resultant differentiated citizenship “generates a graduation of
rights… in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens”
(Holston 2008, 7).
An entirely different kind of paradox emerges, then, when minority
individuals and groups with differentiated citizenships move to demand access to
spaces of political, social, and civil rights (e.g. education, employment, or
consistent application of law). Laclau argues that individuals and/or groups that
cannot or will not fully integrate into the nation-state—i.e. groups that maintain
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differentiated identity—can only make demands for truly equal access to rights by
deemphasizing their differentiated identity and appealing to the “universal
principles that [they] share with the rest of the community: the right to have
access to good schools, to live a decent life, to participate in the public space of
citizenship, etc.” (Laclau 1992, 89).
The realities of such uneven power dynamics in the modern Western
political system have prompted much discussion in academic literature on how
best to deal with the obvious heterogeneity of nation-states and the unequal
distribution of rights and duties that result. The implementation of multicultural
policies and discourses has been one way of addressing these problems and
resolving these tensions. However, as the next section will address, neither
scholars nor policy makers have a unified conceptualization of what
multiculturalism is or should be.

Multiculturalism and its Critics
The word “multiculturalism” is ubiquitous in contemporary Western
societies and yet there is no absolute, agreed upon understanding of what it is.
There are multicultural policies and practices in the political arena as well as
theoretical and conceptual discussions in the academic arena. Definitions of what
it means to be multicultural exist across the ideological spectrum but all notions
of multiculturalism revolve around recognition of difference. Multiculturalism’s
coexisting ubiquity and uncertainty, while seemingly contradictory and
counterproductive, are realities that are essential to understanding how
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multiculturalism has affected (and continues to affect) contemporary liberal
democratic societies and why there are simultaneous proclamations of its
success and failure.
Nagel and Hopkins (2010) provide a cogent representation of
multiculturalism that is conducive to understanding such a contested concept.
Multiculturalism, they argue, is more than “a particular philosophy of governing
diversity” but “represents the on-going disruption of ideas about nationhood and
culture and the articulation and negotiation of cultural differences by state and
non-state actors” (2010, 2). Operating from such an understanding allows for an
easier negotiation of the chaotic collection of propositions for dealing with cultural
diversity.
Contemporary multiculturalist policies emerged out of post-war emphases
on new and different approaches to cultural plurality and minority rights (Kymlicka
1995). Nagel and Hopkins (2010) identify concomitant processes that “led to the
reimagining of national communities” and the prompted a reassessment of how
citizenship rights and responsibilities are made available to individuals and
groups “marked as deviant and the other” (Young 1989, 268; Kymlicka 2007).
One process was a collective recognition in the wake of the destructive
nationalisms of the Second World War “that strident, militaristic ethnonationalism
could no longer have a place in a free, democratic West.” A second process was
the “emergence of civil rights and feminist movements” that “destabilized and
undermined deeply entrenched systems of discrimination in Western states”
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 3). These processes affected public policy and
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confronted uneven citizenship distribution not only amongst groups distinguished
by racial or ethnic difference, such as indigenous peoples, immigrant
populations, and national minorities (Carens 2000; Kymlicka 2007), but also
groups distinguished by religious, gender, and sexual differences (Yuval-Davis
2006; Nagel and Hopkins 2010; Marty 2007).
The increase in discussions of multiculturalism, its existence, success,
and failure within the past two decades specifically has been attributed to
“volatile disputes over the rights of… cultural minorities” in the West (Kymlicka
1995, 1; Wemyss 2006) and the eruption of ethnonationalist conflicts in the wake
of the collapse of the USSR (Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Heater 1999;
Pavlenko 2008; Laclau 1992; Hughes 2005; Kuus 2002). Underlying the debates
over multicultural policies and practices in Western societies is the tension
between the democratic principles of individual liberty and the wellbeing of
collective society. Although some scholars argue that these two principles need
not be seen as antagonistic toward each other (Benhabib 2002; Kymlicka 1995;
Carens 2000), the varying opinions on whether recognition of group difference is
the solution to the challenges posed by cultural plurality (Young 1989) or is the
death knell of a free society (Balint 2010) continue to permeate the
multiculturalism debate.
The following sections address the different forms of and attitudes toward
multiculturalist discourses and policies and how those forms and attitudes
manifest themselves in liberal democratic societies. The broader point being
made is that while the word “multiculturalism” may have been discredited in
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discourse and policy, its underlying concepts are not dead. Rather,
multiculturalism endures as an innocuous means of talking about cultural
difference. Multiculturalism may not be effective at integrating minorities, but its
discourse remains present under different vocabularies of addressing diversity
and difference.
Liberal multiculturalist theories that focus on recognizing group difference
and embracing cultural heterogeneity argue that universalistic configurations of
citizenship require assimilation of minority individuals and groups into political
communities shaped by “hegemonic, majoritarian” identities (Yuval-Davis 2006,
207; Carens 2000; Marty 2007). Multicultural theory and practice, in contrast, is
“designed to give recognition to, and to affirm, cultural diversity” by creating an
environment where performance of cultural difference in the public sphere would
not jeopardize access to the full spectrum of citizenship rights and responsibilities
(Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 4).
The scholarship favoring liberal multiculturalism asserts that suppression
of group difference in favor of emphasizing the commonalities of the citizenry will
severely restrict the ability of minority groups to meaningfully access rights and to
participate fully in society (Kymlicka 1995; Young 1989). Multicultural advocates
assert that protecting cultural difference is not an act that will threaten individual
liberty by giving recognition to groups, but rather is a protection of the right of all
individuals to have their own their own beliefs, ideas, identities and cultures
(Kymlicka 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006). Also, the positive recognition of difference is
consistent with the liberal citizen’s responsibility to respect the equality of their

	
  

45

fellow citizens (Modood 2007). Different citizens have different needs, and
measuring all individuals and groups against “neutral” behavioral and
performative citizenship norms, which are nothing more than the norms of the
privileged hegemon made natural, perpetuates discrimination and division
amongst the citizenry (Laclau 1992; Young 1989).
These perspectives on liberal multiculturalism maintain the importance of
positive recognition of group difference for substantive, meaningful citizenship in
contemporary societies. While liberal multiculturalism’s critics cite the continued
conflict and inequality amongst dominant and minority groups and threats to
social cohesion and national security as the “failure” of liberal multicultural
policies, its advocates maintain that such charges are “greatly exaggerated”
(Carens 2000, 88) and note the continued existence and prosperity of nationstates that have implemented such policies (Kymlicka 2007). Additionally, despite
the pronouncement of multiculturalism’s vast failures in Western societies, it “still
has a great deal of currency in everyday language” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2).
But whether the actual configurations and implementations of liberal
multiculturalist policies affect meaningful and substantive citizenships for minority
groups is hotly contested.
Critiques of multiculturalism have had great currency both in scholarly and
policy-related circles (Nagel and Hopkins 2010; Gill, Johnstone, and Williams
2012). Criticism of liberal multiculturalism has been vociferous and has come
from both ends of the ideological spectrum. Moreover, the proliferation of
counterarguments to liberal multicultural policy and theory has ensured that,
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even though it is being challenged, the issue of multiculturalism is still pervasive
in contemporary, everyday life.
One critique of liberal multiculturalism centers on a “social fragmentation”
or “Balkanization” argument. This line of thought posits that respect for and
recognition of group difference is a direct threat to the unity of the national polity
(Schlesinger 1998; Miller 1995; Phillips 2009). Furthermore, intense focus on
group specificity that bleeds into the arena of differentiated needs amongst the
citizenry will undermine the “common good”—a core tenet of liberal theory at the
base of all liberal democratic societies and the critical parts of republican thought.
A stable democracy is dependent upon a certain solidarity or universal character
to define, uphold, and protect the rights of citizens. The distillation of a
democratic society into separate cultural groups “crystallizes differences,
magnifies tensions, [and] intensifies hostilities” thereby threatening the freedom
of the citizenry (Schlesinger 1991, 2; Doppelt 2001; Phillips 2009; Zechenter
1997).
Still other critics argue that the inchoate character of liberal multiculturalist
policy has allowed for its relatively uncontested “shunting aside” in favor of
neoliberal, market-based conceptions of citizenship in many Western nations (K.
Mitchell 2006b; Carens 2000). These arguments typically come from a more
leftist perspective that recognizes the importance of groups but view
multiculturalism as hopelessly naive. These critics suggest that the inarticulate
yet routine nature of liberal multiculturalist principles has effected nonsensical,
mindless, and meaningless celebrations of cultural difference “while doing little to
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address deeply entrenched racism” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 5). Thomas (2008;
see also: El-Haj 2007) argues that this is particularly evident in schools, spaces
that are integral to the development of citizens who value diversity and respect
difference. “Uncontextualized and unexplained” discourses of multiculturalism
circulate in school curricula fostering a mere “banal or rote celebration of
difference” rather than an actual achievement of diversity (2008, 2964). Benhabib
(2002, 129) cautions that if multicultural discourse becomes rote then what may
result is:
“a kind of multicultural cold war: there may be peace but no
reconciliation; there may be bargaining but no mutual
understanding; and there may be stalemates and standoffs,
dictated less by disrespect for the positions of others than by the
fear of others.”
The variety of approaches, interpretations, configurations, and criticisms of
multiculturalism have ensured that it is a ubiquitous presence in Western
societies. Regardless of those who proclaim that multiculturalism is alive, well,
and effective (Kymlicka 2007) and those who have claimed to observe its
“strange death” (Hesse 2000, 10), multiculturalism is present in the in cities,
schools, and civic organizations. The “ways in which social groups encounter,
experience, recognize, and make sense of cultural difference” on a daily basis
demonstrate that, outside of policy and scholarship forums, multiculturalism
exists in “everyday, lived” realities (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2). However,
multiculturalism’s continued presence in Western societies does not imply that
the contestations over its meanings and proper practices have been resolved.
Such ambiguity has affected many practices that use the legitimacy of
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multicultural keywords such as “tolerance” to mask uncritical pseudoengagements with group difference.

Tolerance as Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism’s reluctance to coalesce around one meaning has meant
that debates regarding its validity remain present in discussions of both theory
and policy. As debates on validity have continued a kind of “soft multiculturalism”
that revolves around ideas of tolerance has become ubiquitous. This trend
reflects a widespread acceptance of actual cultural differences and a need for
everyone to tolerate—i.e. accept and permit—those differences. In the absence
of a consensus on how to meaningfully integrate different groups within societies
with each other, the basic consent to the presence of such differences has
become the most common way of dealing with cultural diversity. Tolerance, then,
can be seen as a soft form of multiculturalism that attempts to “deal with cultural
difference” (Nagel and Hopkins 2010, 2), however ineffective it may be at
producing meaningful integration of different groups.
Tolerance, like multiculturalism, does not have a unified, agreed-upon
meaning with regards to the way that it is put into practice (especially in the
political space), but has come to be couched in the realm of public practice as
the desired telos of the culturally diverse liberal democratic nation-state (Gill,
Johnstone, and Williams 2012; Balint 2010). The discourse of tolerance is
ubiquitous at every geographic scale, ranging from the supranational (e.g. the
EU) to the local (e.g. educational spaces), as the “appropriate solution” for
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contending with sociocultural difference while respecting the liberal principles of
freedom and equality (W. Brown 2008).
Tolerance is, at its heart, is a normative principle that “organizes the
‘conduct of conduct’” (W. Brown 2008, 4; Dobbernack and Modood 2011). It is a
principle shot through with judgment of what is right or wrong, good or bad.
Although the greater complexities of tolerance are debated, most scholars agree
that tolerance (and tolerating behaviors) involve three paradoxical elements. The
first element is that both objection and acceptance are necessary for tolerance to
exist (Forst 2003; Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012; Dobbernack and Modood
2011; W. Brown 2008). Tolerant behavior exists when a person, practice, belief,
or identity is deemed objectionable but is allowed to be present in spite of the
objectionable behaviors.
The second paradoxical element of tolerance arises from the first. In the
name of being “tolerant” towards someone/something that is distasteful, the
person doing the tolerating is simply withholding their power to eradicate it—i.e.
tolerating “even if she or he has the power not to tolerate” (Dobbernack and
Modood 2011, 10). Therefore, the act of tolerating constructs and assumes a
power hierarchy in which the person doing the tolerating is “anointed with virtue”
because they are “standing for a principled act of permitting one’s own principles
to be affronted,” while the subject of the tolerance is marked as distasteful,
objectionable, even deviant, and therefore occupies a subordinate position.
The last paradoxical element of tolerance is that while it parades as an act
of acceptance, it is actually a bordering practice built on the politics of belonging

	
  

50

(Dobbernack and Modood 2011, 25). The label of “tolerable” on a practice or
belief implies that there are practices and beliefs that are “intolerable.” Thus,
persons, practices, and beliefs are saddled with identities that include or exclude
them from the space of tolerance. Significantly, this “bordering practice” also
establishes who is tolerant and who is intolerant. Thus, tolerant people are
constructed as bastions of Western liberal antiprejudice and those who are
intolerant are marked as barbarians who, by virtue of their intolerance, are
intolerable (W. Brown 2008, 6). These three elements that underpin tolerance
have informed the critical engagement with it as a path toward peace,
acceptance, and substantive equality. The continued presence of minority
groups’ inequalities within Western societies have laid bare that tolerance has, at
times, “overtly blocked the pursuit of substantive equality” instead creating an
environment of mutual respect between dominant and majority groups (W. Brown
2008, 9).
Rainer Forst (2003) contends that while there are types of tolerance that
reify power structures and perpetuate inegalitarian citizenship, an “esteemed”
conception of tolerance (2003, 75) that “is driven by a desire to be inclusive,
emancipatory, and equality-driven” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 515) is
the component of a democratic society essential to promoting mutual respect and
substantive equality amongst the citizenry. Forst’s prescription for achieving
“esteem” tolerance is inadequately articulated, however, in that he assumes that
“the most important rights and resources” are the same for all individuals and
groups (Forst 2003, 76). Dobbernack and Modood (2011, 9–10) assert that the
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establishment of what rights and resources should be protected is a contested
process, and one that problematizes liberal conceptions of tolerance:
“The liberal difficulty here is to establish the exact definition of
which interests are important—and should be protected by rights—
and what constitutes harm and therefore a violation of those rights.
From the very beginning, this points to some ambiguity in liberal
toleration and to its context-dependence.”
This point underscores that the modalities of tolerance operating in
Western society are in constant contention with the politics of identity and
belonging. In some modalities of tolerance, individuals or groups vie for the
recognition that their differentiated identity is within the bounds of tolerance.
Other modalities of tolerance strive to promote social cohesion and political unity
by marking certain identities as threatening to the polity and therefore not worthy
of being tolerated.
Wendy Brown (2008) maintains that this process of establishing the rules
about what gets tolerated and by whom is a cleverly disguised way of ensuring
that liberalism, which is itself a culture, retains its socio-political and cultural
hegemony (2008, 23–4). Tolerance, as practiced in liberal nation-states, has
established itself as a “universal value and impartial practice” (2008, 7) when in
fact is it establishing the interests of liberal society as most important. Subjects of
tolerance are marked as “inferior, deviant, or marginal vis-à-vis those practicing
the tolerance,” and the liberal democratic state allows for those in need of
toleration to be present in society in spite of their difference. When this allowance
is projected as an equalizing act, any other existing inequality becomes
something “innate” or “natural” that exists in spite of tolerant attitudes. Brown
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calls this depoliticization (W. Brown 2008, 15), a process which “involves
constructing inequality as either personal or natural in origin, or otherwise
natural, religious, or cultural and therefore profoundly antithetical to claims for
equality” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514). Brown’s conception of
tolerance as a process of regulating aversion within the parameters of liberalism
illuminates its inefficacy as an instrument for promoting substantive citizenship in
diverse societies. The “mainstream” understanding of tolerance in the West has
served to confirm the universalization of particular identities and cement power
hierarchies instead of “removing social stigma” and providing “for equal
accommodation in the public sphere” (Dobbernack and Modood 2011, 8).
The ideals of multiculturalism, tolerance, and diversity remain embedded
in the political discourses of Western societies even as new modes of citizenship
are coming into being. While many of these discourses have been (and continue
to be) deployed and contended with at the national level, multiculturalism and
tolerance are also embedded in the discourses of the more recent configurations
post-national citizenships. Post-national citizenships, which are decentralized
from the nation-state, are centered heavily upon human rights discourses, the
acceptance of cultural diversity, and the toleration of difference. The conditions of
these “post-national citizenships” entail rights that are derived from membership
in international and supranational citizenships and are often engaged with
separately from multicultural citizenship in the literature. But post-national
citizenships, such as cosmopolitan and European citizenship, reflect discourses
of tolerance and acceptance of diversity, suggesting post-national citizenships
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interface with multicultural discourses just as national citizenships do. The
following section considers post-national citizenships in greater detail in order to
uncover the ways in which post-national and multicultural citizenship discourses
interact with each other.

Post-national Citizenships
Since the 1980’s significant changes in the world system stemming from
the many forms of globalization have generated conceptualizations and
observations of citizenships that are multivalent, and dynamic (Sassen 2002;
Calhoun 2002; Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005). Citizenships that supersede
the national scale have been termed “post-national” (Soysal 1997). The literature
on post-national citizenships notes that advancements in communication and
transportation technologies and the proliferation of migratory movements, free
market capitalism, liberal democratic ideals around the globe have fundamentally
altered the boundaries societal associations (Soysal 1997; K. Mitchell 2007;
Kofman 2003; R. Smith 2002; Paasi 2002). The parameters of post-national
citizenships have reconfigured the rights and forms of political participation
associated traditionally associated with citizenship. Post-national citizens may be
defined by multiple dimensions such as identities (e.g. transnational
communities), political participation (e.g. environmental activism), rights (e.g. the
right to identity), and norms (e.g. international human rights regimes). Changing
ideologies, apparatuses, and capacities of nation-states have “engendered or
strengthened alternative notions of community membership,” many of which have
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emerged from an unwillingness to “automatically identify with a nation as
represented by the state” (Sassen 2002, 277). These changes to ideas and
practices of belonging, identity, and rights have problematized the traditional
conceptualization of citizenship as a national phenomenon and have shifted the
boundaries of “the political vis-à-vis citizenship” (Soysal 1997, 510).
Cosmopolitan ideology has undergirded the emergence of the postnational, global citizen that is part of “the worldwide community of human
beings.” Cosmopolitanism is composed of “global identities, attachments, and
commitments” (Banks 2008, 134) and is linked to “political practices associated
with globalization and the possibilities of a new global democratic order” (K.
Mitchell 2007, 706). Cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a key component of postnational citizenship that eschews the primacy of national community membership
in favor of membership in the worldwide community of human beings (Calhoun
2002; Soysal 1997; Banks 2008).
The “entrenchment of international human rights regimes and the spread
of cosmopolitan norms” (Benhabib 2007, 19) have perhaps posed the most
significant challenge to the absolute primacy of the nation-state as the guarantor
of citizenship rights and duties. According to Soysal (1997, 511), the notion that
that all humans are entitled to rights regardless of formal citizenship status within
a nation-state and can claim access to those rights have brought about systemic
challenges to conventional conceptualizations of the public sphere:
“What this challenge entails is that public spheres are realized intraor transnationally; solidarities are shaped beyond national
boundaries; and the referent is no longer exclusively the national
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citizen, but increasingly an abstract individual entitled to claim the
collective and bring it back to the public sphere as her ‘natural’
right.”
These developments have embroidered the traditional configuration of
citizenship with multi-scalar components that are “shaped by conditions,
processes, and institutions at the local, national, and international scales”
(Staeheli 2003, 99). In addition to the “recasting” of national rights as human
rights, some forms of citizenship are multilayered institution and only partially
political (Painter and Philo 1995). It is not clear whether social, cultural,
economic, and civil attributes are working together to actually change the fabric
of citizenship or simply to shift understandings of citizenship, but such attributes
are being mobilized in contemporary society and “may be used as resources in
political struggles” that take place at different places and moments in time
(Staeheli 2003, 99; Staeheli 2008; Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Soysal 1997).
These recastings relating to scale and rights have effected new
vocabularies surrounding citizenship. Discourses of cosmopolitan citizenship are
commonly circulated “in reference to the promise of global democracy based on
liberal conceptions of human rights, tolerance, and universal standards of dignity
and justice” (K. Mitchell 2007, 706). Cosmopolitanism, while not a new concept
by any means, has in its contemporary usage contributed to the linking of
democratic ideals to scales beyond the nation-state by naturalizing the
universality of human rights and legitimizing beyond-national public spheres for
claiming those rights.
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The spread of cosmopolitan norms and the naturalization of international
human rights regimes are evident in real-world practice and not solely in
theoretical conceptualizations. Such norms and understandings of universal
rights are enshrined in and protected by many international documents, such as
the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European
Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2, the Inter-American
System for the Protection of Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Benhabib 2007, 19–20). Such human rights regimes assign
“fundamental rights” to individuals who are not formal citizens of the national
polity in which they reside. This contributes to a condition in which residents
claim some semblance of membership in the political community without full legal
status or participation in the polity’s public sphere. Furthermore, the extension of
such universal rights may be used for those with formal but without substantive
citizenship to claim access to the space of meaningful rights within their polity.
The articulations of post-national citizenships also complicate the
relationship between identity and citizenship. Whereas the formulation of the
identity of a citizen and the negotiation of cultural difference has most commonly
taken place at the national level, post-war reconfigurations of citizenship rights
transformed identity into a fundamental human right. Alternative notions of
collective identities and solidarities that cross borders and transcend the nationstate are “natural attributes and rights” that “are exercised in individual and
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  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is
distinguished by the inclusion of non-EU nation-states as signatories.	
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collective actors’ narratives and strategies” for participation in the multiple
manifestations of the public sphere (Soysal 1997, 513). The “identity as a right”
phenomenon undergirds the multiplication of identities and legitimizes
particularities relating to ethnonationalisms, religious identities, and various other
expressions of the self within the space of the nation. These trends demonstrate
that post-national citizenship processes and practices are intersecting with
discourses of multiculturalism and tolerance in multiple ways and at multiple
scales.
Furthermore, the universal right to identity provides the opportunity for
myriad identities to validly attach to post-national citizenship. The importance of
collective identities to the experience and performance of post-national
citizenships demonstrates that the tension between universality and particularism
exists beyond national scale discussions of multiculturalism and identity. Indeed,
post-national citizenship seems to both produce these tensions and allow them to
proliferate. The widening and reassertion of the boundaries of citizenship to the
universal/cosmopolitan scale complicates and multiplies identities, which are at
their very core based on particularities. Post-national citizenship regimes, such
as the European Union, often celebrate multiple identities within their
communities but also must contend with how those identities complicate
community solidarity.
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European Citizenship
The pervasiveness of the international human rights discourse has been
crucial to the development of European Union citizenship, the most formalized of
post-national citizenships (Sassen 2002, 277–8). More accurately termed
“supranational” than cosmopolitan or international, EU citizenship is one result of
the post-war politico-economic integration of Europe. The rights and duties
guaranteed by Europe’s supranational citizenship are clear demonstrations that
citizenship is no longer inexorably tied to the nation-state. But while the creation
of such post-national rights at the supranational scale changes the nature of
identities and claims to rights and membership, it does not fundamentally alter
the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion intrinsic to the institutionalization of
citizenship. My argumentation in this section is based on the premise that
although modes of post-national citizenship present many new possibilities for
claiming rights and asserting belonging, they ultimately work to reinforce (and
sometimes multiply) the tensions between universalisms and particularisms.
The implications of European citizenship are manifold, but three are
particularly salient. First, its relationship vis-à-vis national citizenship is that the
EU’s sovereignty over supranational citizenship rights is constructed from a the
voluntary reduction of its member states to national sovereignty over rights
claims (Benhabib 2002). The rights afforded to European citizens are heavily
influenced by international human rights discourses, such as the right to
particular identities. The various EU institutions provide public forums within
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which to make claims on the fundamental rights accorded to European citizens,
allowing such practices to be performed above the national scale.
But the second implication demonstrates that European citizenship serves
to link the particularisms that exist on the national level to the supranational level.
European citizenship status is contingent upon national citizenship in a memberstate. This contingency is significant because it demonstrates that the multiscalar natures of post-national citizenships do not erase the importance of the
national scale or eradicate the need for national citizenships, but instead interact
complexly with national citizenships (Delanty 2006; Desforges, Jones, and
Woods 2005; D. Kaplan and Häkli 2002; Painter 2006; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2011;
Paasi 2001). Therefore while the EU passport makes the portfolio of citizenship
rights, experiences, and practices more robust, the nation-state “remains by far
the most important site” of citizenship (Sassen 2002, 278). As Reed-Danahay
(2007, 198–9) argues, the EU’s on-going endeavors “to get its inhabitants to see
themselves as European citizens…is not intended to supplant national identities;
rather it is intended to supplement them with an additional frame of reference.”
The third significant implication of European citizenship is that like all
citizenships it functions as an identity that relies on alterity to constitute itself (Isin
2002). The European citizenship certainly is a unique institution that sets itself
apart as a formalized status of a supranational polity which “alters the topography
of participation and facilitates new projects of citizenship” within its borders
(Soysal 1997, 514). A substantial softening of Europe’s internal borders has
accompanied the deployment of universalisms regarding supranational rights
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afforded to European citizens. However, there is a concomitant hardening of its
external border that is an equally important component of creating the identity of
the European citizen (Delanty 2006). EU geopolitical discourses invoke
“European values” as the identity markers of European member states and their
citizens and unquestioningly “demarcate the EU inside from its outside”
(Browning and Christou 2010, 112; Boedeltje and van Houtum 2011). These
concurrent border-softening and -hardening processes further illustrate that while
the possibilities for new rights and opportunities are manifold, European
citizenship is ultimately characterized by a tension between the universal identity
that encompasses a European citizenry and the particularisms that exclude nonEuropean Others from the space of belonging (Reed-Danahay 2007).
But as a post-national citizenship whose rights are based on international
human rights norms, European citizenship not only multiplies identities by
distinguishing Europeans from non-Europeans, but also multiplies identities
within its own borders. The European Union’s recognition of identity as a
fundamental right has “authorized” both ethnonationalisms and minority group
identity projects to proliferate within its borders (Deets 2006; Soysal 1997;
Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Dobbernack and Modood 2011). The
introduction of a supranational citizenship, and thus a supranational forum within
which to mobilize rights claims, has wrought intense struggle between the EU
and (particularly post-Soviet) member states regarding the treatment of
minorities, multiculturalism and tolerance within national and supranational
boundaries, and the right of formerly oppressed titular majorities to protect their
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own cultures (Johns 2003; Kolossov 2003; Feakins and Białasiewicz 2006; Deets
2006). These situations are acute examples of how post-national citizenship
articulations complicate the relationship between identity and citizenship. In many
European countries, both titular majorities and minorities are drawing upon the
post-nationalist concept of identity as a universal human right—a concept
codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—to assert
the legitimacy of particularisms at national levels. Identities, community
memberships, and entitlements to rights converge and diverge in ways that are
made difficult by post-national configurations of citizenship.
Such struggles over identities and rights in the European Union have
furthermore created complex negotiations of identity and membership in the
everyday, lived reality of European citizens. Citizens of national majority and
minority groups have agency within the political limits of both their nation-states
and the European Union, but their majority or minority group affiliation will create
differing understandings of how and when national and supranational citizenships
are negotiated, invoked, and performed. As such, understandings of citizenships
in Europe are multiple, fluid and, because they are multi-scalar, somewhat
fragmented (Reed-Danahay 2007; Benhabib 2002; Sassen 2002; Delanty 1997).
With respect to minority exclusion and marginalization, however, the universality
of European citizenship (and its protections of identity rights) does not erase the
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion on the national level, but rather complicates
them. Therefore it can be said that while majority/minority politics have long
existed, they have been greatly complicated by the introduction of post-national
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discourses and modes of citizenship. The EU’s supranational space allows
national majority and minority groups to partially locate the politics of belonging
and identity outside the confines of the national-state by deputizing the universal
rights of “Europeans” into arguments for performances of particular collective
identities (Laclau 1992; Soysal 1997), making the discussions on the value of
diversity and the limits of tolerance much more intricate and involved.
European citizenship is illustrative of the increased opportunities and
entrenched tensions that characterize post-national citizenships on a broader
level. Although post-national citizenships are construed in universal terms, the
ways that they complicate the interaction between identity and citizenship reveal
that post-national citizenships are shot-through with particularisms that
perpetuate processes of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, post-national
citizenships interact complexly with national citizenships and therefore
demonstrate that a thorough consideration of citizenships on multiple scales
should not treat them as discrete entities, but rather processes that take place at
various scales at various times. The following sections will shift this discussion
from post-national and national conceptions of citizenship to the role of the local
scale in understanding the interface between state agents and actual citizens.
The school is one of the most crucial spaces at the local scale in which nationstate and supranational citizenship practices and discourses are deployed.
Giving particular attention to the educational realm illuminates the processes of
production and reproduction of citizenship at multiple scales.
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Creating the Citizen: Schools and the Formation of Youth Citizenships
Schools have long been recognized as important socializing agents whose
purpose is to prepare young people for life as members of the nation-state and
inculcating multicultural values (S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Wylie 2004;
Heater 1999; Calhoun 1997). More recently the literature has noted the
importance of the school in also the fostering of post-national citizenships, such
as the European and the cosmopolitan (K. Mitchell 2006b; Banks 2008; E. Doyle
Stevick 2007). Education frameworks and curricula are influential vehicles for
shaping young people’s perceptions of the world in their developmental years.
This influence materializes later in life, as adult attitudes (including those about
cultural identity and solidarity) are directly linked to attitudes formed early in life
(S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Leonard 2010; Wylie 2004).
Previous sections in this chapter discussed the important link between
identity formation and conceptions of citizenship. Education curricula and schools
sites work not only to develop understandings of citizenships, but also the
identities that mark citizenships. Thus, schools should be seen as sites where
young people confront multiple citizenship ideals and norms, engage with
national and supranational ideologies, and learn how to be citizens (S. L.
Holloway and Valentine 2000).

Instructing the National Citizen
State actors use the space of the school to foster particular
conceptualizations of nationalism. Consequently, when nation-state citizenship
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regimes are exclusionary educational will frequently diffuse ethnocultural identity
markers and schools will become key spaces of nationalist political ideologies
and control (Hromadzić 2008; Kolossov 2003). Nation-building projects become
embedded in school and educational policy in different ways. Arguably the most
easily recognizable forms of nationalism in the classroom are curricula and
textbooks that privilege ethnoculturally specific versions of various courses.
Teaching methods will also naturalize and essentialize the connection of the
dominant ethnic group to the territory when the group’s particular ethnocultural
markers are emphasized.
Subjects outside of the formal civics can have just as much (if not more)
influence on students’ attitudes and conceptions of citizenship than the of the
formal civics courses. For instance, several studies note the important political
socialization abilities of a variety of courses, including but not limited to history,
language, and geography courses (Faas 2011; Galston 2001; Ahonen 2001).
Historical myths, language, religion, and folk customs taught in schools serve to
“supplement biological evidence of kinship, and are deployed to circumscribe
who does and does not belong to the national ‘family’” (Michaels and Stevick
2009, 228). Narratives of the past particularly play a crucial role in demarcating
spaces of belonging in the nation, and subsequently the polity (Staeheli and
Hammett 2013; Ahonen 2001).
Nationalist ideologies and socio-cultural attitudes can also be performed
implicitly in the classroom, even in the presence of explicit democratic civic
education . “Informal curriculum” disseminated in learning spaces through
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teacher attitudes and practices, as well as classroom climate, are just as
important and communicative to students as formal curriculum and school policy
(S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Hahn 1998; Wylie 2004). Implicit agreement
with nationalist ideologies may manifest in “diluted recognition” of programs
intended to promote inclusive, democratic, and open ideals of civic education (E.
Doyle Stevick 2007). Just as significant can be teacher avoidance of critical and
open discussion on nationalistic attitudes and practices.
Ethnonationalist policies coexist with more democratic notions of civic
education in the classroom, even in divided societies. In EU member states,
tension between universalist and particularist notions of civic education Union
member states arises from the presence of both state discourses promoting
national solidarities and EU multicultural discourses promoting a “unity in
diversity.” Thus, young people in Europe in particular are on the receiving end of
multiple civic education discourses that play roles in the creation, performance,
and experience of the multi-scalar citizenships that they claim.

Instructing the Cosmopolitan/Multicultural Citizen
Multicultural and cosmopolitan discourses have had a salient position in
European schools. As cultural diversity within nation-states spurs discussion and
debate on how liberal democracies define their societies and their citizenry, the
school has become a site where multiple and conflicting discourses of
multiculturalism and national citizenship exist simultaneously (Banks 2008; Faas
2011). Furthermore, the supranational space of the European Union adds
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another layer of citizenship education to the already crowded space of national
education, as these multi-scalar formations interact with recognition of cultural
diversity. Thus, the challenges of building a society whose citizens are both
connected by shared values, ideas, national identity and who respect the cultural
diversity within the citizenry are translated to educational in schools (Michaels
and Stevick 2009).
Discourses of multicultural and cosmopolitan youth citizenship have
currency within national education systems because, despite the criticisms
discussed earlier in this chapter, such discourses “remain important ideals” in
Western liberal democracies (Thomas 2008, 2864). The forces of globalization,
including transnational migration, are highly salient influences on citizenship
education as nation-states are forced to contend with differentiated identities and
loyalties that operate on multiple scales (El-Haj 2007; Faas 2011). That being
said, nationalist discourses are still highly influential within citizenship education,
and as such discourses of national unity and (oftentimes poorly articulated)
discourses of multiculturalism interact unevenly and complexly within the space
of the school (Michaels and Stevick 2009; Thomas 2008; K. Mitchell 2006b).
Citizenship education in the European Union is a clear instance of the
project to make young people into multicultural citizens who are capable of
interacting across cultures within their own nation-state, within Europe, and within
the global community. Much of the universalist rhetoric of liberal citizenship is
deployed in order to foster common identities between young people at the
supranational level (as European citizens) and the cosmopolitan level (as citizens
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of the world). Although European Union member states retain almost exclusive
control over national education (Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union 2009, Article 6), Brussels’ focus on citizenship education in its member
states is considerable. Many empirical studies of civic education in European
countries note the persistent conflict between member states’ prioritization of the
“development of national consciousness and citizenship” and the European
stress on fostering inclusive, multicultural citizenship (Faas 2011, 481; Wylie
2004). However despite such tensions within educational spaces, incentives for
funding extended to member states by the EU “provide European proposals with
substantial clout” and many opportunities to enter into classrooms (Michaels and
Stevick 2009, 226).
The proliferation of European rhetoric in member states’ civic education
has been paralleled in interdisciplinary scholarly literature by discussions
regarding whether European youth citizenship discourses are (in)effective at
enabling young people to enact substantive multicultural citizenships. For
example, scholars note that notions of inclusion and exclusion actually undergird
the European identity project (Reed-Danahay 2007; Faas 2011). The project to
create a pan-European identity involves concerted efforts to “instill a sense of
belonging and identity connected to Europe as a social unit” and identify as EU
citizens. But while the EU casts itself as a multicultural unit that is “united in
diversity” it universalizes its particular values and ideologies while simultaneously
Othering individuals, groups, and nation-states that do not espouse liberal
democratic norms in the ‘correct’ way (Reed-Danahay 2007; Johns 2003; Jeffrey
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2008). Moreover, EU civic education curricula and materials emphasize
commonalities between its member states to solidify Europeanness while “any
fundamental cultural or political differences either within or between countries”
are minimized (Reed-Danahay 2007, 203). These contradictions, rather than
fostering substantive attitudes of cultural acceptance amongst young Europeans,
reify “stereotypical notions” of what it means to be European, effectively blocking
out other religions and cultures (Reed-Danahay 2007, 213).
Michaels and Stevick (2009) and Ahonen (2001) address how the
dialogue between nationalist and European citizenship education can work to
reify inter-cultural boundaries and cause conflicting understandings of a Europe
that is “united in diversity” to be presented in schools. EU member states
(particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) that have histories of state socialism
promote nationalist rhetoric in their civic education curricula as part of a wider
societal project of “correcting” the illegitimate histories and identities promulgated
by their former socialist rulers. Such ideas are also meant to emphasize these
nation-states’ inherent “Europeanness” and are framed in terms of a “return to
Europe” after decades of interference from political interlopers. The EU, however,
operates under vastly different Western European conceptualizations of being
European that are rooted in the liberal-democratic ideals of inclusiveness,
acceptance of cultural diversity, and universal democratic rights. As such, while
in school young people are subject to and made to negotiate competing notions
of what it means to be European (Michaels and Stevick 2009; Faas 2011). The
result within classrooms is citizenship education that focuses on superficial
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celebrations of cultural difference and focuses on issues that are easy to talk
about, such as rights and privileges of European citizenship, rather than
programs that address entrenched inequalities and substantive pluralism
(Thomas 2008; Hahn 1998).
A slightly different yet no less relevant observation about current
citizenship education in Europe its “implicit association” of the “successful”
European citizen with the cosmopolitan citizen who is able to compete for
employment in the global economic system (K. Mitchell 2007, 397; ReedDanahay 2007; Johnston Conover and Searing 2000). Katharyne Mitchell
(2006b) coherently articulates this argument by examining the marked, albeit
uneven, shifts in EU policies, particularly those of the Education and Culture
Directorate of the European Commission. The changes to policies and programs
for education are trending away from the “philosophical ideals of state-sponsored
multicultural integration” and toward characteristics associated with neoliberal
policy aims, such as “a focus on individual pragmatism and…the skills and
mobility needed for economic success” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 391–2, 404). Major
policy initiatives such as the EU Lifelong Learning Programme (2013) explicitly
aim to “make lifelong learning and mobility a reality,” which leads Mitchell to
conclude that educational spaces in Europe are becoming forums for
“constitution of both market-rational and state-oriented subjects (2006, 396,
emphasis in original). The nature of such neoliberal projects in the EU is “highly
contested… hybrid and contextual, often cohabitating and/or overlapping with
other regimes,” but the ubiquity of EU civic education discourses equating the
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“advancement of citizenship” and the “strengthening of cross-border
employability” is undeniable (K. Mitchell 2007; European Commission 2013). This
suggests that the culture of liberalism (W. Brown 2008) has, to some extent,
universalized its norms rational economic behavior and individual responsibility
for effective sociocultural integration, leading citizenship education programs in
Europe away from the valuation of difference and towards the valuation of
economic competitiveness in Europe.

Education in a Broader Context of Youth Identity and Citizenship Formation
In understanding ways that different educational policies shape identity
and citizenship, we must recognize young people to be active political agents
rather than passive vessels into which knowledge is poured (S. L. Holloway and
Valentine 2000). Education policy makers, and especially those involved in
devising citizenship education, have historically viewed young people has
citizens-in-waiting—as minors learning about their rights but not yet capable of
exercising them (Skelton 2010; S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Weller 2003);
they have also assumed in many instances that young people are politically
passive, apathetic, and disengaged. One strand of literature has countered this
image of young people by demonstrating the variety of non-traditional ways (e.g.
electronic petitions, volunteering) in which young people participate in politics
and are active as citizens (Galston 2001). Others have made the broader
argument that young people are profoundly aware of the networks of power
relations in which they are embedded and that they act politically by
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accommodating, challenging, and subverting such power relations in their daily
lives (Skelton 2010). In this sense, their ideas about identity, citizenship, and
belonging might flow from different set of ideals than that offered by formal
curricula. It is crucial, therefore, to place young people at the center of analysis
and to understand the ways in which they actively participate in the politics of
citizenship and identity in their societies, drawing on a panoply of discourses and
experiences both inside and outside the space of the school. By considering
youth geographies, we understand nation building and citizenship from the
ground up—as performed and practiced by people and not as simply dictated by
states or supranational bodies.
Young peoples’ conceptions of citizenship and identity are not only
dependent upon state or local official curricula, but are also heavily influenced by
teacher attitudes, classroom climate, and school-specific approaches to subjects.
Moreover, whether young people’s understandings of citizenships—especially
post-national ones such as EU citizenship—are based on access to rights or
mere association with a group is heavily influenced by the nature and time of
instruction devoted to those topics. An equally valuable consideration when
understanding how education and youth perceptions interact is that youths are
“active in the construction of their own lifeworlds” and “are not passive dupes
learning a set of skills deemed necessary by national government” (S. L.
Holloway and Valentine 2000, 769). Young people have agency and will
construct their own meanings of citizenship and identity by combining what is
taught in school, what is experienced in their everyday lives outside of school,
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and by what is observed in the media and wider culture (Hahn 1998; Dittmer
2005).
This requires, in turn, that we view the school in relation to a wider set of
youth geographies, that is, everyday spaces in which young people formulate
identities, negotiate social differences, and make various claims of belonging.
Focusing on youth spaces is especially important in divided societies, where
numerous social and geographical barriers can reinforce a sense of privilege or a
sense of oppression and subordination (Leonard 2006; Leonard 2010). In
addition to examining interaction between groups (or the lack thereof) in schools,
we need to consider the cultural landscapes they are confronted with and
negotiate, how they navigate city streets and neighborhoods, and how in moving
through the city, young people accommodate or subvert social, political, and
spatial boundaries (Weller 2003). The next section of this chapter will consider
the ways in which socio-cultural landscapes reinforce, subvert, or mediate the
politics of belonging and discourses of citizenship and identity that they
encounter at home, school, and in wider society.

Identity, Citizenship, and Everyday Space
Space and spatiality provide a lens through which we understand
citizenship as more than state practices and discourses. Citizenships also exist in
everyday experiences and actions of national citizens and non-citizens who
reside within a nation-state’s territory, who are subject in varying ways to
inclusionary and exclusionary narratives and practices (Staeheli and Hammett
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2010; Nagle 2009; Holston 2008). Focusing on youth citizenship demands
understanding the ways that young people relate to space, place, and the
material construction of belonging and exclusion.
Several scholars have enriched theories of citizenship by investigating the
spatialities of citizenship at the local scale and articulating the importance of the
urban context to how citizenship learned, performed, experienced, and
negotiated. Such studies tease out intricacies that illuminate citizenship as more
than an abstract status or bundle of rights (Staeheli 2003). Citizenship is a
dynamic institution that is learned, understood, performed, and negotiated by
individuals on a daily basis. Moreover, the urban environment is a site at which
citizenship takes place rather than simply existing in the abstract. The following
sections of this chapter will explore the theoretical and conceptual
understandings and research regarding the everyday, “lived” spaces in which
individuals and groups learn about and experience citizenship, national identity,
and belonging.

City and Society: Citizenship Formation at the Local Level
As demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter, citizenship is a
fluid, dynamic marker of community membership that can (and does) take
multiple forms and exist at multiple scales. Citizenship, therefore, is not an a
priori concept applied evenly to individuals and groups in society by political
institutions, but one that is continuously being constructed and understood, and
spaces of everyday interaction and experience are critical points at which these
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constructions and understandings take place (Isin 2002; Staeheli 2003; Secor
2004; Bollens 2007). Engaging with local spaces allows investigation into how
citizenship is “continuously being reconfigured from the bottom up” through
practices in the everyday realities of the city (Secor 2004, 365).
The spaces of the city are crucial to the ways in which individuals and
groups use the processes of inclusion and belonging to understand their relation
to the wider political community because it is in these spaces that “routinized
interactions…shape social relations and feelings of belonging” (Staeheli 2003,
99). More than just a status of membership, citizenship is “relational” and can be
conceptualized as a “process” of establishing who belongs by delineating
boundaries (Staeheli 2003, 99; Coward 2012). It is in the everyday spaces of the
city that “identities are staked, belonging is negotiated, and rights are pursued”
(Secor 2004, 353). These processes and the urban spaces where they take
place are “crucial constitutive elements” (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003, 145) of the
“meaning and practice of citizenship” (Secor 2004, 353).
By prioritizing the everyday life at the local level the relational character of
citizenship becomes apparent, but so too does its spatial character. Anna Secor
(2004, 353) demonstrates that, especially within the context of the city,
citizenship is a spatial strategy that that “fixes identities, delineates boundaries,
and disciplines the meanings and practices of social space,” thereby organizing
claims-making through urban positions. Ordinary urban spaces such as
neighborhoods, shopping districts, workplaces, and homes are where citizenship
extends beyond government sites and is actively negotiated by all individuals.
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Because of the “ordinariness” of everyday urban spaces, individuals and groups
that are excluded from the formal political spaces of citizenship (such as noncitizens or young people who are not yet old enough to vote) engage with rights
and notions of inclusion and belonging through spatial practices.
The city gives meaning to citizenship by spatially differentiating identities.
The ways in which people move through urban spaces delineates boundaries of
sociocultural difference and locates identities in certain areas. But such
boundaries oscillate between fluidity and concreteness as contests are waged
between various groups about access to rights and resources (Staeheli 2003;
Isin 2002). The city harbors the “flows of people and ideas” about belonging,
identity, and legitimate membership in society (Secor 2003, 149), and as such
navigating and negotiating its spaces are the practices and processes through
which “relationships and definitions about citizenship are mediated” (Nagle 2009,
133).
Spatial strategies of establishing the parameters of citizenship operate by
disciplining space—that is, making spaces accessible or inaccessible, welcoming
or hostile, or contingent upon specific identity performances. Holston (2008) and
Weyeneth (2005) describe how regimes of sociopolitical power are reproduced in
work and leisure spaces via architecture that “assigns… place and reinforces
social relations” (Holston 2008, 278). Moreover, several empirical studies
demonstrate that access to public space for civic actions (Ehrkamp and Leitner
2003), demonstrations of cultural identity (Nagle 2009), and performances of
historical memory (Ehala 2009) are crucial to claims making and that “continued
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exclusion” from such city spaces are “spatial confirmation of unequal status” in
society (Nagle 2009, 136).
Spatial strategies of citizenship work to discipline space and establish
dominant power structures, but this very action also prompts marginalized and
alienated groups to “decide whether to dissemble or to articulate” their identities
in those spaces (Secor 2004, 362). Thus, the urban is fertile ground for not only
contestations and negotiations over belonging, exclusion, and access to
resources in the city but also dialogue regarding fairness, tolerance, and
acceptance (Bollens 2007). This underscores the important point that although
citizenship attempts to discipline and organize space, it does so unevenly and to
varying degrees of success. Economic, cultural, social, political, and gendered
processes constantly interact in the ordinary urban spaces, creating “fluidity of
identity across community lines” and “diversity of meaning within supposedly
bounded spaces” (McDowell and Shirlow 2011, 704; Secor 2003; K. Mitchell
2006b; McDowell 2008; Leonard 2006).
Empirical studies that prioritize the role of urban geographies in everyday
conceptualizations and configurations of citizenship demonstrate that “the urban
or local are inextricably connected to processes operating at other scales”
including nation-building and state formation (Staeheli 2003, 97). They also
provide a framework within which to address divided societies, those polities
where the politics of belonging and struggles over citizenship are most acute and
the spatial divisions are most entrenched.
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In understanding the roles that everyday urban spaces play in the
construction, contestation, and negotiations of citizenship, the material sites in
cities that shape and are shaped by the politics of belonging and identity must
also be examined. In the context of nationalism and citizenship, landscape theory
has provided a framework through which to view dominant meanings, power
geometries, and contestations of identity. Although landscape has been
conceptualized in different ways, it can broadly be understood as the “tangible,
visible entities that are both reflective and constitutive of society” (Schein 1997,
660).
Contemporary landscape theory revolves around questions of power and
the way power relations produce material landscapes and are in turn reproduced
through spatialities. Richard Schein’s (1997, 663) approach to landscape as
“discourse materialized” is helpfully comprehensive because it acknowledges the
simultaneously material and non-material nature of landscapes. Schein (1997,
663) agrees that discourses have textual and ideological manifestations, but
argues that:
“As a material component of a particular discourse… “cultural
landscape” at once captures the intent and ideology of the
discourse as a whole and is a constitutive part of its ongoing
development and reinforcement.”
This theorization mediates the tension between ideology and materiality
inherent in cultural landscape literature while remembering that the landscape is
perpetually becoming and unbecoming as a result of human action. Within the
context of the processes of citizenship, Schein’s theory is a mechanism through
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which the materialization of notions of belonging and exclusion and practices of
enfranchisement and alienation can be assessed.
Don Mitchell (1996) also stressed the need to scrutinize both the
materiality and the representation of ideas that structure landscape. A significant
contribution of Mitchell’s empirical study of migrant labor and the California
landscape is the recognition of the duplicitous nature of landscape—that is, the
ability of specifically constructed landscapes to mask the power relations behind
it. Landscapes, he argues, are both a “work and an erasure of work” (1996, 6),
spaces that are the result of contests between groups of varying economic,
social, and political power. The dominant group will reproduce landscape in order
to represent the “natural” qualities of the land, and in doing so will fade and erase
the power disparities, exploitation, and oppression of minority groups. Only by
seriously considering the materiality of the landscape, instead of only considering
its representation, can the presence of minority groups, opinions, and work be
revealed alongside hegemonic forces.
The theorizations of Schein and Mitchell are particularly useful to
understanding nationalist landscapes because nationalist landscapes reflect and
project very particular sets of historical narratives and identity discourses while
actively submerging others. By interrogating the materiality of nationalist
landscapes, both the ideology of hegemonic discourses that informs and is
informed by landscape and the power relations that are masked by it are
illuminated which allows for a richer and more comprehensive understanding of
the politics of identity operating within the nation.

	
  

79

Interrogating the mutually constitutive relationship between landscape and
identity is crucial to understanding the wider set of everyday geographies in
which youths negotiate spaces of belonging and social difference. Because the
landscape is constructed out of the contests waged between groups with differing
degrees of power (D. Mitchell 1996; Falah 1996; Steven Hoelscher 2003; Price
2004), youths’ geographies are populated with multiple ideologies of varying
strengths. This point is critical, as it underscores the nature of landscape as fluid
and contested rather than a unilateral exercise of the hegemon’s control.
The urban landscapes encountered by young people will not only serve to
reinforce the sense of belonging or exclusion perpetuated by the prevailing
narratives in their national society, but will also make real the ideologies of
supranational identity as well. Young people, as engaged, active citizens, will
respond to, interact with, and affect change on the landscape because of—or in
spite of—overarching identity narratives and nationalist discourses disseminated
and enacted by adults (Weller 2003; Skelton 2010; Hörschelmann 2008).
Young people with Outsider status—whether at the national or
supranational level, or both—can and do challenge or contest the societal
divisions and socio-cultural narratives that are embedded in the landscapes of
their cities and towns. Importantly, however, all young people will “work through
and alongside” the dominant discourses that have made categories of belonging
and exclusion seem natural and incontrovertible (Mills 2006). This means that, in
divided societies with pervading nationalist ideologies, youths contend with the
landscapes that are constructed, destroyed, preserved, and maintained by
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nationalist elites. Similarly, in European member states, youths contend with
landscapes that are influenced by Brussels. For instance, Tallinn’s landscape is
inscribed with symbols of what could be termed “banal supranationalism,” such
as EU flags and EU symbols on the euro currency.
The use of landscapes of memory to establish how the nation-state’s past
is remembered is a central and long-established practice of producing and
reifying national identity (S. Hoelscher and Alderman 2004). Societies—and their
governments—will create “material representations of the past” that are “symbols
of a ‘people’ or nation” (Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004, 357; Mensagem,
Sidaway, and Power 2005). The features landscapes of memory are most often
monuments, statues, and memorials, which are nationalist discourses that mark
out favored histories, heritages, and people while simultaneously ignoring others
(Johnson 1995; Hay, Hughes, and Tutton 2004). Nation building projects and
landscapes are both ongoing processes, and since nation building is made
material and public through memorialized landscapes (Johnson 1995), the two
processes are intertwined.
Nationalizing elites will move to alter places of memory to reflect the ‘right’
representations of history (Till 1999). However, while political elites have control
over public spaces of memory in the urban landscape, they cannot control how
those places are interpreted and understood by various individuals (Till 2003).
Nations do not have one solitary history, but many competing versions of history
(Billig 1995; Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004; Nora 1989), and therefore the
meanings of historical landscapes can be and are contested. Especially during
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times of social, political, and economic change, the struggle over memory is an
important societal issue (Steven Hoelscher 2003; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).
Struggles over existing monuments and memorials can reveal changing
conceptions of the nation that are part of the contestations of identity and
belonging in wider society (K. Mitchell 2003).
The geographies of national identity and citizenship, therefore, can be
identified not just by uncovering visible entities in the cultural landscape, but also
by locating ideologies and power relations in a multitude of spaces. The
geographies of identity and citizenship are not fixed, however, but are fluid and
are contested and negotiated in individuals’ movements through everyday
spaces. Seemingly mundane urban spaces host processes that establish identity
and belonging at multiple scales, making them sites of complex and multilayered
interaction of community memberships.
Cultural landscapes are meaningful parts of the ongoing fluctuations,
reconfigurations, and shifts in contemporary modes of citizenship. Careful
consideration of landscapes reveal not only the visible translations of nationalist
discourses into concrete forms but also implicit discourses of diversity, tolerance,
and cosmopolitan understandings of societal membership. Contemporary nationbuilding projects may be concretely inscribed in the cultural landscape through
monuments, memorials, and other places of memory, but they operate within a
context in which national identities have been challenged through multicultural
and post-national understandings of societal membership. The everyday,
palpable presence of multicultural and post-national modes of citizenships
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alongside national citizenships has lent legitimacy to identities and
understandings of belonging that are alternative to nationalist concepts and,
subsequently, to alternative readings, productions, and reproductions of cultural
landscapes. Cultural landscapes, then, further demonstrate that multicultural,
post-national, and national discourses operate simultaneously and interface
complexly at multiple scales on an everyday basis. Moreover, current
approaches to studying cultural landscapes also suggest that the tendency to
address nationalisms, post-national citizenships, and multicultural citizenships
separately will result in partial, fragmented understandings of identity, belonging,
and community membership in contemporary society.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to draw a theoretical framework for
understanding the multiple conceptualizations and configurations of citizenship
that young people encounter and negotiate in contemporary Western societies.
Citizenship is often broadly construed as a national phenomenon and the nationstate continues to be an important agent in understanding it. However,
citizenship is a much more complicated institution that exists at multiple
geographic scales. Empirical trends in citizenship studies have thoroughly
demonstrated that it is not only the prerogative of the nation-state, but also
supranational and international institutions, spawning manifold articulations and
understandings of citizenship rights, entitlements, and duties. At any given
moment in any given context, different discourses and formations of citizenship
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exist. As such, citizens necessarily negotiate their citizenship rather than
passively receive it.
Citizenship at any scale exists in tension between universalism and
particularism, inclusion and exclusion. The language of liberal democratic
citizenship employs a vocabulary of universalisms that emphasizes the equality
and sameness of community members and the egalitarian distribution of rights
and duties throughout the citizenry, notably at the national level. But the
qualifications for inclusion in the community of citizens hinges upon
particularisms based on dominant identity narratives and discourses. Moreover,
even in polities where formal citizenship has been universally extended to all
groups, meaningful access to rights is still restricted to those seen as “too
different” from or “unassimilable” to dominant identity norms. Post-national and
multicultural conceptualizations of citizenship also adopt vocabularies of
universality and contextualize community membership beyond the national level.
But while post-national and multicultural citizenships offer new many possibilities
for rights, belongings, and identities, they are ultimately premised upon the same
tensions between universalisms and particularisms that national citizenships
contend with and, indeed, can serve to multiply and reinforce these tensions.
Conceptual insights into the citizenship of minority groups within
multicultural societies have revealed citizenship to be a highly contested
institution. The reality of cultural heterogeneity within nation-states and the
multiplication of identities and loyalties that have resulted from globalization have
prompted intense debate over access to rights and requirements of duties.
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Scholars and policy makers alike grapple with the most effective way to deal with
differences in society, resulting in many competing conceptualizations of
multiculturalism at national, supranational, and global scales. The lack of
consensus on how best to talk about and engage with cultural difference,
however, has resulted in myriad proliferations of “multiculturalism” that are
ultimately mindless and feeble. But while multiculturalism may not be effective at
integrating diverse groups, the discourse remains significantly present in political
and social rhetoric through innocuous vocabularies of tolerance, acceptance of
difference, and respect for diversity.
Citizens’ negotiations of multi-scalar citizenships take place at the local
level in everyday urban spaces. National, supranational, and international
community memberships are made meaningful by the movement through and
encounters in urban spaces. Of the urban spaces, the school can be said to be a
critical site of citizenship formation, as young people contend with adult
discourses of identity and belonging in the nation and broader world. But young
people, far from being passive citizens-in-waiting, are active agents in the
development of their citizenships and identities. The questions that emerge from
this theoretical framework are, How do young people in Tallinn contend with
multiple, and sometimes contradictory, discourses of identity, belonging, and
citizenship? What are the everyday spaces and contexts in which young people
in Tallinn develop and awareness and understanding of social membership(s)?
What role does a young person’s positionality within the nation-state have on his
or her understandings citizenship in the European Union?
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This dissertation attempts to unpack how young people understand and
contend with notions of identity, citizenship, and belonging at multiple geographic
scales using the case of young people in the last year of secondary school in
Tallinn, Estonia. The analysis that follows pays particular attention to the way that
these understandings unfold in young people whose national communities are
simultaneously socio-spatially divided and part of a wider supranational
community that emphasizes unity. In doing so, this analysis uses a theoretical
framework blended from scholarship on citizenship, identity, belonging, civic
education, and cultural landscapes in order to better address the complex
environments in which young people negotiate and develop their sense of
identity and citizenship.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

In this research project students in their last year of secondary school in
Tallinn, Estonia provide an empirical evidence for exploring wider theoretical
questions relating to citizenship, identity, and belonging in divided societies. This
research employed qualitative methods and is situated within an interpretive
paradigm that “highlights the socially constructed and locally negotiated nature of
experience” (Rubin 2007, 455). This dissertation draws on qualitative data
gathered in focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Qualitative research is
often criticized for lacking scientific vigor and the ability to make generalizations
(Staller 2010), but the findings that result from qualitative studies contribute to
theory-building and, as such, can provide a basis for theoretical abstraction (Yin
1992). Moreover, qualitative methods are pragmatic and constructive when the
questions at hand demand explanations of phenomena that cannot be quantified,
such as how the ways that people think, know, and feel relate to the ways that
people behave (Secor 2010; Stake 1978).
This chapter explains the methodology used in this dissertation and why
qualitative techniques are apropos to the research questions. Next, data
collection and analysis are described, specifically addressing the steps taken to
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recruit research participants, formulate focus group and interview questions, and
code and evaluate the data gathered. In addition, this chapter addresses the
reflexivity specific to this project’s data collection. As qualitative research has
become more accepted within the social sciences, the issue of reflexivity has
assumed a significant role in the discussion of knowledge production and validity.
Reflexivity is “an awareness that the researcher and the object of study affect
each other mutually and continually in the research process” (Haynes 2012, 73),
i.e. cognizance on the part of the researcher that there are power dynamics
between her and the research participant(s) and that those dynamics affect the
production and interpretation of information (Secor 2010).

Qualitative Study and Research Techniques
Qualitative research is an “umbrella term” for a wide variety of research
methods and approaches that “provide holistic, in-depth accounts and attempt to
reflect the complicated, contextual, interactive, and interpretive nature of our
social world” (Staller 2010, 1159). The various research methods under the
umbrella label of “qualitative” are not mutually exclusive (Yin 1992) and
combining more than one method in a research design allows for triangulation of
data and, thus, a more rigorous research project (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Morgan
1996; Peek and Fothergill 2009). This research has elements of both case study
and ethnographic evaluation, allowing for a methodologically appropriate forum
within which to “answer questions about the ways in which certain events,
practices, or knowledges are constructed and enacted within particular contexts”
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(Secor 2010, 199). These qualitative approaches are often criticized for lacking
reliability, precision, and the ability to produce generalizable conclusions (Staller
2010). But these criticisms ignore the validity and usefulness of qualitative data
and methods in studying the highly contextual political and sociocultural
processes involved in the production of citizenship, identity, belonging, and
exclusion (Yin 1992; Fetterman 1989).
This research project uses the case study method to investigate
“contemporary phenomen[a] within… real-life context when the boundaries
between phenomen[a] and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1992, 123).
Integrating features of case study methods into this project gives proper attention
to the positionality and situation of knowledge within networks of power and daily,
lived experience. Case studies can include quantitative data, but the importance
of contextual factors in this method makes the richness of qualitative data
particularly salient. This dissertation seeks to understand how young people
develop notions of citizenship, identity, belonging, and exclusion as they
negotiate myriad discourses in spaces of everyday life. As such, the case study
approach is fitting for this project because it is best for research questions that
ask “how” and “why” questions about phenomena that the researcher has little or
no control over (Yin 2009).
The qualitative research methods like the ones used in this study are
soemtimes criticized for producing findings that are not generalizable. However,
this is an un-nuanced appraisal of qualitative methods. Case studies allow for
generalizing about existing theoretical discussions (Yin 2009). Such research
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allows for substantive engagement with existing theories of citizenship and
identity, explaining and expanding upon previously advanced theories and
conceptualizations. In this respect, qualitative research projects are theorybuilding, rather than theory-testing, which is no less valuable when attempting to
contribute to the knowledge of identity formation and delineation of citizenship
boundaries.
Furthermore, qualitative research methods’ use of qualitative data—such
as narratives, observations, and artifacts—helps preserve the contextual integrity
of the research findings. Qualitative, non-numeric data is situated within realworld settings and maintains the link between people’s experiences and the
meanings that they attach to them, which cannot be said of quantitative data
(Staller 2010). In this dissertation, the use of qualitative data ensures that the
nuances and complexities involved in understanding, negotiating, and
formulating conceptualizations of citizenship and identity are not lost or drowned
out by inflexible techniques.
Quantitative studies focus on highly standardized, pre-determined
variables to measure phenomena in order to produce “objective” and “value
neutral” conclusions, but in doing so lose the texture of individual perspectives
that provides for deeper explanations. Quantitative studies have attempted to
categorize and streamline the identities of young people in transitioning societies
(Nimmerfeldt 2008), predict the feasibility of citizenship projects intended to unify
diverse groups (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002), and measure the correlation
between the adoption of certain identity practices and feelings of belonging or
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exclusion (Kulu and Tammaru 2004). But such studies tend to be reductionist in
that they isolate identity markers and citizenship traits in the vacuum of statistical
analysis and therefore cannot account for the multiple and varied meanings of
community membership and identity. Moreover, quantitative scholarship tends to
rely on pre-given categories to define citizenship, such as Bloaemraad’s
examination of naturalization levels amongst migrants to the US and Canada
(Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad 2004). Qualitative research, in contrast to
examining citizenship within such narrow, pre-given parameters, tries to
interrogate these very categories and uncover the complexities of societal
membership. Furthermore, quantitative studies cannot appreciate the value of
non-quantifiable experiences and actions that are important to young people’s
understandings of belonging, identity, and citizenship rights such as everyday
encounters with discourses, narratives, and other people,. As a result,
quantitative studies are limited with respect to the depth of knowledge they can
produce, even though they can produce a great breadth of it (Staller 2010).
Recent literature on the geographies of citizenship and identity
demonstrates the understanding that can be achieved through the meanings and
motivations behind actions and experiences is produced through analyzing
qualitative data gathered from interviews, focus groups, observation activities,
and documents. For instance, Leonard has used focus groups and participantgenerated maps to articulate how young people’s identities are attached to
certain performances and movements through certain spaces in Belfast,
Northern Ireland (2006; 2010). Her studies show how youths not only inherit
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certain understandings of citizenship and belonging from their parents but also
actively construct their own awareness of their community and membership in it.
Also, Zeigler (2002) compares pre- and post-Soviet era maps in Central and
Eastern European countries as a means of illustrating how the meanings of
identities are re-framed and naturalized through banal visual and textual
mediums. Hromadzic uses “multisited participant observation” (2008, 545) and
interviews to illuminate the tension between discourses of citizenship and
democratic principles that are situated at multiple scales and how that tension
becomes tangible within neighborhood, school, and urban spaces. Hromadzic’s
findings indicate effects of competing notions of acceptable interaction between
ethnonational groups on the development of youth citizens.
The important characteristic of qualitative studies, only a few of which
have been mentioned here, is that they allow for both substantive understandings
of highly contextual phenomena and meaningful engagement with theory.
Qualitative research methods recognize that the researcher and the research
participants are situated in networks of power, privilege, and positionality, but that
such situations provide understandings of the contexts of political and
sociocultural processes (Secor 2010; Jones 2004). So while qualitative data,
such as that gathered from interviews and focus groups, are context dependent
and situational, they can also be used to draw out and explain theoretical
propositions regarding citizenship, identity, and belonging.
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Study Population and Research Sites
As explained in the introductory chapter, students in their last year of
secondary school in Tallinn were chosen as a study population because of the
growing recognition of young people as competent beings with political agency
and the importance of investigating how they formulate understandings of
citizenship, identity, and belonging in their everyday lives. As the focus on
Central and Eastern European nation-states’ transitions to democratic polities
increased after the collapse of the USSR, so too did the focus on how these
nation-states construct their national identities, engage with their Russophone
minorities, and educate their younger generations on citizenship and belonging.
As members of a society divided along ethnolinguistic lines, the young people in
Tallinn, Estonia are a study population that will provide fresh insights to the
theoretical issues that this dissertation engages with.
Secondary school students in Tallinn contend with discourses of belonging
and citizenship in the context of a divided society on the national level, but also in
the context of a pan-European community on the supranational level. This makes
for a messy and complicated forum within which to investigate youth citizenships,
but I argue that it is this complexity that gives this project significance and
relevance in broader theoretical discussions of citizenship in the contemporary
world.
Furthermore, investigating the citizenships and identities of Estonian and
Russophone students in Tallinn sheds light on a majority/minority politics that
does not fit comfortably into the common minority group categories of indigenous
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peoples, immigrant groups, and minority nationalisms (Kymlicka 1995). As
previously noted, the vast majority of Russophones in Estonia are a “beached
diaspora” that resulted from (voluntary or involuntary) Soviet-era migration.
Therefore, the processes of citizenship and identity formation, negotiation, and
mediation in the student study population illuminate a set of sociocultural and
political cohesions and fragmentations.
While young people’s identities and citizenships are “made and remade” in
and through everyday spaces, the school is a key site where they are “socialized
with regard to their roles in life and their places in society” (Holloway and
Valentine 2000, 770; Aitken in Holloway and Valentine 2000, 771). Teachers are
included in the study population because, as discussed in Chapter Four, they are
implicated in wider processes of social, cultural, and political interactions are
reproduced through formal and informal curricula. This places teachers in a
prominent role of transmitting and mediating the discourses of citizenship,
identity, and belonging within the nation-state as well as within supranational and
global contexts.
Secondary schools were chosen as the primary site to engage and recruit
student and teacher research participants. While there are a small, but growing,
number of private schools throughout Estonia, public secondary schools were
chosen for this study to reflect the fact that the large majority of basic and
secondary schools remain publicly funded by the Estonian government. As
mentioned in the introductory chapter, primary and secondary education in
Estonia is divided into Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools. There is
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a large overlap between school language medium, student ethnolinguistic
heritage, and student mother tongue (Kulu and Tammaru 2004), so in general it
can be said that Estonian-medium school students’ mother tongue and ethnic
heritage will be Estonian, and Russian-medium school students’ mother tongue
will be Russian and ethnic heritage will be Russian/Slavic. This overlap is
beneficial to study population recruitment in that the student focus groups
recruited from school sites will reflect the wider socio-spatial and educational
segregation in Tallinn.
Two secondary schools from each language medium were approached to
be part of the research project. Research into Tallinn’s educational landscape
and school demographics was conducted via public reports, national surveys,
and personal contacts in Tallinn. Contacts at each of the four participating
schools were made through emailed invitations to school administrators and
teachers describing the nature of the research project. Koidula School and
Pushkin School are well known in Tallinn for their prestigious reputations, high
national exam scores, and vibrant school atmospheres. It should be noted that
these schools are located in upper-middle class areas and that the student
populations generally come from comparatively higher socioeconomic
backgrounds. Both of these institutions are located in middle class areas of
Tallinn. These schools were selected with due consideration to stratifying the
study population over middle and lower level socioeconomic backgrounds so as
to reduce skew to upper class respondents as much as possible.
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Research Questions
This project’s data collection and analysis were shaped around three
major research questions:

1.

What are the everyday contexts in which Estonian youth develop an
awareness and understanding of social membership(s)?

Empirical inquiry for this research question concentrated on the following issues:
(a) how young people position themselves, their own group, and the Other group
within Estonian society; (b) the cultural, social, and political narratives they use to
constitute belonging and exclusion in the Estonian nation-state; and (c) the
extent to which historical memories of conflict endemic to adult populations in
Estonia influence their perceptions and narratives of citizenship and identity.

2.

What role does citizenship/civic education play in the citizenship

imaginaries of Estonian youths?
	
  
Empirical inquiry relating to question two focused on: (a) how educational
discourses on national identity, European citizenship, and multiculturalism impact
the way young people understand, express, evaluate, and negotiate their
citizenships and identities; (b) how young people evaluate, understand, and act
upon their citizenships at the national and supranational level; (c) the extent to
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which they feel politically and socially vested in Estonia, Europe, and/or other
places.

3.

What is the significance of everyday, urban space and place in the

development of young people’s cognizance of belonging and exclusion in the
context of a divided society?

Empirical inquiry for the final research question addressed: (a) the ways that
students’ own identities and the identities of the Other group shape and are
shaped by the everyday, urban spaces that they move in and through; and (b)
how day-to-day experiences impinge on their access to rights and feelings of
belonging vis-à-vis different groups.

These research questions pivot around the multiple, everyday contexts in
which young people experience and express citizenship and identity and attempt
to reveal the processes by which they negotiate discourses of belonging and
exclusion, group boundaries, and multi-scalar polities. These research questions
use everyday contexts as a base for exploring youth citizenships for two main
reasons. First, citizenships and identities are lived, negotiated, and experienced
institutions rather than passively received labels. It is in the everyday spaces and
places that individuals live their citizenships and identities, contending with
myriad discourses and narratives. Second, national and global discourses and
processes are embedded and operate in local spaces and contexts (S. L.
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Holloway and Valentine 2000; Staeheli 2003). Consequently, an investigation
into the everyday environments that young people are situated in exposes how
multi-scalar citizenships and identities intersect and are made meaningful on a
daily basis. This study approaches everyday spaces as more than inert
containers in which activity takes place, but as meaningful, active parts of the
lived practices through which young people articulate citizenship and belonging
at various scales. In this way it contributes to prevailing understandings of how
young people, understood as active agents, produce, reproduce, contest, and
negotiate multiple citizenships and identities. These questions relating to
everyday contexts and spaces, citizenship discourses, and identity narratives
structured the data collection and analysis, discussed below.

Primary Data Collection
Focus Groups
Focus groups were chosen as the primary data collection technique for
conversations with the student research participants. Focus groups are noted for
their ability to be adapted to the needs of many different types of research (Peek
and Fothergill 2009; Morgan 1996). Peek and Fothergill (2009, 55) explicitly
stress the “utility of focus groups for studying children” because the researcher is
able to understand children’s views from their own perspectives rather than
“relying on the accounts of adults.” Furthermore, focus groups have the ability to
“ ‘give a voice’ to marginalized groups” (Joseph et al in Morgan, 1996: 133; Kidd
and Parshall, 2000). This research engaged Russophones, the obvious
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marginalized group in Estonia, and focus groups allowed them to openly discuss
topics that contribute (or not) to their feelings of marginalization. It is argued here
that because of the tendency by dominant adult actors to discount or altogether
ignore the opinions and experiences of children, youths in general can also be
considered a marginalized group (Skelton 2010). The focus groups actively
engaged youths in a setting where their opinions were not only be heard, but
were also valued.
Moreover, focus groups create a group dynamic which solicits richer data
than one-on-one interviews because participants interact with each other (Peek
and Fothergill 2009; Seale 2004). Group members have been found to ask
questions of each other, explain themselves to each other, and engage in spirited
debate, which makes the sum of the focus group parts greater than the value of
individual interviews (Morgan 1996; Hambach et al. 2011). Group engagement
can also encourage participants to volunteer information that they would not have
disclosed in individual interviews (Kidd and Parshall 2000; Peek and Fothergill
2009). The researcher can also take advantage of the group setting to ask the
participants to compare and contrast their own experiences “rather than
aggregating individual data in order to speculate about whether or why the
interviewees differ” (Morgan 1996, 139). Focus groups allow the researcher to
learn multiple perspectives on a topic at one time (Gibbs 1997), and they provide
an opportunity for social interaction and engagement amongst research subjects,
helping to uncover tensions and different viewpoints that might exist among a
group of people (Morgan 1996; Morgan 1997; Leonard 2006; Goss and Leinbach
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1996; Montell 1999)(Man, 1996, 1997; Leonard, 2006; Goss and Leinbach, 1996;
Montell, 1999).
Eight focus groups were conducted with 29 students over a three-month
period in the autumn of 2012. The focus groups ranged in size from three
students to five students, and each focus group was comprised of students from
the same school. As previously mentioned, the participant school sites were used
to recruit student participants.
It was imperative to the research process that the students voluntarily
agreed to participate in the focus groups in order to reduce bias arising from
teachers or school administrators selectively identifying particular “types” of
students to participate. Teachers in each of the four participating schools agreed
to post an informational flyer in their classrooms and verbally alert students to the
opportunity to participate in the project. The informational flyer was made
available in Estonian and Russian and explicitly detailed the nature and purpose
of the project, the format of the focus group meeting, the assurance that the
focus group conversation would not be shared with any teacher, school
administrator, family member, or individual outside the focus group, and my
personal contact information.
The focus groups were assembled through a combination of direct
responses to the flyer and the snowballing technique. Snowballing “begins by
finding an entry point,” (in this case the students who contacted me directly about
participating) and asking “these contacts…to provide the names of others” (Secor
2010, 201). The initial student contacts were encouraged to invite other
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classmates to the focus group. The snowballing technique can “lead to focus
groups where participants are mostly acquainted with each other,” and therefore
bias the sample with participants who are similar to themselves (Secor 2010,
210). Nonetheless, homogeneity of background and personal identity traits in
focus groups can be beneficial because it decreases participant anxiety over
voicing different opinions and promotes “free-flowing conversations” (Peek and
Fothergill 2009, 39; Morgan 1996; Secor 2010). In this research, homogeneity of
personal characteristics were not found to preclude differing attitudes and
opinions as students in the same focus group often disagreed with each other
and debated topics.
The voluntary participation and snowballing recruitment techniques,
however, did not produce a sample representative of Tallinn’s young people that
would allow for inferences across the entire population of youths in Estonia, or
even Tallinn. For instance, because participation was voluntary, some
characteristics, such as gender, could not be controlled for. This resulted in
overrepresentation of females in the Estonian-medium school focus groups and
overrepresentation of males in the Russian-medium school focus groups.
Despite these limitations, however, the voluntary participation and snowballing
recruitment strategies did produce a broad range of attitudes and opinions on
belonging, exclusion, identity, and citizenship amongst young people in Tallinn.
The small size of the student study population prohibited large-scale
generalizations from being made across youths in Estonia or, indeed, in Tallinn.
The limited sample size meant that the analysis is necessarily skewed along

	
  

101

lines such as gender, class, and student participants with relatively homogenous
ethnolinguistic identities. As such, the analysis of the data gathered from the
student study population contains gaps in attention to issues addressed
elsewhere in literature on citizenship, identity, and education in Estonia, such as
non-Russophone minority identities (K. D. Brown 2005; Tammaru and Kulu 2003)
and the decline in the number of Russian-medium schools in Estonia (HoganBrun et al. 2008).
Table 3.1 summarizes the student study population. Coded identifiers are
used instead of pseudonyms in order to maximize anonymity across the student
population. The coded identifiers label students by their school and gender (e.g.
Koidula Girl 1, RB Boy 4) in order to compare responses to the interview data
gathered with teachers at their school during the analysis process. Because of
the aforementioned overlap between school language medium, student
ethnolinguistic background, and mother tongue, the majority of the students were
categorized into “Estonian” and “Russophone” subgroups. The four students
whose school language medium, ethnolinguistic heritage, and mother tongues
did not line up neatly were categorized in a separate subgroup labeled “outliers.”
These students are identified by an “O” in front of the standard coded identifiers.
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Table 3.1. Student Study Population
School

Identifier

Family
Heritage

Self- Reported
Ethnolinguistic
Identity

Mother
Tongue

Legal
Citizenship

Koidula
School
Est
Est
Est
Est
Mixed
Heritage
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est

Est & Rus

Est

Est
Est

Est
Est

Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Rus

Est

Rus

Est

Rus

Rus

Est

Est

Rus

Est

Est

Est & Rus

Est

Pushkin Boy 2
Pushkin Boy 3
Pushkin Boy 4
Pushkin Boy 5
Pushkin Boy 6
Pushkin Boy 7

Rus
Mixed
Heritage
Mixed
Heritage
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Est
Est
Est
Est
None
Est

Tolstoy Girl 1
Tolstoy Girl 2
Tolstoy Girl 3
Tolstoy Boy 1
Tolstoy Boy 2
Tolstoy Boy 3

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Est
Est
Est
Russia
Est
Est

Koidula Girl 1
Koidula Girl 2
Koidula Girl 3
Koidula Girl 4
O-Koidula Girl 5
Koidula Boy 1
Koidula Boy 2
Tammsaare
School
Tammsaare Girl 1
Tammsaare Girl 2
Tammsaare Girl 3
Tammsaare Girl 4
Tammsaare Girl 5
Tammsaare Girl 6
O-Tammsaare
Boy 1
Pushkin
School
Pushkin Girl 1
O-Pushkin Girl 2
O-Pushkin Boy 1

Tolstoy
School

*Est = Estonian/Estonia; **Rus = Russian/Russophone
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The focus group template utilized structured questions (in the form of an
intake survey) and semi-structured questions (in the form of open-ended
conversation). The structured questions on the intake survey were intended to
collect basic information to be used in concert with the semi-structured question
responses to make connections about ethnolinguistic heritage, identities, and
family background. The intake survey, shown in Appendix A, assessed data such
as place of birth, mother tongue, self-identified national identity, citizenship
status, and family background. “National identity” was a problematic category for
Russophone students because of the variety of Slavic backgrounds in their
heritages. After due consideration and discussion with the student participants,
this category was given the more appropriate label of “ethnolinguistic identity” for
the entire student study population as it better represented the group
identification that cleaves Estonian society. The intake survey, then, allowed for
comparison of identities and establishment of sub-groups within the student
study population.
The semi-structured questions facilitated in-depth assessment of how
individual and group identities are constructed, how boundaries are made and
unmade between different groups, how terms of belonging and exclusion are
established, and how different discourses influence and mediate narratives of
identity and citizenship. The questions corresponded to the three main research
questions stated above. The questions addressed: (a) the students’ mental
appraisals of the city landscape and how/why certain meanings are attached to
urban spaces; (b) how the students identify themselves and others, and how they
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evaluate different identity classifications (e.g. Estonian, Russophone, European);
and (c) how the students perceive, contend with, and internalize discourses of
citizenship and identity in their everyday spaces such as schools, home, and in
public. The focus group intake survey and semi-structured question templates
are included in Appendices A and B.
During the focus group the students were also shown maps of Tallinn and
encouraged to mark out which areas and locations are meaningful spaces in their
lives and what territorial impressions (if any) that they had of the city. The use of
this data collection technique was influenced by Leonard’s work on Protestant
and Catholic students in Belfast, Northern Ireland (2010). In her work this
mapping technique was very effective in prompting study participants to explain
their socio-spatial practices and how these relate to their identities and their
experiences of belonging and exclusion.

Conducting Focus Groups
I coordinated focus group meeting times via emails with student
respondents. I chose a café in Tallinn’s historic Old Town as the meeting place
because the city center is a site where people of many ethnic, cultural, and
national backgrounds mingle together freely. The café was chosen because it
had a small, relatively secluded upstairs section where the focus groups could be
conducted in as discrete a manner as possible. Furthermore, my personal
acquaintance with the café staff made reserving the same tables for each focus
group very easy, thus ensuring that the atmosphere was consistent for each
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group of students. Each focus group lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and was
preceded and/or followed by exchanges of pleasantries and inquiries into
American culture, life, and higher education.
All focus groups were recorded on a digital voice recorder. Each focus
group was offered the opportunity to have an Estonian or Russian interpreter
present during the conversation. A Russian interpreter was present at all of the
Russian-medium school focus groups, while the Estonian-medium school
students opted not to have a translator present. The English skills of all students
were advanced, however, and the interpreter present at the Russian-medium
school focus groups served principally to clarify vocabulary rather than to
interpret the entire conversation. Conducting focus groups in a language other
than the participants’ native tongue or through an interpreter poses the risk of
muddled meanings, miscommunications, and adding a power dimension.
However, due to the high quality of the students’ English skills and the
interpreter’s linguistic dexterity, few issues arose during the focus groups.
Regarding the addition of a power dimension between the interpreter and the
students, this was minimized due to the fact that the interpreter used was of
Russophone heritage and therefore the Russophone students were not apt to
adopt defensive or intimidated attitudes because of her presence.

Interviews
The research questions informed the interview templates used for
schoolteachers. The interview template consisted of semi-structured questions
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used to investigate the discourses and narratives of identity, citizenship, and
belonging that circulate within spaces of education in Estonia. These questions
were intended to draw comparisons between the discourses and narratives
presented by teachers in the classroom and the discourses and narratives used
by student respondents. The interview template can be found in Appendix C.
	
  
Identifying Interviewees and Building the Adult Study Population
Semi-structured interviews were chosen for data collection amongst
schoolteachers, education government officials, and NGO representatives.
Interviews are often used for “experts from whom [the researcher] hopes to learn
how certain practices, experiences, knowledges, or institutions work” and have
the benefit of allowing research subjects to explain the context in which they live
and work and how it informs their thoughts and actions (Secor 2010, 199; Jones
2004). Semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate method for acquiring
in-depth, subjective opinions from individuals who occupy particular positions in
public or private enterprises because “it might be socially awkward and
logistically difficult” to arrange a focus group. Furthermore, the use of semistructured interviews in addition to focus groups increases the rigor of the
research by producing richer data, allowing for triangulation, and balancing the
strengths and weaknesses of the utilized methods (Baxter and Eyles 1997;
Morgan 1996).
Teacher interviewees from the participating schools were recruited either
by direct email or the snowballing technique. Interviewees were identified through
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their subject of instruction. I not only interviewed civics teachers, but also history,
geography, and language arts teachers due to the fact that civic values and
national consciousness are shaped in many different subjects and curricula
(Faas 2011; Ahonen 2001; E. Doyle Stevick 2007; Galston 2001).
Teacher participation was voluntary. This accounts for the varying
numbers of teachers (and subjects) that were interviewed for each school. The
teachers who declined to participate cited time constraints and, on one occasion,
unsuitability of their subject for my project3. The teachers of the twelfth level, i.e.
the grade level of the student participants, were prioritized as interviewees.
However some teachers that volunteered handled other secondary school levels.
These interviews were still conducted on the basis that the students’ civic
education is not limited to their last year in secondary school, but takes place
throughout their childhood and adolescence. As such, the discourses and
narratives of schoolteachers throughout students’ education are likely to impact
the conceptualizations of citizenship and identity they hold in their last year of
secondary school.
The adult research participants were given coded identifiers similar to
those of the student respondents. Teachers’ coded identifiers are based on their
school and their subject (e.g. EB History/Civics or Pushkin Russian Language).
Table 3.2 summarizes the adult population, but it is addressed in more detail in
Chapter Four.
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A geography teacher that was contacted replied that she only taught physical geography and
not human geography, and therefore would be unhelpful to interview given the subject matter of
the research.
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Table 3.2 Teacher Study Population
School

Identifier

Self- Reported Ethnolinguistic
Heritage

Koidula School
Koidula History/Civics
Koidula Estonian
Language
Koidula English
Language
Koidula Geography 1
Koidula Geography 2
Koidula Extracurriculars

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Tammsaare School
Tammsaare
History/Civics 1
Tammsaare
History/Civics 2
Tammsaare
History/Civics 3

Est
Rus
Est

Pushkin School
Pushkin History/Civics 1
Pushkin History/Civics 2
Pushkin Russian
Language
Pushkin Geography

Rus
Rus

Tolstoy History/Civics
Tolstoy Estonian
Language
Tolstoy Geography

Est

Rus
Est

Tolstoy School
Mixed Heritage
Rus

*Est = Estonian; **Rus = Russophone
Conducting Interviews
Interviews were arranged according to the needs and preferences of the
interviewee. Interviews with teachers were conducted in their classrooms during
after-school or break hours. Education government officials and NGO
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representatives were interviewed in their offices (with one exception of an
interview being conducted in a café of the interviewee’s choosing).
The interviews were recorded on digital voice recorders and lasted from
45 to 70 minutes. As with the student study participants, all adult study
participants were offered the opportunity to have an Estonian or Russian
interpreter present. Throughout the majority of the adult study population,
interviewees who were younger and/or operated at state and international levels
opted not to request an interpreter. The English skills of these interviewees were
exceptional, decreasing the possibility for miscommunication and linguistic
barriers. Conversely, older and locally based interviewees requested an
interpreter. These interviews included both conversations that were completely
conducted via the interpreter and those where the interviewee spoke English and
consulted the interpreter for vocabulary and/or grammar issues. In order to
maximize the interviewees’ comfort levels and decrease awkwardness, the
interpreters used shared the same ethnolinguistic background of the individual
being interviewed.

Reflexivity: Power Relations in Focus Groups and Interviews
Several scholars of qualitative methodologies have written on the inherent
subjectivities of research. Constructivists, such as feminist and critical theorists,
in particular “reject the basic premise that an objective researcher discovers
truths from preexisting data” (Staller 2010, 1159–60; C. Brown 2005). In
qualitative data collection techniques such as focus groups and interviews, the
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interviewer and interviewee(s) are situated within a power relation that is imbued
with meanings, values, and ideas. This power relation affects both the researcher
and respondent because during focus groups and interviews the “encounter
becomes a mutually co-operative event” (Seale 2004, 253; Secor 2010).
In recognizing the researcher’s embeddedness within the social
interactions and iterative processes, qualitative methods theorists have argued
the imperativeness of reflexivity—that is, the awareness on the part of the
researcher that she affects and is affected “by the research processes and
outcomes” (Haynes 2012, 72). Moreover, reflexivity on the part of the researcher
must extend past the face-to-face encounter and into the data analysis and
research dissemination phases (Gee 2011; Haynes 2012; Fetterman 1989;
Oakley 2004; Staller 2010).
A properly reflexive researcher acknowledges not only that she and her
respondent(s) are entrenched in webs of power relations, but also the way in
which she herself is situated within the respondents’ communities. This involves
both the way that she perceives her respondents and the way that her
respondents perceive her (Nagar and Geiger 2007). Moreover, when the
researcher is or becomes, to a certain extent, an “intimate insider” of the
community she is researching or at least “friendly” with the respondents (both of
which I experienced during fieldwork) the importance of reflexivity is elevated
(Taylor 2011). The relationships that develop between the researcher and
respondent(s) will generate certain biases, but will also enhance the richness of
the data gathered.
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In my case I decided to ingratiate myself with the Estonian community by
studying the Estonian language intensively for six weeks prior to fieldwork. The
Estonians regard their language as the hallmark of their identity and are
extremely protective of its continued existence because of the small number of
people who speak it (approximately 1 million speakers in 2012). Estonians are
known for looking favorably upon any foreigner who learns their language, not
only because it is a basic show of respect but also because Estonian is a
notoriously difficult language to study and therefore requires a great deal of effort
on the part of the learner.
Being able to converse, however basically, in Estonian was quite clearly
appreciated by Estonian respondents—both young and adult—and generally
effected friendly, relaxed atmospheres during interviews and focus groups. The
Estonian research participants were forthcoming and enthusiastic during
conversations, demonstrating a genuine appreciation for an American researcher
that was informed about Estonian culture, language, and history. To be sure, my
“insider” status should not be interpreted as complete knowledge of sociocultural
substance and structure, but rather as a status that makes me “privy to
undocumented… knowledge of the people and cultural phenomenon being
studied” (Taylor 2011, 9).
This insider status was not uniformly applied, however. My abilities in
conversational Estonian did not, for instance, preclude some Estonian
respondents’ from adopting a somewhat frosty attitude towards an American
whose research project included questions of Russophone experience and
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minority politics in Estonia. With Estonian adult respondents in particular there
was an emphasis placed on addressing the historic plight of Estonians at the
hands of Russian and Russophone interlopers and the subsequent right of
Estonians to preserve and protect their culture and identity.
Conversely, Russophone respondents tended to perceive me as a friendly
figure (even though my Russian was extremely limited) because I was
acknowledging the legitimacy of their perspectives and narratives. Several
Russophone respondents expressed surprise that an American (a) knew that
there was a Russophone diaspora living in Estonia and (b) did not appear biased
against Russophones because of the historically contentious politics between the
USA and Soviet Union/Russian Federation. These attitudes contributed to many
open, frank, and enthusiastic responses from Russophones.
These and other factors contributed to the relationships that I developed
with many of the research participants, and those relationships continue to
influence this dissertation in several aspects. For instance, the reciprocal
perceptions developed between myself and the respondent(s) are evident
through the tenors of the conversations. The mood and tone of each
conversation contributed to the ongoing development of these mutual
perceptions during the encounter, which affected the amount and content of the
information exchanged. Furthermore, the natures of these relationships have a
continual effect on the ways in which I interpreted and engaged with the data
during the analysis process. In consideration of trust and confidence between my
respondents and I, great care was given to use and analysis of the data so as to
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respect the contexts in which statements were made while also reporting
information relevant to my research.

Secondary Data Collection
The two main components of data collection outlined above were
supplemented by the collection of Estonian government policy documents,
census data, reports, and assessments, EU educational policy documents,
treaties, and directives, newspaper stories, and other secondary materials that
provide context and background information for this project. Particular focus was
given to the following: Estonian reports and assessments of integration programs
and policies; newspaper articles about interethnic issues in Estonia; EU
programs and policies aimed directly at youths in new member-states; and
materials and websites published by NGOs dealing with youth issues, especially
youth citizenship.

Data Analysis
Evaluative Criteria and Coding
The analysis of the primary and secondary data was organized around the
topics that relate directly to the primary research questions detailed previously in
this chapter:

1. Student Identities: Focus groups were evaluated according to (a) the
respondents’ definitions of themselves (e.g. Estonian, Russophone,
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European, and/or combinations of these); (b) their explanations of the
boundaries of their identities as well as the permeability of those
boundaries; (c) the terms of belonging to or exclusion from certain identity
groups and the processes of Othering different individuals and groups the
extent to which ideas of diversity and multiculturalism are relevant to their
identities; (d) their sense of possessing rights an identities somewhere
other than Estonia; (e) the extent to which school is a meaningful site of
citizenship formation; and (f) the extent to which identities if formed
through everyday experiences.

2. Civic Education Curricula and Discourses: For this element of the
research, both focus groups and interviews were assessed according to:
(a) teachers’ engagements with nationalist discourses of citizenship and
identity in the classroom; (b) teachers’ engagements with discourses of
multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance in the classroom; (c) the
characterizations of national, post-national, and multicultural citizenships
within the classroom and wider school environment; (d) the styles of
informal curricula present in the classroom; (e) students’ perceptions of
the discourses, narratives, and strategies employed by their teachers in
the classroom; and (f) students’ conceptualizations of citizenships,
identities, and terms of belonging as compared to the discourses they and
the teachers report experiencing in the classroom.
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3. Youth Geographies: For the final research component focus groups were
examined according to: (a) students’ narratives of Tallinn’s urban
geographies; (b) descriptions and evaluations of Tallinn’s sociocultural
landscape, including specific places of memory such as monuments,
memorials, and museums; (c) spaces of inter- and intra-group social
interaction, including where students feel comfortable and uncomfortable,
and places that they frequent or avoid; (d) evaluations of the meanings
and identities attached and/or ascribed to certain spaces and places in the
everyday urban landscape of Tallinn; and (e) the sense of belonging or
exclusion felt in particular areas or places in the city.

The evaluative criteria were formalized through color-coding of focus
group and interview transcripts. The coding guide designated certain colors to
responses regarding various topics, such as self- and Other- identify traits,
dialogues on language use, perceptions and meanings assigned to urban
spaces, discussion of traits and significances of national and European
citizenships, and explicit and implicit evaluations of identity and citizenship
discourses disseminated in schools and other everyday spaces.
Following fieldwork, focus group and interview recordings were
transcribed and prepared for analysis. Both primary and secondary data were
evaluated using the discourse analysis technique. Discourse analysis, according
to Gee, “is the study of language-in-use” and is appropriate for this research
project because “all language is political and all language is part of the way we
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build and sustain our world, cultures, and institutions” (Gee 2011, 10). By
language-in-use, Gee refers to meanings, attitudes, and opinions that are
conveyed both through and beyond words. Discourse analysis involves careful
selection of formal and informal, direct and indirect themes of meaning in oral
and written texts. Such an analysis technique is salient to the research questions
that shaped this project because,
“people build identities and activities not just through language, but
by using language together with other “stuff” that isn’t language…
[Discourses are] ways of combining and integrating language,
actions, ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using various
symbols, tools, and objects to enact a particular sort of socially
recognizable identity.” (Gee 2011, 28–9)
In order to establish patterns in narratives and identify discourses, student
and adult respondent traits were input into several spreadsheets labeled with a
specific criteria topic. In each of these spreadsheets, the participants’ responses
on the particular topic were matched with the corresponding participants’
identifying traits. For instance, focus group or interview participants’ traits, such
as sex, school-language medium, ethnolinguistic identity, mother tongue, or
subject taught in school, were listed on each spreadsheet. Then, the responses
of each participant for the spreadsheet’s particular topic were matched to the
particular participant’s identity trait. This allowed for their responses to specific
topics to be sorted and compared within the group according to particular identity
traits. This ordering was not intended to make broad generalizations across the
entire student or adult study population. Instead, this sorting aimed at identifying
patterns within sub-groups of the study population in order to establish what, if
any, connection existed between sex, school-language medium, ethnolinguistic
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identity, mother tongue, or subject taught in school and the nature of the
responses for that particular topic. Table 3.3 is a partial example of one such
spreadsheet that grouped responses by identity trait.
Table 3.3. Partial Spreadsheet Sorting of Coded Responses
School	
  Medium	
  
Estonian	
  
Estonian	
  
Estonian	
  

Heritage	
  
Estonian	
  
Estonian	
  
Estonian	
  

Sex	
  
F	
  
F	
  
F	
  

Study	
  Abroad?	
  
Yes	
  
Yes	
  
Yes	
  

Estonian	
  
Estonian	
  
Russian	
  
Russian	
  
Russian	
  
Russian	
  

Mixed	
  
Mixed	
  
Mixed	
  
Mixed	
  
Russophone	
  
Russophone	
  

F	
  
M	
  
F	
  
M	
  
M	
  
F	
  

Yes	
  
Yes	
  
Yes	
  
Yes	
  
No	
  
Yes	
  

Length	
  
Short	
  
Short	
  
Short	
  
Long/perman
ent	
  
Short	
  
Short	
  
Short	
  
n/a	
  
Short	
  

Additionally, a reverse sorting of responses and identity traits was
performed. Instead of sorting responses by identity traits, identity traits were
sorted by responses. Clustering by response allowed comparing and contrasting
between subgroups according to how various members of the study population
delineated boundaries of social groups, characterized citizenship meanings, and
ascribed identities on urban spaces. Moreover, this type of grouping aided in
evaluating response patterns that may not have coincided with preconceived
notions and assumed linkages between certain identity traits and attitudes or
opinions. For instance, it became clear that narratives of multiculturalism were
woven into the fabric of several Russophone students’ conceptualizations of
belonging and exclusion in Estonian society. Not all Russophone students,
however, incorporated those tenets into their thoughts on issues of belonging.
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Thus, the multiculturalist ideas cannot be assumed to be part of the narratives of
all Russophone students, much less all Russophones in Estonia, simply because
they are part of the minority group. However, by comparing student responses
that included and omitted multicultural ideas, I was able to explore the ways in
which different discourses play into individuals’ perceptions of the politics of
identity and belonging in Estonia.
One benefit of performing these two sorting methods on responses and
participant identity markers was the ability to monitor consistency, or lack thereof,
in respondents feedback about interrelated topics. For instance, in clustering one
set of responses that involved phrases and ideas related to multiculturalism and
another set of responses that privileged specific ethnolinguistic or cultural
practices over others, I was able to discern which members of the study
population contradicted themselves, either explicitly or implicitly. As is discussed
in greater detail in Chapter Four, this analysis revealed trends that suggest
uneven internalization of multicultural discourses amongst the student
respondents in particular.
The focus group and interview transcripts were analyzed according to the
criteria outlined at the beginning of this section. I engaged with the results of the
research in the context of both the issues of Estonian youth citizenship that
interested me and the possibilities that I anticipated prior to fieldwork. To begin,
these young people’s unique position of being the first wholly post-Soviet
generation in Estonia posed interesting questions about the interaction between
historical narratives of older generations and young people’s personal
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experiences in a democratic Estonia. I anticipated the possibility that tensions
between Estonian and Russophone youths would have remained high due to the
strong influence of negative narratives in home spaces, but also the possibility
that EU membership and discourses may have served to mediate animosity
between the younger generations. Second, the fact that the young people in the
proposed study population holding Estonian citizenship have been European
citizens for almost a decade at the time of fieldwork raised compelling questions
about their perceptions of supranational citizenship and the attendant rights and
responsibilities. Third, my research on Estonian society prior to fieldwork led me
to expect that the students’ personal geographies would reflect the socio-spatial
divisions of Tallinn’s neighborhood districts. I was interested in exploring whether
this expectation was true and how the student respondents ascribed meanings
and identities to urban spaces and place. Finally, I was interested in what kinds
of narratives and discourses operate in secondary schools in Tallinn and how
they address multi-scalar identities and citizenships in a post-Soviet, European
Estonia. The data collected in focus groups and interviews was compared
against these assumptions and that analysis was used to inform arguments
made regarding the original research questions noted above on youth citizenship
and identity formation.

Conclusions
To summarize, this dissertation has applied qualitative research methods
in the framework of a case study. This research project has attempted to achieve
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results that are valid and reliable through methodic ordering, organizing, and
analyzing of focus group and interview transcript data. The highly contextual,
rich, and subjective explanations of citizenship and identity perceptions
presented by young people in Tallinn required the use of qualitative techniques to
produce substantive and considered arguments about such unquantifiable topics.
While not concerned with generalizing findings to young people in Tallinn (or
Estonia) as a whole, this dissertation has focused on using conclusions to
engage with and contribute to current theories and approaches to citizenship,
identity, and belonging in youth populations.
As the body of citizenship and identity theory indicates, myriad
conceptualizations of belonging, rights, and community membership have been
advanced. What is apparent in these contemporary conceptualizations,
regardless of the numerous striations within the literature, is that citizenship,
identity, and belonging are not static statuses or institutions, but rather are
constantly being formed and reformed in and through various spaces, places,
and scales. In assessing the data and investigating the potential trends that the
data suggests, this dissertation intends to illuminate the ways in which young
people actively negotiate, mediate, and contend with multi-scalar discourses of
belonging, identity, and rights and the spaces in which these practices occur.
These issues are the focus of Chapters Four, Five, and Six, which use focus
groups and interviews to engage with contemporary understandings of
citizenships.
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Chapter 4
Youth Citizenship and Identity:
Navigating Multiple Discourses of Belonging
Liberal theory defines citizenship as a rights-based institution that
establishes a relationship between citizens and the state. Liberal theory rests on
an “ideal of universal citizenship” that assumes an equality amongst all
individuals in a political community and that “transcends particularity and
difference” (Young 1989, 250). Most contemporary definitions of citizenship treat
the universality of citizenship as a given and draw upon a vocabulary of equality,
sameness, and generality. Critics of these assumptions of liberal theory,
however, suggest that such universal ideals are in fact predicated on difference.
Liberal theorizations have been challenged by cultural conceptions of citizenship
as a “collective identity… that can come to terms with cultural difference and
fragmentation” (Bosniak 2000, 967).
Because equality has been “conceived as sameness” (i.e. a status that is
common to all regardless of differences of identity, social standing, or economic
worth), the universality of citizenship, it seems, rejects particularity. Universality
means that citizens are defined by what they “have in common as opposed to
how they differ” and that laws and rules are the same for everyone because they
are “blind to individual and group differences” (Young 1989, 250). However the
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universality of citizenship in contemporary liberal democratic nation-states has
failed to bring real equality to all individuals within the polity. Groups and
individuals with formal national citizenships still experience significant
discrimination and marginalization.
Several citizenship theorists have interrogated the reasons why universal
citizenship has not led to the actual equality of all groups and individuals in
nation-states (Bosniak 2000; Laclau 1992; Young 1989; Wemyss 2006; W.
Brown 2008). These discussions indicate is that although membership in the
nation-state is defined in universal terms of common identity markers and the
“same general point of view” (Young 1989, 251), those identity markers and the
elements of the same point of view are in fact defined by the particularisms of the
dominant group in society. Hence, the privileged position of the dominant group
in a liberal democratic nation-state results in “the universalization of its own
particularism” (Laclau 1992, 86; emphasis mine) that “asserts its…perspective on
social events as impartial and objective” (Young 1989, 268). Universal
citizenship, therefore, is nothing more than a particularism that has been made
dominant.
The liberal insistence on “equality as sameness” has resulted in a
universal citizenship that suppresses or ignores group difference in order create
a seemingly homogenized society. In recent years multiculturalist theory and
practice have attempted to rectify the suppression of social and group differences
through discourses of acceptance and tolerance of cultural difference.
Multiculturalism has attempted to decouple the idea of sameness from equality
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by arguing that recognition of socio-cultural difference will lead to true freedom
and equality for all citizens. These multicultural ideas have permeated most
Western societies, as evidenced by the European Union’s assertion that it is
“united in diversity,” among much else. But the ambiguity in multiculturalist
discourse and theory is revealed in actual practice of multiculturalism. Brown
(2008) argues that multiculturalism usually means mere toleration of difference
that allows the majority group to maintain privilege. Wood and Gilbert (2005)
have observed that multiculturalism in practice involves superficial contact with
the Other in urban, educational, or political spaces. The result is that theories of
multiculturalism are not as adept at alleviating the tension between universalisms
and particularisms as its proponents suggest. In fact, multiculturalism reproduces
these tensions and indeed brings them into sharper relief, calling into question
whether the tensions between universalisms and particularisms can actually be
alleviated at all.
Still, multicultural discourses are important in Western societies. They
operate in myriad spaces and have become important fixtures in political and
social discourses (Kymlicka 1995; Balint 2010). The pervasiveness of
multicultural discourse in educational spaces in particular demonstrates their
significance in Western nation-states. Schools are principal sites where
citizenship ideals are communicated to young people and are sites where youth
encounter and learn about multicultural discourses. Multicultural discourses, in all
their variations, are attempts to articulate and practice sameness and difference
in diverse societies—i.e. they are modes of negotiating the tensions in attempting
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to reconcile the idea of equality and sameness with the reality of differences and
disparities. As such, despite the theoretical paucity of multiculturalism, the
consideration of multicultural discourses is requisite to the examination of
articulations of belonging and identity.
Western nation-states and the EU are constantly contending with how to
balance between promoting nation-building/social cohesion and espousing
tolerance/respect of difference. This contention is thrown into sharp relief in
culturally diverse divided societies. Multicultural integration is often framed as the
desirable alternative to assimilatory nationalisms, processes that involve minority
culture(s) being subsumed under the dominant culture. However, a more critical
reading of these two apparently competing discourses illuminates that both rely
on processes of Othering particular groups. Similar logics of alterity lead both
multiculturalist and nation-building practices to define terms of membership in
society, thereby locating Other groups on the margins or outside the boundaries
entirely. Multiculturalism does not eliminate assimilatory practices and
discourses, but rather complements and complicates them.
This chapter attempts to illustrate how the narratives of national
citizenship and multiculturalist discourses inform identity, citizenship, and
belonging among young people Estonia. The analysis here assesses how the
student interviewees ascribe identity traits to the Estonian citizen. This chapter
also highlights the interaction between the student participants’ positionalities
within the Estonian nation-state and the Western liberal democratic ideals of
multiculturalism (framed as tolerance) that circulate in their educational spaces,
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and how this interaction produces conceptions of belonging, identity, and
citizenship.
The findings from this study reveal that the politics of identity and
citizenship in Estonia are much more complex than simply a titular majority
discriminating against a minority. Young people are prone to delineating the
parameters of substantive citizenship along ethnolinguistic and socio-cultural
lines rather than solely on formal politico-legal membership in the nation-state.
This results in a contestation over who is or should be allowed access, and under
what terms, to all citizenship rights—legal, political, socio-cultural, and civil. The
legacy of Estonia’s Soviet era has produced an unpredictable environment where
the “righting of historical wrongs” interplay with the country’s dominant narrative
of leaving behind an oppressive Soviet past and embracing a free, democratic,
Western European way of life and with ideas of diversity and tolerance.
Estonian students often justify universalizing the particular identity traits of
ethnic Estonians as a means of protecting an Estonian culture that has been
historically threatened by outside forces (most recently Russophone Soviet
forces). At the same time, Russophone students adduce the ethnopolitics of
exclusion that Russian-speakers have faced in recent years to highlight threats to
their own identities and to argue for their sociocultural and linguistic rights.
Tellingly, however, Russophone students continue to maintain and assert their
differentiated identities in response to the dominance of the Estonian group even
while holding Estonian citizenship—in other words, they assert sameness and
difference at the same time. Further complicating the students’ ideas and
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opinions is their use of multicultural keywords like “tolerance” and “acceptance”
(likely influenced by EU discourses on unity in diversity in schools and wider
society) without any indication that they have internalized attitudes of
acceptance. The meanings of citizenship articulated by both the Estonian and
Russophone students reflect stereotypes, prejudices, assumptions, and
experiences, which in turn lead to frequent contradictions. As such, the student
focus groups reveal highly complex and dynamic conceptions of belonging and
citizenship.
This chapter focuses on the tensions between universalisms and
particularisms present in both multicultural and national citizenship discourses
and how these tensions interact with the students’ ascriptions of identities in
Estonian society. Using data collected in student focus groups and teacher
interviews, this chapter examines the tension inherent in negotiating an
apparently universal citizenship that is in fact underscored by differences in the
students’ positionalities in the Estonian majority or Russophone minority. It pays
special attention to the discourses that they encounter in schools by exploring the
similarities and differences between the narratives of the students and their
teachers. This chapter is organized around the contexts in which young people
form citizenship and draws on direct quotations from focus groups to illustrate
how they negotiate, contest, and perform citizenship in Estonia. These contexts
are not limited to formal circumstances in which official discourses of citizenship
circulate, but also include mundane spaces of daily life where engagements with
informal, varied configurations of citizenship take place. The varied nature of the
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contexts in which young people develop understandings of belonging suggests
that citizenship is a multi-sited process, de-centered from the nation-state, and
present everyday spaces and interactions

The Classroom as Forum for Multiple Discourses of Citizenship
Educational spaces have long been recognized as a crucial site for the
development of citizens. Through national curricula that emphasize certain
“values and behaviors associated with citizenship” and particular readings of
history nation-states not only create citizens but also the identity of the national
community (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668; Michaels and Stevick 2009;
Ahonen 2001; Kolossov 2003). In Western nation-states civic education curricula
are by and large aimed at forming democratic citizens, and are therefore laden
with discourses of liberal ideals of citizenship that include “post-national”
narratives of equality, tolerance, and multiculturalism (Banks 2008; Ahonen 2001;
Soysal 1997). Such post-nationalist narratives work to reconfigure rights,
identities, and political processes that are traditionally associated with the nationstate, instead conceptualizing citizenships as institutions and processes that exist
above and across national boundaries. But even in liberal democratic nationstates that espouse multicultural ideals there are narratives and discourses of
nationalism that seek to construct a cohesive national community (Faas 2011;
McGlynn et al. 2004). The coexistence of different civic ideals reflects multiple
layers of citizenship discourse that are multivalent rather than uniformly
constructed. As a result, national and post-national agendas and discourses
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operate and circulate simultaneously, generating ideological tensions that must
be then negotiated by teachers and students in the classroom (Hromadzić 2008;
Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010).
The coexistence of national and post-national discourses in educational
spaces is particularly evident in divided societies. Civic education in divided
societies that are in the process of transitioning to liberal democratic systems is
particularly fraught because of the simultaneous desires to establish and solidify
a national community and a democratic citizenry. These discourses exist in
tension with each other, creating civic education discourses that “veer between
ethnocentrism” and liberalism (Faas 2011, 480). During the process of
democratic transition in divided societies, teachers are required to both navigate
the “step-by-step” transformation into democratic civic education (Toots 2003,
566) and the shift in the grand narratives used in nation-building (E. Doyle
Stevick 2007; Ahonen 2001; Staeheli and Hammett 2010). In such situations
classroom environments are not only subject to conflicting discourses and
narratives but also to widely varying attitudes projected by teachers, parents, and
fellow students (Sarah L. Holloway et al. 2010; Hahn 1998).
Teacher narratives, classroom environments, and curricula discourses,
along with the actual built environment of the school, are all parts of what Brown
(2005, 79) calls the “schoolscape”—the “physical and social setting in which
teaching and learning take place.” Schoolscapes are the everyday contexts that
comprise part of educational spaces, where abstract educational plans, ideals,
and values are enacted. If educational spaces, broadly construed, are where
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citizens are developed, schoolscapes are the crucial “factor[s] in shaping
identities and dispositions toward” citizenship and the terms of belonging in
society (K. D. Brown 2005, 79). The schoolscape contributes to what Havel
(2009, 18) describes as “the panorama of everyday life,” which constantly, and
often subliminally, “reminds people… what is expected of them...and what they
must do well if they don’t want to be excluded” from society. For young people in
particular, schoolscapes are prominent and oft-encountered parts of the
“panorama of” their everyday lives and geographies and transmit ideas not only
about what it means to be considered legitimate in society, but also about what it
takes to be excluded from society.
The schoolscape encompasses discursive, material, and even virtual
elements that convey particular assumptions about identity, belonging, and
legitimacy in wider society. School curriculum topics and projects, displays of
patriotic symbols in the school and on the school grounds, ceremonial events
and rituals, and even the use “of the school’s social space” (K. D. Brown 2005,
84) are components of the schoolscape that (re)produce and even reinforce
certain understandings of citizenship, the rights it affords, and what individuals
(and groups) those rights are available to. Schoolscapes are undoubtedly an
important factor in shaping educational spaces, but must still be considered as
situated within young people’s broader geographies amongst other spaces where
socialization takes place, most notably the home and other familial settings (S. L.
Holloway and Valentine 2000; Wylie 2004; Thomas 2008).
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Schoolscapes in divided societies, (i.e. those with divided school
systems), often introduce an added layer of complexity to the education of
citizens. Even if there is a formal, official, national curricula that applies to all
schools in a divided educational system, the physical and social settings in which
learning takes place will vary considerably depending upon whether the school’s
student body is from the majority group, minority group, or is mixed (integrated)
(Hromadzić 2008; Hayes, McAllister, and Dowds 2007). In addition to the
possibility that schoolscapes will vary according to societal divisions drawn along
ethnocultural lines, young people’s experiences within the schoolscape will
interact with experiences in other spaces of their personal geographies,
especially the home and the segregated urban landscape. In minority group
schools, for instance, “required” curriculum material dictated by the government
(read: dominant majority), as well as the way in which that curriculum is
presented, may serve to reinforce feelings of exclusion and “supply raw material
for partisan narratives” (Barton and McCully 2005). Therefore, the schoolscape,
as the “vital, symbolic context” in which values and ideals are “socially supported
in the school” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79), will serve to communicate standards of
legitimacy, but cannot guarantee that all young people will experience the
schoolscape similarly or positively.
Civic education is not a static, unilateral process in which adult agents
pour knowledge into young people who are passive receptacles of ideas and
information (S. L. Holloway and Valentine 2000; Hahn 1998; Skelton 2010). Civic
education is a dynamic set of processes in which teachers, students, and
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communities interact within highly contextual political, economic, social, and
cultural situations to actively “rework both the teaching of citizenship education
and the ways in which it is received” (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668).
Therefore it is important to consider the role of teacher narratives, classroom
environment, and the school site in the production and reproduction of citizenship
discourses within the space of the school.
As detailed in chapter one, the Estonian school system is divided by
language-medium. Similar to this research’s student study population, there is a
sizable overlap between the teachers’ ethnolinguistic heritages and the language
medium of the school they teach in (with a few notable exceptions). This point is
worth noting, as teachers’ backgrounds can and do figure into the informal
curricula of teacher attitudes to produce varying classroom environments even
when the formal curriculum is standard across schools (McGlynn et al. 2004; E.
Doyle Stevick 2007; Hahn 1998). The special attention given to the teachers’
narratives and discourses is not meant to imply that the school is the only or the
most meaningful space in which young people encounter and negotiate
conceptualizations of citizenship; on the contrary, this section will illuminate that
young people’s conceptualizations of citizenship and belonging cannot be
compartmentalized within one discrete space, but must be understood as fluid
products produced and reproduced through and in multiple spaces of their
everyday geographies such as the home and the urban environment. Because
citizenship education “inevitably has to confront the histories that children,
parents, and teachers have lived” it will necessarily involve discourses of
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citizenship, identity, and belonging in other spaces that complement, contradict,
and mediate each other (Staeheli and Hammett 2010, 668). The evidence
gathered in this project substantiates these theorizations of the school as one of
many important spaces for young people’s development and understanding of
belonging and identity in society.
My findings suggest that Holloway and Valentine’s (2000, 771)
theorization of “the spatiality of the school as both embedded within wider sociospatial relations and as a site through which these are reproduced” is a helpful
mode of understanding the complexities of young people’s negotiation of
citizenships and identities. In comparing the responses of the student and
teacher study populations I discovered that the interaction between students’
experiences in the school and in other spaces (e.g. the home and the city) is
complex and circular—that is, the discourses that students encounter in the
classroom inform and are informed by the discourses and experiences in other
spaces. This finding suggests that citizenship is produced in a very uneven
political landscape, resulting in multiple productions of ideas about belonging.
Importantly, the discourses of identity and belonging that the students from
different schools speak ardently about vary between multiculturalisms and
ethnonationalisms, and between nationalisms and supranationalisms.
The sections that follow will address the citizenship discourses present in
all participant schools, how teacher narratives of these discourses vary, and the
patterns that emerge between the students from the same participant schools.
Responses and narratives from both teachers and students are compared in
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order to demonstrate these patterns. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 outline the teacher and
student respondents’ identifiers, school affiliations, and ethnolinguistic heritages,
and are provided for reference purposes.

Table 4.1 Teacher Study Population
School

Identifier

Self- Reported Ethnolinguistic
Heritage

Koidula School
Koidula History/Civics
Koidula Estonian
Language
Koidula English
Language
Koidula Geography 1
Koidula Geography 2
Koidula Extracurriculars

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Tammsaare School
Tammsaare
History/Civics 1
Tammsaare
History/Civics 2
Tammsaare
History/Civics 3

Est
Rus
Est

Pushkin School
Pushkin History/Civics 1
Pushkin History/Civics 2
Pushkin Russian
Language
Pushkin Geography

Rus
Rus

Tolstoy History/Civics
Tolstoy Estonian
Language
Tolstoy Geography

Est

Rus
Est

Tolstoy School

*Est = Estonian; **Rus = Russian/Russophone
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Mixed Heritage
Rus

Table 4.2 Student Study Population
School

Identifier

Family
Heritage

Self- Reported
Ethnolinguistic
Identity

Mother
Tongue

Legal
Citizenship

Koidula
School
Koidula Girl 1
Koidula Girl 2
Koidula Girl 3
Koidula Girl 4

Est
Est
Est
Est
Mixed
Heritage
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est

Est

Est & Rus

Est

Est
Est

Est
Est

Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Est
Est
Est
Est
Est
Est

Rus

Est

Rus

Est

Rus

Rus

Est

Est

Rus

Est

Est

Est & Rus

Est

Pushkin Boy 2
Pushkin Boy 3
Pushkin Boy 4
Pushkin Boy 5
Pushkin Boy 6
Pushkin Boy 7

Rus
Mixed
Heritage
Mixed
Heritage
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Est
Est
Est
Est
None
Est

Tolstoy Girl 1
Tolstoy Girl 2
Tolstoy Girl 3
Tolstoy Boy 1
Tolstoy Boy 2
Tolstoy Boy 3

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus
Rus

Est
Est
Est
Russia
Est
Est

O-Koidula Girl 5
Koidula Boy 1
Koidula Boy 2
Tammsaare
School
Tammsaare Girl 1
Tammsaare Girl 2
Tammsaare Girl 3
Tammsaare Girl 4
Tammsaare Girl 5
Tammsaare Girl 6
O-Tammsaare
Boy 1
Pushkin
School
Pushkin Girl 1
O-Pushkin Girl 2
O-Pushkin Boy 1

Tolstoy
School

*Est = Estonian/Estonia; **Rus = Russian/Russophone

	
  

135

Teacher Narratives of Belonging
A pattern that emerges across the student study population as a whole is
one of inconsistent but frequent narratives about multiculturalism, tolerance, and
respect of diversity. This pattern, I argue, results from students’ contradictory
encounters with multicultural and ethnocultural discourses both in their individual
school sites and in the wider Estonian educational space.
In almost all of the teacher interviews there are persistent referrals to
multiculturalism and tolerance. All but one of the teachers interviewed explicitly
state that teaching tolerance and respect of difference to their students are major
priorities. Unsurprisingly, the teachers’ descriptions of their classroom practices
and narratives indicate that there are different levels and modalities of
engagement with multicultural discourse depending upon subject, teacher
ethnolinguistic heritage, and school-language medium, and combinations of
these elements. But the manner in which the teachers describe their classroom
narratives and teaching methods invariably include multicultural vocabularies:
Tolstoy Estonian Language:
[I say to them] Ok, it doesn’t
matter who you are! The most important thing is that we are human
beings, and you have to be tolerant about everybody.
Tammsaare History/Civics 2:
We have [the topic] pluralism—
that our nation, that Estonian society here, we are from different
nationalities, we are multicultural.
Pushkin Russian Language:
During the lesson I can’t just
specify that here we are studying Russian culture and here is
Estonian [culture]. So they are connected… We respect traditions
of both cultures…I don’t like to separate them.
Koidula Geography 1:
When we talk about human
geography [I want] them to understand that the world is very…that
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there are different parts to the world and that they understand these
differences and that they respect them.
Tammsaare History/Civics 1:
Tolerance is in the curriculum—in
the history curriculum especially. We have these seven points that
we have to get through to them, and one of them is tolerance and
empathy [sic]… I have to think about this, when making up every
lesson, to ask some questions or tell some stories to make them
think about this, because empathy is the thing to learn.
From these interviews we can gather that multicultural rhetoric is very present in
each of the four participant schools. The teachers’ responses suggest that if
nothing else students are exposed to formal curricula that define the “right”
attitude toward identity and belonging is a tolerant, multicultural attitude. The
statements in student focus groups mirror those in teacher interviews. Both
groups verbally espouse narratives of tolerance and assert that a tolerant attitude
is what everyone “should” adopt. Because we know that multicultural ideals are
heavily present in formal educational curricula, I argue that the students’ verbal
affirmations of multicultural values are directly related to their official prominence
in the classroom.
However, students’ tolerance talk, which is addressed in detail in the
following section, is often followed by contradictions, qualifications, and
particularisms that contravene their espousal of multicultural ideas. Careful
consideration of the teacher interviews reveals that ethnoculturally specific
narratives and discourses are also present in the teachers’ formal and informal
curricula. Most, but not all, teachers make statements in the interviews that
indicate an implicit bias towards prioritizing Estonian or Russophone culture,
depending upon the ethnolinguistic heritage of the teacher in question.
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Teachers with Estonian heritage tend to reify the importance of Estonian
cultural traits to forming the base for Estonia’s multicultural society even if they
speak passionately about respecting Estonia’s cultural diversity elsewhere.
Koidula History/Civics teacher, for instance, describes Estonian national identity
to the students as “our own language, our own culture, our own traditions, and
loyalty to our country.” The use of “our” is a verbal bordering practice that
legitimizes Estonianness, locates Russophone characteristics outside the bounds
of the national community, and implies that it is the responsibility of nonEstonians to assimilate in order to be accepted. Tolstoy History/Civics, an
Estonian teaching in a Russophone school, notes that the history of the Soviet
era “is difficult to teach” because “I think the students have their own different
opinion from the ‘official road’ opinion on the subjects in Estonia, because their
opinion is based on Russian media.” Tolstoy History/Civics goes on to describe
how national identity is discussed with the Russophone students:
[Defining national identity] is a problem for me. I had this problem
during my lessons. And actually, I asked my Russian students,
“who do you think you are? Are you Estonians or Russians? So the
majority of my students are Estonian citizens, but for example if I
ask them, ‘if you go to Russia, what do you say? Are you Estonians
or Russians?’ They say ‘we are Estonians.’ But then I say, ‘but you
don’t speak Estonian!’ So there is a great paradox with this
question.
This teacher’s unease with the students’ lack of proper Estonian qualities filters
into the classroom environment and exists in tension with the multicultural
discourses in the formal curricula. These two teachers’ narratives imply
suspicions, if not rejections, of multiculturalism in the classroom, attitudes that
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have been observed in Estonian heritage teachers elsewhere (Valdmaa 2002).
These teacher’s comments exemplify a pattern in the interviews with Estonian
heritage teachers that reveal the simultaneous presence of formal multicultural
curricula and informal ethnocultural biases in the classroom.
Teachers with partial or fully Russophone backgrounds tend to put
emphasis on the fact that, while respecting Estonian culture is important to
integration, Russophone culture has the right to exist in the Estonian nation-state
and that Estonians have a responsibility to accommodate Russophone culture
within their society. Russophone teachers create dialogues about tolerance and
respect of cultural diversity in their classrooms, but also exhibit attitudes of
marked sympathy for the Russophone community in Estonia. One example of
this is how Pushkin Russian Language describes the importance of continued
Russophone education in Estonia:
It’s important to learn [Russian] because, firstly, it’s our culture, it’s
our national identity, and we are integrating, but we are not
assimilating into the Estonian society…I think we should think of the
[fact that] there are not only Estonians living here, but we have to
honor the other cultures. We [Russophones] have to be proud of
our own.
Similar to Koidula History/Civics, Pushkin Russian Language uses the word “our”
repeatedly, which reifies the borders in Estonian society drawn along
ethnolinguistic lines. Again we see national identity not connected to citizenship
in the nation-state, but to a cultural subgroup within it. These teachers’
perspectives seem to understand integration as a process of protecting rights to
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cultural identity rather than meaningfully incorporating multiple cultures into one
society.
The invocation of “right to identity” is used alongside discourses of
“respect for diversity” in Tolstoy School as well. Tolstoy Estonian Language, who
is of mixed Estonian and Russophone heritage, explains to her students that
learning Estonian is crucial to economically successful citizenship. But Tolstoy
Estonian Language also displays sympathy for the students being forced to take
60 percent of their courses in Estonian when they haven’t been properly
prepared:
Sixty percent, I think that is a very big number…I do not think [it is
fair] because first of all, I don’t believe that they [the students] have
to study history or civics in Estonian because they don’t understand
it. They don’t speak Estonian well enough to understand about
history or the other issues in the Estonian language… They won’t
be able to speak about those dates or events of historical wars and
so on in Russian because they won’t have the Russian vocabulary.
They just take a text [in Estonian] and they are learning every
phrase from there, but they don’t understand what it means.
What these examples from both Estonian-medium and Russian-medium
school teachers imply is that the students in this study move through and in
school spaces that are unevenly populated with seemingly contradictory
discourses of multiculturalisms and cultural particularisms. This fact creates a
school space within which opportunities for critical engagement with
multiculturalism are often contradicted or obscured by ethnocultural rhetoric,
leading the students to impart inconsistent narratives about the terms of
citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonia.
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These characteristics of the student respondents’ individual school sites
are reinforced by the wider structure of the Estonian education space. The fact
that the Estonian education system is divided along ethnolinguistic lines serves
to reinforce the socio-spatial division of young people’s everyday geographies
and to reduce the number of opportunities to have meaningful encounters with
the Other group. While simply putting young people from the different groups
together in a physical setting is no guarantee of meaningful exchange,
educational spaces are much more likely to induce cross-cultural dialogue and
mixing than a short-term space like a youth camp. The majority of the teachers
interviewed for this project use group projects and in-class discussions on a
frequent basis in their classrooms. However, because schools in Estonia are
largely ethnolinguistically homogenous, group classroom activities and lesson
plans are facilitating interaction between students who are, by and large,
ethnolinguistically similar. Such consequences are not lost on the student
respondents in this study. O-Koidula Girl 5 asks “How can you learn the [other]
culture if you are surrounded by people like you?” Tammsaare Girl 2 and Pushkin
Boy 2 both make mention of the fact that, similar to home and leisure spaces,
schools are not a place where Estonian and Russophone youths encounter each
other and therefore “don’t communicate” as a result of spatial separation.
Perhaps Pushkin Girl 1’s pithy summary of the benefits that young people would
reap from an integrated school system is most telling:
It would be great if the schools would have been mingled so
Estonians and Russians, for example, would go to the same
school. And maybe some different cultures also—this would be
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great for practice for language. In the future there wouldn’t be any
problems between people who don’t understand each other
because there wouldn’t be any language barrier, if they had studied
together.
Integrating the Estonian education system is quite easier said than done
as the language barrier exists not only between Estonian and Russophone young
people, but also between Estonian and Russophone teachers and administrators
(Toots 2003; Laitin 2003; Kulu and Tammaru 2004; Brosig 2008). But the data
that I gathered through focus groups, interviews, and participant observation
indicate that the division of schools along ethnolinguistic lines works to
exacerbate the negative effects of Estonia’s wider socio-spatial divisions,
especially in terms of inter-cultural dialogue and experience between young
people.
Divided along linguistic lines, it is important to note that Estonia’s schools,
to say nothing of each classroom, engage with varying discourses of citizenship
and belonging in unique ways and thus produce unique schoolscapes. The
following section demonstrates the impact that specific school environments
have on student narratives by examining patterns that appear between student
respondents from the same participant schools.

Pushkin School: The European Discourse
The students from Pushkin School consistently and earnestly speak of
their identification as European citizens. More than conceptualizing their EU
citizenship as a means to access Western European spaces of economic wealth
and education, several of the students perceive it as a marker of their
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membership in a cross-cultural space of human rights where respecting diversity
is “the European way” (Pushkin Boy 2). To be sure, the Pushkin School students
value the rights that they are afforded by their EU citizenship. But these students,
more so than students from the other three participant schools, specifically
address the inherent values of learning about other cultures and respecting
cultural diversity. The Brussels discourses of cooperation, connection,
integration, and facilitation of communication that are part of the EU’s mantra are
present in the focus groups, such as O-Pushkin Boy 1’s statement that:
I totally value EU citizenship because, firstly, it’s really cool to be a
part of something big, and also it connects many people and it’s
easier to cooperate with different European countries.
Furthermore, the students from Pushkin School are more apt to embrace
a European identity. For O-Pushkin Girl 2 being European is a “big part” of her
identity; Pushkin Boy 3 uses “European” to define himself because he has many
European heritages in his family lineage; Pushkin Boy 4 states that he would say
he’s “European. That’s the best.” It is also worth noting that Pushkin Boy 4
previously held an Alien’s passport and tells me that he applied for Estonian
citizenship in order to get European citizenship. As such, it can be argued that
the student participants from Pushkin School not only look favorably upon
Europe as a “space of rights” but also readily identify as European.
Each of these student participants is taught history and civics by Pushkin
History/Civics 1. In their civics class they are exposed to in-depth lessons and
activities on the EU, how it functions, what its core values are, and current
controversial issues including enlargement and financial bailouts. But Pushkin

	
  

143

History/Civics 1 goes beyond formal, required curricula and also applies for EU
education grants and enters his students’ work on EU topics into competitions.
During a tour of Pushkin School I viewed a large wall mural comprised of
students’ one-by-one foot paintings depicting their interpretations of the various
rights outlined by the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The mural (Figure 4.1) is a product of a Comenius Program4 competition that
students of Pushkin History/Civics 1’s twelfth level civics had won the year
before. The school received the funds for students to paint pieces and then to
construct the mural, which also included large plastic panels featuring the main
articles of the Charter in Estonian.
The schoolscape of Pushkin School, then, is heavily laden with specific
ideas and messages about these students’ place in a European Estonia. In
another corridor of the school a display cases features student interpretations—in
Estonian and English—of a Comenius sponsored in-school project on how
Europe is changing and Estonia’s role, alongside other member states, in that
change. Even the in-school and after-school activities, which are a part of a
cooperative program between Tallinn and Turku schools to promote the healthand well-being of young people, are financed in part by the EU. For Pushkin
School students, the social and physical setting in which they learn legitimizes
the values and ideals of a united, but multicultural, Europe.
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Part of the EU’s Lifelong Learning Programme, the Comenius Programme puts “Europe in the
Classroom” of basic and secondary school students across the EU. The programs “aims to help
young people and educational staff better understand the range of European cultures, languages
and values. [Comenius] also helps young people acquire the basic life skills and competences
necessary for personal development, future employment and active citizenship.” (“The Comenius
Programme: Europe in the Classroom” 2013)
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Figure 4.1. Mind Your Rights EU Project. Pushkin
School’s mural featuring students’ depictions of the articles
of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European
Union, which is a product of an EU sponsored grant
competition under the Comenius Program.
This mural project is one of many examples of how students at Pushkin
School encounter EU discourses in their schoolscape. The active engagement
with EU discourses beyond lectures through hands-on activities, open
discussions, and grant competitions can be connected to the frequency and
ardency with which the students from this school speak about EU citizenship and
identity. But other participant schools in this study also engage in EU sponsored
learning activities, and the student respondents from those institutions did not
speak as often or as avidly about their Europeanness. Analysis and comparison
of the focus group data reveals that the students from Pushkin School, uniquely
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amongst the student study population, enthusiastically relate multiple stories of
engaging with EU discourses outside of the space of their classroom.
Several of Pushkin School students comment on their travels to Western
Europe and their engagement with other European cultures. O-Pushkin Boy 1
and Pushkin Girl 1, for instance, talk about their trip to London for a school
project and how they enjoyed discussions on different stereotypes that
Europeans have about each other. Pushkin Boy 4, Pushkin Boy 5, and Pushkin
Boy 7 enthusiastically recall going to Brussels on an EU-paid trip after “We won a
competition. We had to make a video about ‘My Home as A Part of Europe’.”
Other students recount travels to parts of Europe with their families and friends
that have enticed them to want to return to other parts of Europe to learn more
about other cultures, practice their language skills, and meet new friends.
These narratives of positive experiences with Europe and EU discourses
in spaces both within and outside of the immediate school environment are
unique to the students from Pushkin School. This element of their focus groups
suggests that meaningful experience with European topics in multiple spaces of
their personal geographies translates into more frequent and more ardent
espousal of European ideals, citizenship, and identity than the remaining student
study population. This intimates that significant engagements within and through
multiple spaces, rather than only the school, may produce greater internalization
of European discourses on citizenship, identity, and belonging.
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Koidula School: The Estonian Nationalist Discourse
The students from Koidula School move within and through a unique
school space. The history of Koidula School is closely tied with the history of the
Estonian Republic. This unique feature of Koidula School plays a large part not
only in formal classroom curricula, but also in the schoolscape via informal
curricula of teacher attitudes, the school’s landscape, and extracurricular school
events.
Estonian history forms a powerfully symbolic part of the fabric of the
school site at Koidula School. The physical setting of the Koidula schoolscape is
heavily laden with nationalist materials, such as statues, flags, and photographs
of past Estonian presidents. One of the most prominent physical features of the
school’s grounds is a statue, originally created in the 1920’s to commemorate the
Estonian War of Independence. Several students and one teacher from Koidula
School died in the War of Independence, and the statue is considered by both
teacher and student study participants to be an important reminder of Estonia’s
struggle for freedom and the unique connection that their school has to the War
of Independence. Soviet officials had the statue removed from the school
grounds because of its connection to the Estonian War of Independence, an
action that both the teacher and student study participants cite as evidence of
Soviet “occupation” rather than “liberation.” Upper-secondary school students at
Koidula School maintain the statue and the area around it, a job that is seen as
an honor and privilege by both the teacher and student study participants.
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The social setting of Koidula School’s schoolscape “officially sanctions”
and “socially supports” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79) messages, values, and ideals of
Estonian nationalism and the Koidula School’s role in Estonian history. At inschool festivals and assemblies that take place throughout the school year, the
Estonian flag and national folk costumes play prominent roles, as do Estonian
songs, school traditions, and visits from alumni. O-Koidula Girl 5 remarks that
“our school, I think we can say it’s a little bit different because our school is very
patriotic…So we are taught to be more close to each other, and to respect our
country, traditions, and history. So it’s a little bit different than the so-called
‘normal’ schools.”
The students at Koidula School display a pattern of articulating citizenship,
identity, and belonging in Estonia from a platform of Estonian nationalism which
demands assimilatory actions on the part of Russophones. Although they do
address values of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, there is a distinct
element of Estonian nation-building discourse in these students’ narratives that
permeates their broader conceptualizations of belonging and identity in Estonia.
While Estonian particularisms are not unique to the students at Koidula School,
these students also verbally construct hard and fast borders between Estonians
and Russophones in society.
These student respondents are almost unanimous in the deep conviction
that an individual is only Estonian when they speak the Estonian language, and
that the extension of this identity into the parameters of legal citizenship is not
only legitimate, but necessary for the preservation of Estonian society:
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Koidula Girl 3:
[It is fair that you have to know Estonian to
obtain citizenship] because otherwise the Estonian language
wouldn’t survive.
Koidula Boy 1:
The constitution says that one of the main
goals of the Estonian country, the state, is to protect the Estonian
language.
Koidula Girl 4:
If the person wants to be Estonian, then he
studies the language, he accepts the rules…But a lot of Russians
are like, they don’t want to learn the language… to be an Estonian
[citizen] you actually need to know about Estonia and you actually
need to know about the culture and language and everything. I
think it’s the main point to become Estonian. I don’t know how
difficult the [citizenship] exam is. But I mean, some kind of
[citizenship] exam, there should definitely be one.
The feeling of these students is that the hegemony of Estonian culture is a crucial
part of the Estonian nation-building project. That project, moreover, is seen as
one with historical precedence, cultural and linguistic legitimacy, and democratic
validity due to the Soviet past (among other remnants of the Russian Empire’s
influence). As a result, these students’ narratives rather obstinately link the
extension of citizenship, identity, and belonging to Russophones with the
Russophones’ acquiescence to the hegemony of Estonian culture. Russophones
who do not meet such standards are deemed unassimilable and relegated to the
margins of society.
Formal and informal displays of Estonian nationalism, then, often abut the
formal and informal curricula of multicultural discourses. Several of the teachers
at Koidula School, for instance, relate how they teach tolerance in the classroom
by “reiterate[ing] that we always look at the different opinions, the different sides
of an issue, and we try to understand all the different sides” (Koidula History and
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Civics 1) or by reminding students that “young Russians that we have here now,
they have not come from Russia” (Koidula Geography 1). But an emphasis on
the particularisms of Estonian culture as the standards of belonging in Estonian
society is clear in teacher narratives as well:
Koidula Extracurriculars:
[Estonian] independence is very
fragile, so [the students] have to remember that and think about
that for a second, because we have this scary neighbor next door!
So independence is not self-evident for us.
Koidula Geography 2:
The background of the school is
very connected to the independence movement. And the population
of small people who speak Estonian, the number of people is small,
so the school has a focus of making sure that Estonianness stays
alive and the language stays alive, and that the students care.
Koidula Estonian Language:
I think that in certain ways in the
current local context it’s perhaps not even politically correct to be so
proud of your nationality, or it might seem that it’s not politically
correct. But I think that to really understand the Estonian people
you have to understand the pride that they have in their resilience
and in their survival, and the pride that they have in their unique,
rich culture and how important that is to being an Estonian.
The interviews with teachers in Koidula School are flecked with these nationalist
narratives of varying subtleties. Moreover, these teacher attitudes are not lost on
the student respondents who mention that “our history teacher really stresses the
Estonian history, like, from world history. Estonian is most important” (Koidula
Girl 3) and that their teacher makes it clear that “when you get marks, the marks
that you get in Estonian history are more important” (Koidula Girl 1). This
indicates that in addition to any nationalist undertones in formal civic education
curricula, these students encounter the informal curricula of a nationalist school
environment and teacher attitudes that belie the discourses of tolerance and
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openness that circulate in their classrooms. The space of this school is, to some
degree, situated within the space of the Estonian nation-building process.
The students from Koidula School also relate personal anecdotes from
their experiences in urban spaces that may contribute to and/or reinforce the
notion that Estonian culture needs to be protected—mainly from Russophones.
Many of the students relate their memories of the Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007
when the abrupt relocation of a Soviet war memorial from the city center to a war
cemetery caused widespread rioting between Russophones and Estonians in
Tallinn for two nights. Although the students were 13 or 14 years old when the
incident occurred, the memories of the television footage (Koidula Girl 2),
damage to the city center (Koidula Girl 4), and the fear they felt (O-Koidula Girl 5,
Koidula Girl 3) are associated with the “Russians who were destroying the city”
(Koidula Boy 1).
A few students also relate everyday encounters with Russophones as
evidence that Russophones are “too different” to fit in to Estonian society.
Koidula Girl 4, for instance, harbors resentment for the Russophones she has
encountered that do not want to learn Estonian because they’re leaving Estonia
for good after school, feeling that this proves that they don’t care about or have
loyalty to the country they’ve grown up in. Koidula Girl 1 tells of how Tallinn’s
Russophones just “throw garbage everywhere” and have turned the Lasnamäe
into a trash dump, which to her makes it “seem like they are differently raised and
don’t have the same values as us.” While these anecdotes of banal encounters
may seem insignificant, they are indicative of the pervading sense of
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irreconcilable socio-cultural divisions that these students have between
themselves and the Russophone community at large.
The narratives of students from Koidula School suggest that what they
learn in school is reinforced by what they observe outside of school, and that
they tend to interpret Russophones and Russophone spaces through a notably
nationalist lens. The stories, experiences, and encounters in everyday urban
spaces that these students describe over the course of the focus groups
illustrates that their formulations and negotiations of identity and belonging are
situated in multiple spaces of their everyday personal geographies. Young
people’s understandings of the nature of citizenship are constantly being shaped
and reshaped by fluid movement within and through multiple spaces rather than
statically conceived at discrete sites.

Tolstoy School: Discourses of Alienation
The responses from the student participants at Tolstoy School illustrate
the ways in which the discourses that they encounter in school can exacerbate
and deepen existing feelings of exclusion and alienation developed in other
spaces, such as their workplaces or leisure spaces. Tolstoy School is located in
a less socioeconomically affluent part of Lasnamäe, the city district with an
overwhelmingly Russophone population. As such, the school is situated within
the wider socio-spatial geography of Lasnamäe that is largely devoid of
Estonianness in general.
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The physical setting of the schoolscape features a few displays of cultural
artifacts and student projects about Russophone and Central Asian cultures, but
otherwise the atmosphere is rather staid. The Estonian flag does fly near the
entrance during school hours, but little else in the schoolscape suggests that it is
an educational space for young people in an actively integrating Estonia. The
social contexts of the school are, unsurprisingly, largely Russophone because of
the ethnolinguistic heritage of the vast majority of the teaching staff and student
body. However, other messages—such as the integration between Estonians
and Russophones, or the ideals and values of the European Union—are not
notably part of the social or physical setting of the schoolscape. Thus, the
schoolscape of Tolstoy School runs counter to, or at least does not provide a
fostering atmosphere, for official curricula requirements that are dictated and
tinged with Estonian nationalist overtones.
The students from Tolstoy School tend to identify more strongly and
singularly as Russophone, explicitly deny any feelings of Estonianness, and
harbor overtly anti-Estonian feelings. Much of their feelings of alienation are
linked to experiences such as encounters with Estonians who “discriminate”
against them (Tolstoy Girl 3) or their perceptions that Estonians are wealthier
because they dominate the economy and purposefully exclude Russophones
from economic and occupational spaces (Pushkin Boy 1, Pushkin Girl 2). Their
responses also indicate that the students the Bronze Soldier crisis from 2007
plays a continuing role in their perceptions of belonging and understandings of
identity in Estonia. The broad consensus amongst the students is that the
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Estonian government moved the Soviet war monument to deliberately
discriminate against the Russophones, disrespect Russophone history, and
make the Russophone community feel like outsiders in Estonia.
The pattern of disaffected narratives amongst these students is further
revealed through their accounts of interactions in their school space. These
students’ take history and civics from Tolstoy History and Civics, whose
ethnolinguistic heritage is Estonian. By all accounts these students’ relationship
with Tolstoy History and Civics is antagonistic and serves to deepen their
feelings of alienation in society. In their history and civics class the formal
curriculum requirement that this subject must be taught in the Estonian language
dovetails with the informal curriculum of the teacher’s perceived anti-Russophone
behavior to intensify the students’ resentment of their treatment at the hands of
the Estonian nation-building process. This is illustrated by these students’
descriptions of Tolstoy History and Civics:
Tolstoy Girl 3:
Our history teacher is Estonian and he doesn’t
really like Russians, and we quarrel a lot about this language topic
because he knows Russian and he doesn’t want to speak it during
the lesson. That’s why a lot of things within the topic of history and
civics remain unclear.
Tolstoy Girl 1:
Actually, he [Tolstoy History and Civics]
doesn’t state his opinion clearly. Sometimes, still, it slips, his
opinion towards Russians. But still, we are used to his style of
teaching. He teaches from the textbook.
In the eyes of these student respondents their teacher’s attitude combines with
the formal curricula of the textbook and language requirement to further
marginalize them within their educational space. While these students have had
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Estonian language lessons for several years, by their own admission their
Estonian language skills are poor and therefore the requirement that 60 percent
of their curriculum be taught in this language is unfair:
Tammsaare Girl 1: It would be fair if we had had Estonian
subjects, for example, since the fifth grade. But we have them since
the tenth grade—and a lot of us choose, still, to do our
examinations in Russian because we can’t do them in Estonian.
Their lack of language skills combined with the fact that their history and civics
teacher refuses to help them clarify topics in Russian, means that the students
“have some things clear and some things remain unclear” (Tolstoy Boy 1). In line
with these sentiments is Tolstoy Girl 2’s assertion that “the language is very
difficult, and it’s very difficult to understand the topics. Maybe it’s because of the
fact that this [history and civics] textbook has been written by Estonians for
Estonians.”
The students from Tolstoy School perceive their teacher’s attitude and the
formal curriculum as part of a wider, systematic discrimination of Russophones
by Estonians and the Estonian nation-building project. Their accounts of their
movements within and through their school space are interspersed with
descriptions of their everyday geographies outside of the school, indicating that
the pattern of feelings of exclusion from substantive citizenship and feelings of
belonging in Estonian society emerge from encounters with discourses of
exclusion multiple spaces. Analysis of the Tolstoy School student participants’
responses suggests that young people can also engage with negative
discourses, such as discourses of exclusion, and not only with positive
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discourses of rights and opportunities (e.g. Pushkin School students) or
discourses privileging their identity over the Other’s (e.g. Koidula School
students).

Tammsaare School: Discourse in Only One Space
Tammsaare School is located in Mustamäe, Tallinn’s second most
populous district. Tammsaare School is unremarkable in terms of reputation and
draws its student body from Mustamäe’s middle-class, mostly Estonian
population. Taamsaare’s School’s schoolscape is rather “averagely” Estonian.
The students pass the Estonian flag flying in front of their school’s main entrance
each day and the curricula certainly unfolds in a culturally and linguistically
Estonian context, but the ideas and messages that are “officially sanctioned and
socially supported” (K. D. Brown 2005, 79) in the schoolscape at Taamsaare
school are not undergirded by any particular fervor. The school’s material
environment is clean, orderly, and neat, but devoid of artwork or special displays
featuring national, supranational, or multicultural topics. In short, the schoolscape
of Taamsaare School is a physical and social setting in which the dominant
Estonian culture is banal and rote, and generally not a setting where issues of
nationalism, multiculturalism, or supranationalism are critically assessed or
emphasized often.
Analyzing the responses of Tammsaare School students revealed a
pattern in their responses converse to that of the other student participants. The
narratives of the students from the other three participant schools were more

	
  

156

fervent with regards to discourses that they had encountered both in school and
in other spaces. The narratives of Tammsaare School imply that a discourse only
meaningfully encountered in school, but not in other spaces, will tend not to
appear significantly in young people’s narratives, or at least appear much less
frequently.
The discourses of multicultural values and tolerance are present in each of
the four participants schools via both formal and informal curricula (something
that is addressed in greater detail in the following section). The interview with
Taamsaare History and Civics 1 reveals that she embraces a discourse of
multiculturalism that aims to dismantle prejudices and preconceived notions of
the Other. She is convinced of the value of respect for diversity and takes great
care to address the entrenched inequalities in her lessons. This teacher’s inclass activities regarding controversial history topics are designed to strongly
encourage critical thinking amongst the students. For instance, one activity
involves assigning different groups in the class with an unidentified source of
information, such as a newspaper article or pamphlet, and requiring the group to
analyze and probe the message in the source and what it can reveal about
nation-building, historical interpretations, political views, and so on.
Taamsaare History and Civics 1 also creates a discursive environment in
the classroom that allows students to express their opinions and also to be
questioned by her. For instance, Taamsaare History and Civics 1 relates the
following account of a discussion on the topic of coexisting respectfully with
Russophones in Estonia:
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[Some students] talk about “bad Russians” and “Oh, they steal and
they are hokum. Sixty to 70 percent of all the people in prison are
Russians, in Estonia” and all that kind of stuff, and “the Russians
are like this and that. And then [I say], “look to your left or right. This
friend [classmate] of yours [who is Russian]—are you speaking
about him or her? And usually they’re like, “no, no, he’s really ok,
he’s normal and fun.” And I’m like, “Ok, who are you talking about?”
I’m saying “you can’t generalize” and that kind of stuff.
This interactive style of classroom discussion was exhibited when I
observed one of Taamsaare History and Civics 1 class sessions during fieldwork.
The students’ biases against opinions, peoples, and attitudes that are different
from their own are evident, but this is something that Taamsaare History and
Civics 1 is aware of. During the interview, Taamsaare History and Civics 1
recognizes that the fact that the presence of Russophones in Estonia “is so
normal and everyday” results in many students not perceiving their home
country’s diversity as a multicultural space:
When we talk about multiculturalism they are saying about this
Islamic world coming to Europe and that we have this and that kind
of people living everywhere and so on… last year [during a
discussion] it was, I don’t know, a half an hour or something like
that until someone threw in the Russian minority in Estonia.
Taamsaare History and Civics 1 plans her lessons with the idof combating the
biases and preconceived notions that her students bring into her classroom.
However, this teacher states that the discourses the students encounter in their
home and leisure spaces oftentimes have an impact that school curricula cannot
overcome.
Taamsaare History and Civics 1’s perceptions of the strength of
discourses in home and other everyday spaces outside of school is supported by
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the focus group conversations between students from Tammsaare School (each
of whom is a student of Taamsaare History and Civics 1). Analysis of these
students’ focus group conversations reveals that, like the other student
participants, they nominally acknowledge that being tolerant of Others is the
correct modality of addressing difference. But Tammsaare School students
speak much more forcefully about the legitimacy of Estonian sociocultural and
political hegemony than about respecting diversity. This appears to be in spite of
the fact that there is significant engagement with multicultural discourses in the
space of their school through their lessons with Taamsaare History and Civics 1.
I argue that these students’ narratives of their movements in and through
everyday spaces away from the school are evidence that they have few, if any,
significant encounters with discourses of tolerance and/or respect of diversity
outside of their classroom(s). These examples from focus group conversations
are illustrative of these students’ prevailing attitudes towards belonging and
identity in Estonian society:
Tammsaare Girl 4:
My mother is an Estonian language
teacher in a Russian school, and when she teaches the Estonian
language, a lot of the Russian students don’t want to learn because
they say that they don’t think that the Estonian language is
important, and they fight for that. They don’t have to take exams in
Estonian, and they don’t want to take classes in Estonian. They,
like, fight for it. And my mother often comes home and is just
astonished by the Russian younger demographic. They [her
students] are [saying] “my grandfather said you Estonians are liars
and so I think so too, because of his opinion.” So it’s a bit of a
battle, that when you have a Russian student in your class, they
maybe you can’t be that liberal about “Oh, Estonia, yay!”
O-Tammsaare Boy 1:
There are two types of Russians. One
type is the bad type, because they’re more like, “It’s still Russia. We
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came here! We saved Estonia, so they Estonians still owe us!”
Historical matters [sic]. And they don’t want to learn the language,
they don’t care about anything—they just live here. So that’s [the
type of Russians in] Lasnamäe, mostly.
Tammsaare Girl 2:
I think it was ok to move the [Bronze
Soldier monument] because they [Russophones] can still visit if it’s
important to them—it didn’t have to sit, like… to Estonians, to the
older generation, maybe, it’s important that the Soviet thing doesn’t
sit under your nose all the time. And [the Russophones] can still
visit it, so I think that it’s ok.
The students’ experiences and negotiations within their home space, Tallinn’s
urban neighborhoods, and memorialized landscapes interact to produce
narratives with a distinctly pro-Estonian bent. The responses of the students from
Tammsaare School suggest that the varied spaces of everyday geographies are
not discrete containers of action. They also imply that the space of the school is
one of many significant spaces of young people’s personal lives. While not
denying the influential power of school sites in young people’s conceptualizations
and contestations of citizenship, I suggest that the Tammsaare School students’
statements reveal that discourses encountered in only one space, however
meaningfully, may not inform young people’s broader narratives of identity and
belonging.
By engaging with student focus group and teacher interview responses,
this section has argued that the space of the school is a crucial site for
citizenship formation, but one that is situated amongst other spaces of young
people’s everyday geographies. Moreover, the analysis has detailed the ways in
which young people’s movement through and within the multiple spaces of their
personal geographies inform and are informed by each other rather than existing
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as discrete, static entities that contain uniform experiences and discourses.
Giving special attention to the space of the school and the many, sometimes
competing, discourses that circulate within it has also contributed to the
argument that the politics of identity and belonging in Estonia are far more
complex and dynamic than a unilateral discrimination of a minority by the titular
majority. The remainder of this chapter will explore the students’ chaotic
deployment of competing multicultural and identity-specific frameworks to
conceptualize citizenship, identity, and belonging in Estonia.

Student Narratives of Multicultural Citizenship in Contemporary Estonia
The previous section demonstrated that the interaction of various political
discourses that young people encounter in schools is quite complicated. As a
result, the student respondents are confronted with coexisting narratives of
nationalism, post-nationalism, and multiculturalism in their classrooms. These
multiple citizenship discourses are emphasized differently within schools, and
then are further absorbed and acted upon differently by young people. Youths
take the varying ideas presented in their complicated school discourses and then
develop their own interpretations and explanations of multiculturalism and
“tolerance” within the wider contexts of their daily experiences. Using the
students’ diverse characterizations of the terms of tolerance in Estonian society,
the analysis that follows attempts to illustrate that the production of citizenship is
a disjointed process that takes place at multiple sites.
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Both Estonian and Russophone students articulate the desire and need
for a less conflictual co-existence between the two groups in Estonian society.
Many of the students cleave their generation from their parents’ and
grandparents’ and claim “tolerance” and “integration” as marks of the younger
generation that is forward-looking, an attitude that has also been observed in
young people in Northern Ireland (Leonard 2006, 2010). The influence of
multiculturalist discourse is evident here because its vocabulary is utilized to
mark the older generations’ attitudes as relics of an era of intolerance and the
younger generations’ attitudes as proof of a modern, European Estonia that is
not marred by historical trauma. The quotes below demonstrate how students
rate their generation’s ability to reconcile the ethnocultural tensions in Estonian
society very highly and blame the specter of the Soviet era for the older
generations’ reluctance to move on.
Tammsaare Girl 5: For our grandparents, it was more like…
O-Tammsaare Boy 1: Historical.
Tammsaare Girl 5: Yeah, historical.
Interviewer:
So it matters more to them than it does to you?
Tammsaare Girl 5: Yeah.
O-Tammsaare Boy 1: I think we do get along better… of course, it
depends on the attitude, but yes, I think that our generations are
more tolerating each other.
Interviewer:
So there are some Estonians that don’t feel
anything bad towards you?
Pushkin Boy 7:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 6:
Yes. The older generation tends to worry about
problems between Russians and Estonians. But young Estonians
are not like that. You can communicate with them.
Pushkin Boy 3:
Today, it [nationality] is not so important, like
right now, because there’s the process of integration and
adaptation…But when nationality is taken into consideration…and
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that’s why you’re making some decisions, only based on nationality,
it is not right. It means that the person’s living in the past, and today
the society is different.
These quotes exemplify how the student participants view themselves as the
standard-bearers of the tolerant, accepting attitudes that will push Estonia further
into the “good” realm of modern, multicultural societies and further away from the
days of yore when the divisions between Estonians and Russophones were
dominant. However, as the next sections will demonstrate, the students’ actions,
and even their words, contradict their initial avowal of multicultural attitudes.
These frequent and sundry contradictions corroborate Leonard’s (2006; 2010)
observations that the complexity of youth geographies in divided societies stem
largely from young people’s tendencies to both reproduce the prejudices of their
parents and develop their own ways of knowing the world that are separate from
that of adults at the same time.

Multiculturalism framed as “Tolerance”
The generational divide that the students perceive is framed by Estonia’s
re-entry into the Western “club” of liberal democratic nation-states, demonstrated
most notably by its membership in the European Union. Estonia’s place in the
club of Western liberal democracies is cited as proof by the student respondents
that their generation is living in a “different” more “tolerant” and “multicultural”
world that that of their parents and grandparents. “Their” Estonia is one that is
already exhibiting more tolerance than their parents’ Estonia, and multicultural
values of Western liberalism will provide a sturdy foundation for the new,
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improved Estonia that their generation is building. In focus groups, Estonian and
Russophone students explicitly espouse the values and ideas that Western
liberal democracies are built on, which, I argue, is indicative of the pervasiveness
of liberal multicultural paradigm in Estonian society:
Pushkin Boy 3:
I think that in the future when you speak
Russian, this won’t draw any special attention because this is the
European way of treating different nationalities, and Estonia is
getting—trying to get [become] more and more of a European
country. [emphasis added]
Tammsaare Girl 2: How to solve the problems [between Estonians
and Russophones], like, in geography we talk about that.
Interviewer: And do you think there’s anything you can do, or that
people can do, to solve the conflict?
Tammsaare Girl 3: Maybe be open-minded, and accept other
people…
Tammsaare Girl 1: Be tolerant.
Tammsaare Girl 3: Tolerance.
The predominant belief in the students’ narratives about the divide in Estonian
society, how it should be handled, and how it will be handled in the future is that
tolerance of difference is a cure-all. The liberal values of acceptance of diversity
and respect of difference has made its way into the students’ conceptualizations
of a good, stable society.
But the cracks in the multicultural foundations of the students’ narratives
are revealed as the focus group discussions progress—or fail to progress—into
how tolerance is or should be performed. The true keyword quality of the
multiculturalist vocabulary is exposed when the students immediately contradict
themselves with regards to advocating tolerance. For instance, being “tolerant”
and open-minded are the go-to fixes for the conflict between Estonians and
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Russophones. But it’s quickly revealed that, from the perspective of the Estonian
student respondents, the onus is on the Russophones to facilitate integration.
What the Estonian students, by and large, characterize as multicultural
integration is actually an assimilatory demand placed on the Russophones. The
platform of tolerance is laid upon a foundation of the Estonian language;
tolerance can only be achieved after a smoothing out of cultural difference.
Russophone students attempt to paint Estonian society—within the
younger generations—as already tolerant and accepting. There are assertions
that there is “no discrimination” between young Estonians and Russophones
(Pushkin Boy 5, Pushkin Boy 6, and Pushkin Boy 7), and that when they do their
part to respect the Estonian language and culture, their culture and language
receive respect in return. But these assertions are countered within minutes with
stories about how their attempts to tolerate Estonian culture are rejected by
Estonians, (e.g. when Russophones try to speak Estonian the Estonians “just
laugh about our accents”). Even in describing how Estonian and Russophone
young people get along, there are numerous examples put forth by the
Russophone students about how they are more tolerant, more accepting, and
more “forward-looking” than their Estonian peers—which in itself speaks to
persistent practices of Othering. The Estonian young people, the Russophone
students claim, call on the Soviet past to discriminate against Russophones.
According to Pushkin Girl 1, “all my [Estonian] friends, for example, they said ‘I
don’t know why I hate Russians, but it comes with my family…and now I think
that too.’ But they don’t understand why.” Aside from the incongruent
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characterization of people who “hate Russians” as her “friends,” Pushkin Girl 1’s
portrayal of Estonian young people as less tolerant is illustrative of the
Russophone student population in this study.
Some student respondents express bewilderment at how they are
supposed to interact meaningfully with the Other group when there are significant
obstacles to doing so in Estonian society. For instance, Koidula Girl 3 describes
a summer camp5 that was designed to give Russophone and Estonian students
a chance to connect with each other:
Koidula Girl 3:
I’ve been to youth camps, and there was like
half Estonians and half Russians. But actually, it was meant to
make us come together and to work together and communicate
with each other more. But as I was there, still, just Russians were
just with Russians, and Estonians were just with Estonians.
Although we had mixed groups and so forth, you still didn’t really
like, talk to them.
These summer programs, many of which are coordinated by the quasigovernmental Estonian Integration and Migration Foundation (MEIS), are an
attempt to foster meaningful communication between young people of different
backgrounds as part of the Estonian government’s larger, ongoing “Integration
Programs” detailed in chapter one. Judging from Koidula Girl 3’s experience at
youth camps, the inherent ambiguity of the ideas of multiculturalism engenders
anemic attempts by the government to implement them in society. In the absence
of any firm conviction from the youth camp organizers about how the coexistence
of Estonian and Russophone identities should be handled, the socio-spatial
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

The belief amongst policy makers that simply putting young people together in the same setting
will break down barriers has been observed in other divided societies, such as Northern Ireland
(Leonard 2010) and Lebanon (Staeheli and Nagel 2013).
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divisions present in everyday Tallinn society are simply reproduced in the
microcosm of the youth camp setting, further obscuring the path to achieving
meaningful inter-cultural dialogue from the youths (if such a path even exists).
The socio-spatial division of Estonians and Russophones throughout the
Estonian nation-state complicates matters for the students as well. As noted
previously, Harju County (Tallinn) is the only county in Estonia with a relatively
equal number of both Estonians and Russophones. The rest of the country’s
demographic makeup is very homogenous, with the other 15 counties either 90+
percent Estonian or Russophone. O-Koidula Girl 5 notes that this areal division is
a barrier to real integration:
I have talked to people, both Russian and Estonian. Russians want
to communicate and contact with Estonians more. But in their areas
there is just no possibilities. They don’t have enough Estonians.
And if you don’t have enough people then how can you practice
your language [skills]? How can you learn the culture if you are
surrounded by people like you? And at the same time people from
the islands, they’re mostly Estonians, and they want to speak with
Russians, but on the islands there are no Russians.
O-Koidula Girl 5 is touching upon a larger structural deficiency within the policy
framework of multiculturalism —how will the neatly packaged ideas of respecting
and accepting cultural difference play out in the real world, where the everyday
geographies reflect socio-spatial divisions along ethnolinguistic lines? The effects
of such geographies are not lost on the students who participated in this study.
Multicultural activity and real integration is not a reality for them because even in
Tallinn, a city with a fairly equally mixed population, the spaces of the two groups
are mutually exclusive, preventing meaningful exchanges with young people
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different than they are. Moreover, as Koidula Girl 3’s experience with the youth
camp suggests, putting young people together in an attempt to overcome the
socio-spatial divisions is no guarantee of meaningful interaction either. The
students’ responses suggest that it can be argued that the socio-spatial division
is both a cause and a symptom of the politics of identity in Tallinn.
Given cursory instructions to espouse the Western ideals of equality and
acceptance but no mechanism to implement them, the students in this study are
left to muddle through the particularities that abut such universalisms,
contradicting and confusing themselves along the way. The outcome of this
chaotic interaction of insufficiently articulated multiculturalist values and strong
ethnolinguistic identities is a manifestation of what Wendy Brown calls
“depoliticized tolerance” (W. Brown 2008, 13). Tolerance in Western liberal
societies, Brown argues, is not the wholehearted universal acceptance of all
cultures and groups, but instead is an identity-producing process that marks out
the subjects of tolerance as “inferior, deviant, or marginal vis-à-vis those
practicing tolerance.” Tolerance becomes “depoliticized” when inferiority or
inequality is “constructed as either personal and individual in origin, or otherwise
natural, religious, or cultural and therefore profoundly antithetical to claims for
equality” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514). Tolerating difference, then,
becomes “not simply the withholding of speech or action” against things that are
distasteful or deviant, but also “the enactment of social, political, religious, and
cultural norms” (W. Brown 2008, 13).

	
  

168

Striations of Belonging: Framing the Particular as Universal
The student participants acknowledge the conflict in Estonian society, the
need to eradicate it, and the multiple barriers to its resolution. Their oft-conflicting
comments and conversations demonstrate the inadequacy of the liberal
discourses of multiculturalism that they encounter at school, at home, and in
everyday urban spaces. That multiculturalism is inherently problematic because it
requires the consideration of equality and cultural difference is exemplified by the
students’ articulations of highly particular conceptualizations of the ostensibly
universal space of Estonian citizenship.
Because the cultural norms of the dominant (Estonian) group are enacted
as the standard for the ideal universal citizen (Laclau 1992; Young 1989), the
students are operating within an Estonian dominated framework that is portrayed
as universal. This allows the Estonian students to “operate from a conceit of
neutrality” (W. Brown 2008, 7) and forces the Russophone students to appeal to
universalisms to claim their rights to perform their particular identities while
maintaining equal status in society. The remainder of the chapter explores the
student participants’ ideas and opinions on tolerance, acceptance, and belonging
which they fold into their arguments regarding the definition, discussion, and
performance of citizenship. The students’ engagements with these three issues
demonstrate how particularisms pervade the “universal” space of citizenship.
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Depoliticized Tolerance in Action: Tolerable vs. Intolerable Behavior
Both Russophone and Estonian students invoked the concept of tolerance
in describing their interactions with the Other. The students contend with
tolerance in terms of identity production and what cultural norms and values are
enacted, which is symptomatic “depoliticized tolerance”. The depoliticization of
tolerance involves “construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and
social conflict” as “natural, religious, or cultural” phenomena rather than as the
historical results of power politics (W. Brown 2008, 15–6). Construing difference
as innate to an individual or group “position[s] the tolerator as a morally superior
individual” (Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012, 514; Dobbernack and Modood
2011; W. Brown 2008). Unsurprisingly, the Estonian and Russophone students
employ this depoliticized tolerance in quite different manners. The crucial
element here is that there are fundamental disagreements between Estonian and
Russophone students about what needs to be tolerated and how multicultural
discourses are interpreted.
For the Estonian students, as part of the titular majority, the Russophones
are the subjects in need of toleration. In the Estonian students’ narratives,
discourses of multiculturalism and tolerance become an “impartial practice” when
in fact the act of tolerance is shot through with power politics that marginalize
Russophone practices and culture. The Estonian students tend to legitimize the
Estonian nation-building project by invoking the Soviet era when the Estonians
and their culture were suppressed in favor of Sovietization and Russification. By
couching protection of Estonian language as a move to counteract authoritarian
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Sovietzation policies, these students are mimicking a “decolonization” discourse
present at the state level in Estonia (Hughes 2005, 748–9). Any effort on the part
of Russophones to detract from or not fully support the Estonian efforts to
reestablish their national culture is marked as a disloyalty that is intolerant of the
Estonian right to “preserve” their culture, and therefore will not be tolerated.
Some of the Estonian students describe what type of behavior amongst
Russophones qualifies for tolerance:
Koidula Girl 2:
For me, it depends, for a Russian who is living
here, on their attitude. Because when they are “yeah, we want to
rule you” in the same manner as the Russian Federation, then I
don’t like them. But if they’re like, “Ok, we’re living here, and we’re
trying to learn” and be more open to our society and community,
then I am ok with it.
Tammsaare Girl 1: I think it’s the education thing—that Russians
should learn Estonian language… it’s a big part of [integration],
because then we communicate more and understand each other
more.
Koidula Girl 4:
Russian people who are more or less Estonian
also, I don’t really care about [their Russianness].
To qualify for tolerance, Russophones have to be open to Estonian society and
community. Otherwise, they are classified, as Koidula Girl 1 puts it, as people
who “don’t respect that Estonia exists,” i.e. “intolerant” people that do not belong
in the “tolerant” liberal democratic society that is the Republic of Estonia. Again,
the Estonian students’ conversations showcase the convoluted interactions
between the standard of equality, what person qualifies for that equality, and
what identity belongs in Estonia.
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Two common themes running through the Estonian students’ statements
are that tolerance is deeply valued by free, democratic societies and that the
people who qualify for tolerance are those who “respect” Estonianness.
Importantly, these students also believe that the Russophone Other that
“disrespects” Estonianness by retaining too much Russianness is in fact being
intolerant of the mainstream values, and therefore does not belong in the
tolerant, liberal democratic space of Estonia or qualify for tolerance from “true”
Estonian citizens.
The Russophone students invoke tolerance—or access to it—as a way of
demanding their equal rights as citizens. The overwhelming irony is that, as
Laclau (1992, 89) noted, minority groups who are asserting their right to both
equality in a nation-state and the right to maintain their group identity must make
their demands in terms of the “universal principles that the minority shares with
the rest of the community.” Simply put, the Russophone students demand their
rights both to complete access to the space of rights in Estonia and retention of
their minority identity by appealing to the universal principles that the dominant
Estonian culture defines.
Most often the Russophone students speak in broad terms about what
should be tolerated. But many of them are open to accepting Estonian cultural
norms, not because they have a desire to abandon their Russophone heritage,
but because it is seen as the pathway to being tolerated in return. Here again we
see a shift in the invocation of tolerance that depends upon positionality within
the nation-state. The minority group is apparently adhering to the dominant

	
  

172

group’s definition of tolerance because it is a value of wider society that will level
the playing field for their group. However, what is actually happening is that they
are acquiescing to the demands of the Estonian nation-building project which are
framed in terms of “respecting” Estonian culture. Take the following exchange
between students from Pushkin School:
Pushkin Boy 2:
A lot of people just see your surname and they
make a decision about you. But lately, I feel that there is more
tolerance in society. Knowledge is taken into consideration, not only
[your] language. So I think that you should respect the culture of
Estonians and the local culture, and then we will be respected also.
Interviewer: And then you will be respected in return?
Pushkin Boy 2:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 3:
I think this problem [intolerance] is being
solved…of course it’s important to learn the state language and to
respect the laws of the constitution and the traditions of the country,
and of course tolerance is important.
This exchange is illustrative of a larger assumption amongst many of the
Russophone students. They have the right to their own culture, but in order to
have that right respected by Estonians, they must reach out and make an effort
to learn about the Estonian nation. A good citizen, according to Pushkin Boy 7, is
“the one who treats other citizens equally. So we are one—all of the citizens, we
are equal.”
At the same time that the Russophone students are calling on the idea of
performing tolerance as a means to receive toleration, they are also leveraging
what they perceive as lack of tolerance on the part of the Estonians to accuse
them of not abiding by the universal principles that unite everyone in Estonia.
Here we see the history of discrimination and oppression in Estonia brought into
play again, except the Russophone students describe discrimination in the post-
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Soviet (rather than Soviet) era that has been directed at them by Estonians.
Several students share the plight of their Russophone grandparents and parents
in order to establish a pattern of Estonian discrimination, and then follow up with
stories of their own experiences of it, to paint a comprehensive picture of their
exclusion from the equality that they are entitled to by law. Tolstoy Girl 3 tells
how “Estonians are offended when they hear the Russian language” and they
“hang up the phone” on her when they hear it; Pushkin Boy 2 describes how his
mother “was on maternity leave, she went to the state department for the
unemployed, and she was treated very badly there. They didn’t respect her”;
Pushkin Girl 1 cites the fact that young Estonians parrot the anti-Russian feelings
of their families even though they “don’t understand why” and “they can’t explain
it.”
The result of this complicated web of asserting their right to retain
Russophone heritage while at the same time conforming to Estonianness is that
there is no set pattern of Russophone student attitudes towards performing their
citizenship. Their particular experiences lead them to different conclusions about
how to contend with being a Russophone in Estonia, and more often than not
their statements reveal internal contradictions.
For instance, Pushkin Boy 6 claims that he “doesn’t pay attention to such
minor things” as when he is discriminated against and that young people should
“look to the future” instead of focusing on identity, but then also laments that “a
Russian native can’t find a place in the Estonian community.” Tolstoy Girl 3
states that she “loves this country” because she was born in Estonia, but later
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says she only has the “feeling of attachment with my family and relatives, and if I
could take them all and leave from here it would be great.” Tolstoy Boy 1 draws
on other multicultural nation-states to question the norms of tolerance in Estonia,
arguing that “in Sweden, they have the second state language as Finnish. Still
there are not so many Finnish people living there, [but] they [the Swedes] learn
Finnish. And I don’t understand why we are forced to learn Estonian”.
The swirling vortex of invocations, applications, and qualifications of
tolerance that are revealed in the focus groups with the Russophone students
speak to the contestedness of the multicultural paradigm. The considerations that
these young people making in defining membership in the Estonian community
demonstrate that “tolerance” is central to this multiculturalist framework. The
student respondents assert and act upon conflicting interpretations of tolerance,
including what it means to be tolerant and also who is the subject/object of
tolerance. Legal citizenship is not a guarantor of full access to participation in
society or acceptance (or tolerance) in Estonian society. Rather, full access to
the space of rights is predicated upon performance of a national identity—
Estonianness—that is presented as “common to citizens” but that in reality is
wholly within the bounds of the Estonian nation-building project. What can be
argued, then, is that multiculturalism does not actually present a viable
alternative to assimilatory nationalisms. Multiculturalism simply complicates the
politics of belonging by adding another layer of political discourse about who
belongs and on what terms.
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Conclusions
This chapter on the conceptualizations of citizenship amongst young
people in Tallinn highlights the tensions inherent to identity and belonging in a
national community—tensions that multiply when several different citizenship
ideals and discourses coexist alongside one another. By addressing themes
common to all of the student focus groups this analysis exposes the points at
which competing discourses of national identity, multiculturalism, and belonging
mediate the students’ negotiations of citizenship. The analysis shows that for this
generation of wholly post-Soviet young people, historical inter-ethnic tensions in
Estonia abut Western liberal democratic standards of multiculturalism and form a
contentious environment in which they have to confront notions of belonging
exclusion in Estonian society. Informed by identity politics, nationalist and
multicultural discourses in everyday spaces, Soviet and post-Soviet history,
stereotypes, and personal experiences with the Other, the students’
conceptualizations of citizenship are particular, often contradictory, and in
continuous flux.
All of the student participants contend with notions of citizenship from a
platform of Estonian nation-building processes. As part of the titular majority, the
Estonian students tend to define the parameters of citizenship on identity
markers particular to ethnic Estonians that have been naturalized as traits
common to all ‘real’ Estonians, allowing them to speak in “universal” terms while
mediating difference. The Russophone students negotiate their Other status by
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asserting sameness—via their equal status as citizens—in order to maintain their
difference.
Although much of the student narratives on belonging reflect adult
discourses and can be separated along ethnolinguistic identity lines, the young
people are neither mirrors of their adult counterparts nor consigned to groupthink.
The discourses that they encounter in the spaces of their schools are influential
parts of how they conceptualize citizenship and identity, but that influence is
situated within the wider contexts of the students’ everyday personal
geographies. Their acceptance or rejection of the terms of belonging in Estonia is
mediated by their personal experiences and negotiations of all of their everyday
spaces rather than one or two particular spaces. A close analysis of the focus
group conversations reveals that these young people are active agents in
defining and performing their citizenships at the national level. The students’
abilities to contend with belonging and community membership on their own
terms are also evident as they negotiate citizenship at other-than-national levels.
The following chapters discuss how students’ negotiate citizenship in everyday
urban spaces and in the supranational space of Europe.
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Chapter 5
Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging in Everyday Spaces

The previous chapter elaborated on the varying discourses of citizenship
and identity that this study’s student participants contend with and deploy in their
narratives of belonging in Estonian society. Recent scholarship illustrates that
contemporary citizenship is mediated by diverse discourses that exist in multiple
spaces and that are formulated in different political realms (Secor 2007; Ehrkamp
and Leitner 2003; Nagel and Staeheli 2004). Young people, especially those in
divided societies, contend with differentiated discourses of belonging and
community membership that coexist in their everyday spaces (Skelton 2010;
Leonard 2010; Cairns 2008). These students actively conceptualize, negotiate,
and contest citizenship and identity as they encounter varied discourses of
belonging and citizenship in the socially divided spaces of Tallinn.
Young people’s understandings of citizenship and belonging, then, must
be considered as active processes that are continually being produced and
reproduced by their actions and reactions in their everyday lives (Sarah L.
Holloway et al. 2010; Staeheli 2008). The student participants’ narratives reflect
the ways an individual moves through and within certain everyday spaces
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such as spaces of language, memory, and the urban landscape. This chapter
builds on this argument, suggesting that the young people in this study encounter
and participate in spatial strategies of citizenship, which can be understood as
“process[es] that fix identities, delineate boundaries, and discipline the meanings
and practices of social space” (Secor 2004, 353). The socio-spatial division of
Tallinn and Estonian society at large continues to play a central role in these
students’ understandings, negotiations, and contestations of citizenship and
identity. Although the students acknowledge discourses of multiculturalism and
efforts to integrate the Estonian and Russophone communities, their personal
geographies are still organized through ethnolinguistic, sociocultural, and
territorial boundaries with varying degrees of permeability. The analysis in this
chapter focuses on the ways that students’ operate within and through these
bounded spaces and use and invoke space as a strategy for delineating the
parameters of citizenship and belonging in Tallinn.
This chapter uses data collected in focus groups with the student study
participation to engage with the students’ narratives of how they describe
movement within and through certain everyday spaces as indicators of identity
and belonging. In this chapter, when general patterns appear between students
in schools of the same language medium the student participants’ responses are
identified as being from “Estonian-medium school students” or “Russian-medium
school students.” However, when patterns emerge along ethnolinguistic lines
rather than school language medium lines, the students’ responses are identified

	
  
as being from Estonian heritage, Russophone, or “outlier”6 students. For
example, if an outlier student at Estonian-medium school, such as O-Tammsaare
Boy 1, who is Russophone, expresses opinions that are similar to students from
a Russian-medium school, the student responses will be noted by ethnolinguistic
heritage rather than school language medium in order to highlight that such
response patterns appear outside the space of the school.
The previous chapter illustrated that the tensions between the
universalisms and particularisms of citizenship are manifested through
inconsistencies and slippages in the students’ narratives of belonging and
citizenship in Estonia. This chapter extends that point by analyzing the ways that
the student participants actively negotiate citizenship and belonging in Tallinn on
a day-to-day basis. Drawing out the themes that the students consistently deploy
in focus group conversations about negotiating citizenship, the following sections
engage with students’ accounts of their movements in and through physical
spaces of the city. By examining the ways that students actively negotiate
citizenship this chapter expands upon the argument made in the previous
chapter that the politics of identity and citizenship in Estonia are complex and
dynamic, and that the terms of citizenship and belonging are complicated by the
shifting tension between universalistic and particularistic political claims, projects,
and identities.
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As noted in chapter two, “outlier” students are those four participants whose ethnolinguistic
heritage, mother tongue, and school language medium do not neatly overlap into Estonian or
Russophone categories.
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Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging Through Language Spaces
Language is without a doubt the trait used most often to identify
belonging in Estonia. Language has always been at the center of post-Soviet
Estonian politics and socio-cultural relationships. Estonia’s constitution, which
was written in 1938 and re-instituted in 1992, declares in the preamble that the
Estonian state will “…guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation,
language, and culture throughout the ages…” before going on to establish
Estonian as the sole national language in Chapter I (Constitution of the Republic
of Estonia 1992). Moreover, the naturalization process for adults in Estonia
includes an Estonian language exam component. These formalizations of the
Estonian language as chief marker of national identity ensured in no uncertain
terms that it also served as the chief marker of citizenship.
Government documents, street signs, history textbooks, and most
officially sanctioned modes of communication explicitly and implicitly convey that
Estonian is the only socially, and often legally, legitimate means of
communication in wider society. Although publically funded pre-K, basic, and
secondary education in Estonia is offered in Russian to accommodate the large
Russophone minority, “the use of Russian is interpreted as a major threat to
national identity and as a tool of ‘Russian imperialism’” (Kolossov 2003, 258). As
alluded to in the previous chapter, a part of the Estonian government’s
“Integration Plan: 2007-2012”, Russian-medium secondary schools are required
to teach 60 percent of the curriculum in Estonian (regardless of the quality of
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teachers’7 and students’ Estonian language skills). Many students’ perspectives
on the “60 percent” rule indicate that it actually works to ensure socio-political
exclusion by guaranteeing that Russophone students can’t learn effectively,
which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
Language in Tallinn, then, must be considered geographically in order
understand how the built environment interacts with discursive practice. The
students use language to ascribe identity to people, but also use it to ascribe
identity to spaces in the city and, subsequently, the people who inhabit those
spaces. In these young people’s narratives of identity and belonging, it is not only
whether a language is spoken that is important, but also how the language is
spoken about in spatial terms. The students’ descriptions of “Russian speaking”
and “Estonian speaking” spaces in Tallinn speak to Kay Anderson’s assertion
that discursive practices of cultural norms construct ethnically/racially segregated
spaces, which give those norms “a concrete referent in the form of” concentrated
linguistic communities physically present in the city (1987, 589). The students
organize Tallinn’s districts and places by using language to locate the space of
the Other, against which they define themselves. Their narratives imply that in
Tallinn, language has become spatialized through the “recursive relationship”
between discursive political practices and the “built environment” of the city
(Farrar 2000, 5). Tallinn’s spaces of belonging and exclusion are constructed
through the spatialization of language identity, resulting in an urban geography
coded by language. In this way, the “city explicitly and implicitly reflects and
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  Although teacher skill is evaluated in an attempt to control quality, the success of such
evaluations has been questioned (Toots 2003).	
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establishes the larger social and political order; in it, a society’s attitudes towards
difference are codified.” Estonians’ and Russophones’ political subjectivities, and
the political possibilities available to them, are “forged in and through the spaces
they inhabit,” and therefore by the space of language.
The student respondents have strong opinions not only about the
Estonian language, but also the Russian language. To these young people, the
Russian language is just as important as the national language in defining and
performing Estonian citizenship. Which language an individual chooses to speak
the most often—and their attitude towards that language—will situate him or her
in the space of belonging in Estonian society or in the space of the Other.

“It’s Our Country, So Why Don’t You Speak This Language?”
As members of the dominant group, the Estonian heritage students tend
to speak as if they have the authority to decide whether someone is “really
Estonian” or not. Because the Estonian language is now taught in Russianmedium schools and is required for adults to gain citizenship, the Estonian
heritage students have narrowed ascribing full Estonianness down to the Others’
attitudes towards learning Estonian. For instance, the quotes below demonstrate
a clear tendency to measure enthusiasm for the universal language of the
Estonian citizen:
Koidula Girl 2:
I don’t like the attitude that they [Russophones]
have, “No, we don’t want to learn Estonian.” But those people of
Russia, Russian people who come here and try to learn, and at
least say some words in Estonian, that’s very welcoming and we
are very open to it.
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Koidula Girl 4:
If the person actually wants to be Estonian,
then he studies the language, he accepts the rules or whatever—
but a lot of Russians are like, they don’t want to learn the
language…
Tammsaare Girl 1: These Russians who are intelligent and smart
and more…open minded, they understand Estonian, mostly.
Tammsaare Girl 2: It’s our country, and you [Russophones] live
here, so why don’t you speak this language? I don’t understand
that.
Perhaps even more telling about the way that Estonian heritage students
conceptualize the “true” Estonian citizen is their characterization of people who
speak or have a desire to speak Russian. There is a line that people whose
mother tongue is Russian must cross in order to be fully accepted into the
Estonian national and civic fold, because their mother tongue is a clear indication
that they have to work to become Estonian. Anyone who speaks only Russian, or
appears to use Russian as their preferred language even if they have the ability
to speak Estonian, is perceived as not legitimately belonging to the Estonian
nation-state:
Koidula Boy 1:
Fifty percent of Tallinn’s population is nonEstonians, or… they might consider themselves Estonian, but they
are speaking Russian.
Tammsaare Girl 1: Why don’t they learn Estonian so they can
speak with us? It’s our national language, so the Estonian language
is more important than the Russian.
Tammsaare Girl 6: We have many, many Russians who don’t
speak Estonian. So that’s why we get really upset, because they
live here but they don’t speak a word of Estonian.

	
  

184

	
  
Koidula Girl 2:
Like, when you say “I’m Estonian” but speak
Russian, then we feel like, no you’re not. You should speak
Estonian.
Tammsaare Girl 4: It’s not that uncommon that when you go to a
store, the cashier speaks to you in Russian. They say privyet
[informal hello in Russian] and they tell you the sum in Russian
numbers. And I’m just—I usually stare at them and say, “in
Estonian please.” So then they moan something out—they really
don’t know the numbers. And its quite difficult for me. It angers me
a bit. When you go to a bus driver and you ask, “What is the next
station?” they don’t understand. They will talk to you in Russian,
and that upsets me because I think that in my own country I should
be able to talk to most of the people in my native language—well,
the country’s native language.
These comments are indicative of the general feeling of the Estonian focus group
participants. Kolossov notes that “social groups tend to define themselves not by
reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is by comparison
with ‘strangers’” (2003, 257–8), an idea noted elsewhere (Jenkins 2000; Entrikin
1999). Consequently, what the Estonian heritage students’ comments reveal is
that they are contesting the notion that full citizenship is available to individuals
who do not fully conform to the key marker of Estonian national identity: the
Estonian language.
Tammsaare Girl 4’s anecdote about Russophone shop clerks and bus
drivers makes apparent that language spaces overlap and intersect with other
everyday urban spaces. With Tammsaare Girl 4’s story, though, it is possible that
everyday experiences may be used to reinforce or support preexisting
impressions of the Other (I demonstrate in the next section that Russophone
students may do this also). I argue this point because of her example of bus
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drivers. All Tallinn public transport—trams, buses, and ‘trolls’8—have digital signs
clearly displayed over the driver’s seat that indicate the route’s next stop—in
Estonian only. Because of the presence of these signs it is unlikely, based on my
own personal experience navigating the city’s public transport routes, that any
person would need to ask the driver what the next stop is. Although I don’t doubt
that Tammsaare Girl 4 actually had this experience on a bus, I find it unlikely that
she was expecting an answer in Estonian from the driver.
The importance of the language issue to how the Estonian heritage
students demarcate the bounds of the Estonian citizenry cannot be overstated.
The pronoun “our” is used regularly—at least once during each focus group with
Estonian heritage students—to describe the Estonian nation-state and the
language, and to irrevocably link the two. This demonstrates the extent to which
the space of full citizenship and the space of the Estonian nation-building project
overlap. The students’ use of “our” is a verbal bordering practice that locates
non-Estonian speakers and, as I have demonstrated, those who speak Estonian
but prefer to use other languages, on the outside of the “real” Estonians’ space of
rights. But because of the students’ concomitant citing of Estonia’s history of
oppression—particularly relating to the role cultural suppression via language
use—under Soviet rule, the students act justified in asserting Estonianness via
laws and norms on “their” language.
The Estonian heritage students acknowledge that the language barrier
between themselves and Russophone young people is the greatest obstacle to
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A ‘troll’ is a bus that is connected to wire leads above the street.
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integration and a lessening of tensions between the two groups. (This, it should
be noted, is in contrast to the students’ earlier statements that their generation is
more integrated than the older generations, and that the language barrier is
“smaller” among young people.) The solutions suggested for the language barrier
problem invariably involve Russophone young people learning Estonian rather
than Estonian young people learning Russian9.
The only specific solution that students suggest, (and suggest multiple
times), is the state-level solution of phasing-out the dual language school system.
Many Estonian heritage students do not think that this poses a threat to
Russophone language rights because, as Tammsaare Girl 2 points out, “they can
speak Russian at home, nobody takes that away from them.” Her relegation of
the deviant behavior—in this case, spoken Russian—to the home is an attempt
to confine that which threatens “the orderly functioning of civil society” to the
private sphere (Marston 1990, 453). In this student’s statement, culture—or at
least minority culture—becomes a denizen of the private sphere rather than the
public sphere. The public sphere is very much based upon the dominant cultural
norms, which have been universalized as the “common concerns” of the people
(Fraser 1995, 287). Because language skills allow individuals to enter the public
sphere and benefit from civil, social, and political rights, they are also often
crucial to obtaining full citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003). By advocating for
an Estonian-medium only school system, the Estonian heritage students are
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Estonian-medium school students are required to begin learning Russian as their third language
in or around the fifth grade. Tellingly, however, when Koidula Boy 1 pointed out that learning
Russian is compulsory for them, Koidula Girl 3 responded, “Yeah, but its not that compulsory.”
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implying that full citizenship can only be obtained on the terms of Estonian
ethnolinguistic norms and values.
For the Estonian heritage students, it is clear that language is one of the
most, if not single most, important crucial identity marker for an Estonian citizen.
The majority of these students feel that associating access to substantive
citizenship with Estonian language skills is key to asserting and preserving
Estonia’s status both as a sovereign state and as a free nation of people.
Russophones, then, are perceived as descendants of Soviet interlopers whose
Otherness is proven by their mother tongue, the language of Russian
imperialism, and their lack of Estonian skills. The assumption on the part of
Estonian heritage students is, broadly, that the Estonian nation-state’s right to
establish the terms of universal citizenship is closely tied to their right to selfdetermination and freedom from Soviet oppression.

Language and Class Status within the Politics of Identity
The Russophone student participants have much more complex
engagements with the Estonian and Russian languages and these languages’
relationship to substantive citizenship that includes meaningful access to rights.
The focus groups with Russophone students reveal yet again the paradoxical
process of harnessing the universal characteristics of the Estonian citizen (which
almost always overlap with the Estonian nation’s ethnolinguistic markers) in order
to assert their rights to be a Russophone with access to full citizenship in
Estonian society.
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The general patterns of the Russophone students’ attitudes towards the
Estonian language suggest that they have rather calmly accepted, or are calmly
resigned to, the fact that it is a necessary part of life for claiming the political,
social, and civil rights available to Estonian citizens. But the statements from the
focus groups reveal that these students’ multiple and varied approaches to
negotiating citizenship and language stem largely from the diverse personal
experiences they have had with Estonian speakers and in their everyday spaces.
Many of them speak about their Estonian language skills in utilitarian terms—a
means to an end of legal citizenship, secondary school graduation, or basic
communication with Estonians in everyday contexts. While this utilitarian view of
the Estonian language doesn’t imply enthusiastic assimilation into the Estonian
culture, it signals the success of Estonian nationalist policies in restricting access
to citizenship rights to individuals that acquiesce to the dominant Estonian
culture.
An observable pattern in the Russophone students’ narratives regarding
the role of language in negotiating belonging in Estonian society is an association
between class status and experiences with the Other group. One example of this
class based rhetoric is the Russophone students’ distinction between “bad
Russians” and “good Russians” in their own ethnolinguistic community. The
“good” Russians are those who make an attempt to integrate into Estonian
society, particularly through learning the language. “Bad” Russians are
characterized by an unwillingness to integrate (Pushkin Boy 4), low levels of
education (Pushkin Boy 2), and weak civic values such as drunkenness and drug
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dealing (Tolstoy Girl 3, Tolstoy Girl 2). In particular the students from Pushkin
School, known for being a ‘progressive’ institution with regards to the integration
process, have constructed borders within their own community based on
assimilatory practices:
Pushkin Boy 4:
And also there are a lot of Russians who don’t
want to integrate, and they don’t want to know anything… they are
very aggressive.
Interviewer:
Aggressive towards Estonians?
Pushkin Boy 4:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 7:
Some Russians are just thinking that they are
living in the USSR and they encapsulate themselves in this
[Russian] society, and they don’t understand what’s happened here
[in Estonia].
Pushkin Boy 2:
I think that a lot of people who are thinking a lot
about [the tension between Russians and Estonians] are Russians.
They have basic education, and maybe they are working as
welders. But those who are better educated, they don’t treat the
nationality question the same way.
When these students speak about integration into Estonian society it is
commonly understood that the most important act is learning the Estonian
language. Learning Estonian, according to the students quoted above, is
associated with higher levels of education, a willingness to meet the Estonians
half way in the integration process, and indicative of higher class Russophones.
But the fact that they are basing the “good” or “bad” judgment on Estonian sociocultural norms evinces the pervasiveness of Estonian nation-building project in
these students’ conceptualizations of citizenship.
The pattern of class-based rhetoric in discussions of language, identity,
and belonging also appears in Russophone students’ distinction between
different classes in the Estonian community. Estonians that demonstrate
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willingness to communicate with Russophones in Russian, or make a
compromise between Russian and Estonian, are viewed favorably as a class that
is forward-looking and progressive and distinct from the elitist Estonian
nationalist class that is patently anti-Russophone. Pushkin Boy 7, for instance,
makes a distinction between Estonians and their attitudes towards Russophones:
I think that there are two groups of Estonians: those who are
belonging to richer classes, they don’t want to communicate with
Russians. They even joke about it. But also there is another group
of Estonians who really don’t mind and they communicate with
Russians.
Several other Russophone students echo the sentiment of Pushkin Boy
7’s comments, implying that they associate class status and language skills with
the politics of identity in Estonian society. The Russophone students tend to
couch all individuals who are interested in bridging the ethnolinguistic gap in
similar terms regardless of ethnolinguistic heritage, perhaps unconsciously
creating a new class status shared between Estonians and Russophones that
will smooth the waters for integration and cross-cultural communication. For
Pushkin Boy 3 this shared class status that connects progressively minded
individuals exists at the supranational level instead of at the national level:
I know one, my friend, an Estonian, who learns Russian. And it may
feel strange, but it is, it’s happening. I think that in the future when
you speak Russian, this won’t draw any special attention because
this is the European way of treating different nationalities, and
Estonia is trying to get [become] more and more of a European
country.
There is a general pattern, then, amongst Russophone students’
perceptions of the role that language skills play in belonging and identity in
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Estonia. But there are divergent comments amongst Russophone students,
reflecting varying and inconsistent experiences. This shows that young people’s
experiences are not homogenous, but rather reflect different class positions and
outlooks. This is apparent in the following discussion between students:
Tolstoy Girl 3:
Estonians often are offended when they hear
the Russian language, and they don’t want to speak Russian…
Tolstoy Girl 1:
I don’t agree. I worked in an Estonian company
in the summer. They didn’t speak Russian a lot, and also I don’t
have a very good knowledge of Estonian. But still, we tried to make
a compromise. They tried to speak Russian and I also tried to
speak Estonian as much as I could.
Tolstoy Girl 3:
I don’t agree though. I think that when I start
speaking Russian, when I call someone, and Estonians hear my
Russian, they don’t want to talk to me. They even hang up the
phone.
Tolstoy Boy 1:
I agree [with Tolstoy Girl 3]. That happens.
Tolstoy Girl 1:
Still, it all depends on the person.
Tolstoy Girl 1 is reluctant to subsume her conclusions about Estonians under her
classmates’ opinions, which dismantles any presupposition that young people
uniformly contest and negotiate belonging because they are in the same
ethnolinguistic group, attend the same school, and have similar positionalities
within Estonian society. Instead it suggests that they are likely to have different
strategies for negotiating these identities and power relationships. The differing
opinions in this conversation are also indicative of the unevenness of feelings of
belonging in the Russophone community. For instance, although Tolstoy Girl 1
expresses feelings of socio-political alienation later in the conversation, her
unwillingness to categorize all Estonians as hostile to the Russian language in
the above conversation indicates that the parameters of belonging and exclusion
(and by extension citizenship) are not clear-cut. Even Tolstoy Girl 3, who
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describes Estonians as “offended” by the Russian language, later mentions that it
is important to learn Estonian because it facilitates communication with Estonian
people and gives Russophones an advantage in operating in Estonian society,
further suggesting that young people’s negotiations of belonging a knotty and
dynamic process.

Language Norms and Feelings of Alienation Amongst Russophone Students
The Russophone students’ narratives reflect perceptions of class status
when it comes to language as a tool for communicating and integrating. But the
focus group conversations also reveal that some students view the enforced
hegemony of the Estonian language as unnecessary at best, and little more than
cultural barbarism at worst. During the focus groups, these students are
inconsistent in their assessments of the value of learning the Estonian language.
For instance, in one of the focus groups I ask Pushkin Boy 5 whether he thinks
that speaking Estonian is important for his future of living in Estonia, and he
responds that “I think its more important for Estonians, not for us. It’s important
for them that we must know their language.” But later in the conversation when I
ask him if he felt Estonian at all, he answers, “Yes, because I can clearly speak
the Estonian language. I can use it to communicate with other Estonians.”
There’s an internal struggle taking place about exactly which side of the
Estonian/Russophone “fence” he belongs on, and the pivot point for this struggle
is language.
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The Russophone students who are more militant regarding the
hegemony of Estonian bring geographic elements into the discussion. For
instance, two boys deploy the social geographies of Estonia and their personal
lives in their resistance to accede to Estonian cultural-linguistic norms. Tolstoy
Boy 1 and Tolstoy Boy 2 had the following conversation about mandatory
Estonian in Russian-medium schools:
Tolstoy Boy 2:
I think that it’s very important to think differently
about the problem [of language medium in schools], because even
though some children start to learn Estonian since their young age,
they still don’t communicate with Estonians. They don’t speak to
them. They go to work and they still speak Russian with their
colleagues. It is better to enforce the second state language as
Russian.
Tolstoy Boy 1:
I agree. I still don’t understand why we have to
do that [learn Estonian]. For example, in Sweden, they have the
second state language as Finnish. Still, there aren’t many Finnish
people living there. But they [the Finns] are left calm—they [the
Swedes] learn Finnish. And I don’t understand why we are forced to
learn Estonian.
The first geographic element introduced in this conversation is the reality
of heavy socio-spatial division between Estonians and Russophones, which
exists both at the urban level in Tallinn and the national level in Estonia as a
whole. As discussed in chapter one, the social geography of Estonia is clearly
demarcated between the two groups, with the vast majority of Russophones
living in the northeastern county of Ida-Virumaa. The only other sizeable group of
Russophones lives in Tallinn, which itself is remarkably spatially divided. Every
single student participant in this study identified the city district of Lasnamäe as
“where the Russians live,” with several also noting that districts of Kopli and
Õismae are heavily populated with Russophones. Both Russian-medium schools

	
  

194

	
  
that participated in this project are located in Lasnamäe, and 13 of 15
Russophone student participants (as well as O-Koidula Girl 5, O-Pushkin Boy 1,
an O-Pushkin Girl 2) live in Lasnamäe. None of the Estonian student participants
live in the districts of Lasnamäe, Kopli, or Õismae.
From what I observed during my time in the various districts of Tallinn,
the point that Tolstoy Boy 2 makes about Russophones communicating and
living in almost entirely Russian language spaces is not hyperbole. There are
Russian language newspapers, TV stations, radio stations, and bookstores
available for the Russophone population of Tallinn. When I was in the Lasnamäe
district, I quickly learned to initiate conversations in what little Russian I knew
rather than Estonian, because oftentimes the bus drivers and shop clerks would
either tell me in Estonian that they did not speak Estonian well, or answer
immediately in Russian. All of this is to say that Tolstoy Boy 2’s point that a
Russophone doesn’t necessarily have a large need for Estonian in everyday life
is legitimate, concurrent with previous studies of Estonia’s language geographies
(Pavlenko 2008; Laitin 1998). With this assertion, Tolstoy Boy 2 is illustrating the
complex web of urban geographies, language geographies, socio-spatial
divisions, and identity politics that all young people, not just Russophones, are
required to negotiate on a daily basis as they contest and contend with
citizenship in their country.
The second geographic element in their conversation is the inclusion of
another nation-state, in this case Sweden, into the debate. Tolstoy Boy 110 and
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Boy 1 holds Russian Federation citizenship. He is one of only two of the 29 student
participants that do not hold Estonian citizenship. This indicates that, although his legal and
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Tolstoy Boy 2 both agree that Russian should be made the second national
language. The style of Tolstoy Boy 1’s argument for Russian as the second
national language of Estonia is compelling. Although his goal is to ensure rights
for his minority group, he is arguing for that goal by putting the Russophone
minority on even footing with the Estonian majority. He is arguing for the right to
be different from the Estonian majority by mobilizing sameness with them—in this
case, on equal rights to cultural-linguistic expression. Furthermore, he deputizes
the universality embedded in multicultural discourse into his argument by citing
Sweden’s “equal treatment” of the Finnish minority. He also underscores his
argument by emphasizing that the Russophone minority in Estonia is even more
entitled to use their language than the Finnish minority in Sweden is to use
Finnish because the Russophone minority in Estonia is substantial, compared to
the relatively few Finns in Sweden. Essentially, he is constructing a hierarchy of
entitlement to minority rights even while operating from the base of the
universality of rights. He is distinguishing between minority groups who are,
ostensibly, not only equal to majority groups, but also equal to each other.
The Russophone student participants’ responses further underline
language’s role as the chief identity marker that mediates access to the space of
substantive and formal citizenship in Estonia. While there are a variety of
attitudes towards the hegemony of the Estonian language amongst the
Russophone student participants, their negotiating stances all emanate from their
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
political citizenship is granted by the Russian Federation, his residence in Tallinn ensures that on
a day-to-day basis his social, civil, and cultural rights are under the purview of the Republic of
Estonia. Although he is not a legal citizen of Estonia, he is forced to negotiate his social and civil
citizenship rights on dominant Estonian terms, once again demonstrating the fraught and
intertwined nature of universalisms and particularisms in citizenship performances.
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positionality of Others within the Estonian nation-state. The tension between the
Estonian and Russian languages is a microcosm of the larger struggle to set the
specific terms of who Estonian citizenship is universally available to.

Minding the Gap in a Divided Society: the Outlier Students
The centrality of language to the co-constitution of substantive and formal
Estonian citizenship is further demonstrated by the way it functions in the lives of
the “outlier” students in the study population. Of the four “outlier” student
participants, three come from mixed heritage backgrounds, and one is a
Russophone-heritage student who attends Tammsaare School. For these four
students, their mother tongues, the language of instruction at their school, and
their fluency (or lack thereof) in Estonian and Russian has great bearing on how
they negotiate their own citizenship and also how they conceptualize Estonian
citizenship on a larger basis.
Although the four “outlier” students listed their national identities as
Estonian on intake surveys and hold Estonian citizenship, their performances of
that citizenship differ highly. The variability of their conceptualizations of
citizenship indicates that for these students, straddling the Estonian and
Russophone communities produces a highly conflictual existence. I will also
argue that these students’ varied familial and personal geographies interact with
their school spaces to produce diverse performances of Estonian citizenship.
Although O-Taamsaare Boy 1 and O-Koidula Girl 5 are both in Estonianmedium schools, their familial and personal geographies are partially or fully
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Russophone language spaces. O-Taamsaare Boy 1 comes from a Russophone
household, and O-Koidula Girl 5 comes from a dual language, mixed heritage
household. Their narratives reveal that they contest and negotiate their Estonian
citizenship quite differently. O-Taamsaare Boy 1 negotiates the conflict he feels
between his Russophone heritage and his Estonian citizenship by constantly
qualifying his Russophone heritage, disassociating himself from Russophones
who are not properly integrating into Estonian society by learning the language
and respecting the culture. O-Koidula Girl 5, meanwhile, is less conflicted about
associating herself with both the Estonian and Russophone identities, but is very
concerned about the level of misunderstanding that takes place between the two
groups. She attempts to resolve this by citing examples of Russophones who are
eager to learn the Estonian language and Estonians who are eager to learn the
Russian language.
It is my argument that the way that these students’ Estonian-language
education space interacts with their familial geographies accounts for their
different methods of negotiating and performing their Estonian citizenship. OKoidula Girl 5 has an Estonian parent and counts Estonian as one of her mother
tongues, which most likely makes her positionality within Koidula School
relatively unproblematic. This mother tongue and heritage congruency with her
school language medium may be why she is less concerned with affirming her
Estonianness and more concerned with reconciling the misunderstandings
between her two identity groups.
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O-Taamsaare Boy 1, in contrast, has two Russophone parents and
learned to speak Estonian in early basic school, which distinguishes him from the
majority of his classmates at Tammsaare School. Because he bears some
identity markers of the Other group, he concentrates on asserting his
Estonianness by uncoupling his Russophone heritage from Russophones who
are “disrespecting” their home country by not learning the language. Using these
two examples as evidence, I posit that the presence or absence of an Estonian
parent and/or the Estonian language in the home influences the ways that these
two Estonian-medium school students contest and negotiate their identities and,
subsequently, citizenships.
O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 are further examples of how
language spaces are central to “outlier” young people’s negotiation and
performance of citizenship. Both O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 are
mixed-heritage students that attend a Russian-medium school, but their familial
and personal geographies complicate the ways that their negotiations of
citizenship pivot around language. O-Pushkin Girl 2, for instance, grew up
speaking only Russian and admits that she can barely speak Estonian even
though she has been studying it in school for years. She laments that she cannot
attend university in Estonia because her language skills are not nearly good
enough to complete higher education courses in Estonian. Although she
considers herself Estonian because she was born in Tallinn and has an Estonian
parent, she is conflicted by her inability to speak the national language and the
societal exclusion that results from it.
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Contrastingly, O-Pushkin Boy 1 comes from a dual language, mixed
heritage household and declares that his ability to “speak both languages without
an accent” is his ticket to moving easily through Estonian society and being “ok
with both nationalities.” However, he makes contradictory statements during the
focus group with regard to his apparent comfort with both nationalities. He
criticizes Estonians for ridiculing Russophones who speak Estonian with an
accent and notes the disadvantages that the Estonian language’s hegemony
presents for Russophone Estonian citizens (such as access to jobs and higher
education).
Both O-Pushkin Boy 1 and O-Pushkin Girl 2 contend with their Estonian
citizenship based largely based on language, but again the varying contours of
their familial geographies interact differently with their shared educational space.
O-Pushkin Girl 2’s educational and familial spaces are dominated by the Russian
language, which has affected her ability to access fully substantive citizenship in
Estonia. This, in turn, has resulted in the national language not factoring into her
conceptualization of an Estonian citizen—a position that is unique in the entire
student participant study population. O-Pushkin Boy 1 shows a certain amount of
conflict with regards to the preponderance of Estonian and his Estonian heritage,
which he deflects by commenting on the ways that the national language is used
as an exclusionary instead of inclusionary tool. His statements, I argue, stem
from the unease of having Estonian heritage while moving through largely
Russian-speaking spaces.
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The unique set of responses from the four “outlier” students with nonuniform ethnolinguistic identities suggests three things. First, the growing number
of young people in Estonia whose personal geographies are neither wholly
Estonian-speaking nor wholly Russian-speaking spaces will have much more
complex contestations and negotiations of identity and citizenship in Estonia due
to the long-standing antagonistic relations between the titular majority and
Russophone minority. Second, language is not only a central issue in the
negotiation of their citizenships, but arguably makes those negotiations more
fraught than their peers’ because of their regular movement through both
Estonian and Russophone spaces. Last, the highly varied configurations of the
“outlier” students’ personal geographies is evidence that it is, and will continue to
be, challenging to make generalizations about the attitudes of other young
people with similarly complex identities toward and negotiation of citizenship in
Estonia.
The analysis of the focus groups with the student study population
reflects the central role that language plays in negotiating citizenship and
belonging in Estonia. The students often deputize the city’s landscape and
topography into their narratives about language use and how it affects belonging
and exclusion in Tallinn. This demonstrates that these young people’s
citizenships are negotiated within and through multiple spaces, and that the
experiences within the various spaces of their everyday geographies interact
complexly to inform the ways in which they encounter and navigate the politics of
identity in their city. The following section explores the role that the urban
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landscape plays in the student respondents’ negotiation of belonging and
citizenship in greater detail.

Urban Landscape, Territory, and Belonging
The urban landscape of Tallinn is unique among Estonian cities because
of its large numbers of both ethnic Estonians and Russophones. Elsewhere in
Estonia, cities are 90+ percent comprised of either the titular majority or
Russophone minority. Tallinn’s population, by contrast, was 53 percent Estonian
and 44 percent Russophone in 2012 (Tallinn City Office 2012). As noted earlier,
the urban geography of Tallinn is very clearly divided on ethnolinguistic lines
(Figure 5.1), similar to the socio-spatial divisions observed in other contexts
(Leonard 2006; Kuusisto-Arponen 2002). The marking of territory in urban
spaces can be accomplished through symbols of banal nationalism (Billig 1995)
and spatial practices of memorialization (Till 1999; Till 2005; Ehala 2009; Smith
and Burch 2012), and also through invisible borders such as language use
(Pavlenko 2008) and mental maps (Kuusisto-Arponen 2002).
In divided societies, the struggles over identity and citizenship are often
localized when urban spaces become spatialized as different groups lay claim to
territory in asserting belonging and performing ethnolinguistic identities (Massey
1995; Mills 2006; Kuusisto-Arponen 2002; Staeheli 2008). Moreover, urban and
local boundaries divide not only movement through physical space, but also
social, economic, political, and cultural practices (Kuusisto-Arponen 2002; Mills
2005). As such, cities embody citizenship practices and citizenship struggles
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(Secor 2004). In focus groups, my student participants engage frequently with
visible and invisible boundaries throughout Tallinn as part of their
conceptualization and everyday performance of citizenship. Substantiating the
argument that urban places and landscapes are constantly shifting and have
different meanings to different groups (Massey 1995; Rodman 1992), the
Estonian and Russophone students interpret, appropriate, and navigate Tallinn’s
urban spaces on the terms of their own conceptualization of citizenship.

Figure 5.1 Percent Russophone Population—Tallinn Districts. The
socio-spatial divisions between Estonians and Russophones are reflected in
the ethnolinguistic populations of Tallinn’s districts.
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Mental Maps: Ascribing Identities to Tallinn’s Districts
Each focus group with the student participants began with a discussion
about Tallinn and the places where they feel most comfortable. The students
were given a map of the greater Tallinn area and asked to mark the areas of the
city that they feel are distinct from others. By working together to agree upon and
specify the city layout, each of the eight focus groups produced material versions
of their mental maps, each of which are identical.
Mental maps are a form of mental segregation that, as Kuusisto-Arponen
(2002) argues, can be more influential than actual physical lines in divided
societies. This is confirmed by the students’ verbal descriptions of the borders
that they drew on the maps. The invisible border around the Lasnämae district
drew the most discussion in all of the focus groups. Lasnamäe is a district in the
eastern part of Tallinn that experienced a housing construction boom during the
1970’s and early 1980’s under the Soviet regime, and as such is the most
populated district of Tallinn. Pre-fab concrete block apartment homes were built
at a fast rate during the construction boom, which gives the district a very
different architectural feel than most of Tallinn. Moreover, the population of
Lasnamäe has been overwhelmingly Russophone since the Soviet era and
continues to be so today, with 68 percent of the district’s population identified as
Russophone in 2012 (Tallinn City Office 2012).
Unsurprisingly, given that both Russian-medium schools that participated
in this study are located in Lasnamäe, 13 of the 15 students from the Russianmedium schools hail from this district. Only one of the Estonian-medium school
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students, O-Koidula Girl 5 (who is of mixed heritage) lives in Lasnamäe. As such,
although all students’ mental maps of the city are similar, the mental images
attached to Lasnamäe and its neighborhoods are highly skewed according to
their ethnolinguistic group. For instance, compare how a sampling of Estonian
and Russophone students descriptions vary:
Tammsaare Girl 4: They have lots of Russians there [in
Lasnamägi, a subsdistrict of Lasnamäe], and its really like the
Soviet Union, you can feel it everywhere. All the buildings are like
nine stories high, and its really gray and so, its not really
comfortable to be there. Its really, like… you can feel the Soviet
Union there.
Pushkin Boy 7:
We feel comfortable everywhere, but
[Lasnamäe] is our district, this is our home, and we feel the best
there.
Koidula Boy 1:
I have really bad feelings about Lasnamäe…
Russians, and the overall… it doesn’t look very nice, the region. I
like Põhja-Tallinn because, architecturally, its small wooden
houses. In this way, its cozy, which couldn’t be said for Lasnamäe,
which is just concrete blocks. But one thing is the social… well,
these areas— Põhja-Tallinn and Lasnamäe—you have lower social
status, I would say, for the region. The people are probably poorer,
more crime.
Tolstoy Girl 3:
I think that we really like the most the district
where we stay and live. And I was born and I’ve lived all my life in
Lasnamäe, and I like it the most.
Tammsaare Girl 1: …Lasnamägi—
Tammsaare Girl 2: And Kopli—
Tammsaare Girl 1: Are creepy!
Interviewer: What makes those two places kind of creepy?
Tammsaare Girl 1: In Lasnamäe, there lives so many Russians.
Pushkin Boy 5:
There [Lasnamäe] lives most of our friends
[sic]. We can say that Lasnamäe district, there lives mostly
Russians [sic].
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This sample of responses reveals the obvious disconnect between Estonian and
Russophone mental images of Lasnamäe district. While it is agreed that
Lasnamäe is “where the Russians live,” Estonian heritage students’ unease
about Lasnamäe is explicitly connected with the presence of a large Russophone
population. The students associate the district with deep feelings of unease,
higher crime rates, and architecture of the bygone Soviet era, but more
importantly tie each of these things to the Russophone population explicitly. A
few Estonian heritage students, as well as outlier student O-Taamsaare Boy 1,
went as far as to laughingly label Lasnamäe simply as “Russia” or “USSR.”
Lasnamäe, because of its perceived Soviet-ness, is a “no-go area” for
these Estonian heritage students, i.e. mental maps of where the Other is
(Kuusisto-Arponen 2002). The images that the Estonian heritage students attach
to these no-go areas—such as Soviet style architecture—are negative, which
reinforce not only the spatial divisions in the city, but also the sociocultural and
political divisions within society. The “Russian people” area of the city is by
default associated with the Russian language, the identity marker that Estonian
heritage students define as contrary to what an Estonian citizen is. Therefore
what we see here is the spatiality of the city acting as a delimiter of the
boundaries of citizenship. Because Lasnamäe is where Russophones and the
Russian language is located, it is labeled as un-Estonian, and therefore outside
the space of full, substantive citizenship. Substantive Estonian citizenship and
the urban spaces of Tallinn form and are formed by each other through a process
of border drawing and identity-marking.
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The Russophone students, and three of the “outlier” students who live in
Lasnamäe, clearly have much more positive feelings towards their home district.
The two Russophone students who do not live in Lasnamäe11 also speak about
the district in positive terms because their friends live there. Because these
students talk about Lasnamäe in terms of community and belonging their
conversations tend to ethnolinguistically homogenize the area (Secor 2004) even
though roughly 28 percent of the district’s population is Estonian. These students
do not mention crime or dull architecture, but instead talk about the comfort that
they feel because they associate it with family, friends, and the majority of their
lives.
The similar mental mapping with differing commentary amongst the
student study population does not end with Lasnamäe district. Each of the focus
groups also mention Kopli, a sub-district of Põhja-Tallinn, and Pirita, a district in
northern Tallinn. Kopli, interestingly, is a district that is noted by both the
Estonian and Russophone students as an area where drug use, alcohol abuse,
and crime are common, and where the majority of the population is Russian.
Given the Estonians students’ mental images of Lasnamäe, it is not surprising
that they have a very negative mental image of another area with a high
Russophone population. Again we see a class distinction in these narratives as
the Russophone students distinguish the of Russophones that live in Kopli:
Pushkin Boy 2:
Kopli is—there are living many Russians, bad
Russians. They drink alcohol…
Pushkin Boy 3:
And use the drugs.
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Pushkin Boy 4 and Pushkin Boy 7 live in Maardu, a small town 6 miles from Lasnamäe whose
population is 70 percent Russophone.
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Tolstoy Girl 3:
The first district I don’t like is Kopli.
Interviewer: What’s wrong with Kopli?
Tolstoy Girl 3:
I distinguish it from the other districts of Tallinn.
Tolstoy Girl 2:
Its one of the oldest districts, and its not about
the architecture of something specific about the
district, but about the people who live there.
Tolstoy Girl 3:
It’s because there are a lot of alcoholics and
drug dealers, and that’s why its not the best district to
live in.
Tolstoy Girl 1:
I also don’t like to go to Kopli, and I don’t feel
comfortable there.
Tolstoy Girl 2:
I know that in Kopli there are mostly Russians,
there are no Estonians there.
There is a distinction made that the Russophone population in Kopli is deviant.
This legal and social deviance factors into the Russophone student participants’
conceptualization of citizenship because several of them explicitly state that
following the laws and participating in the betterment of the city is the mark of a
good citizen. The Russophone students’ mental images of Kopli are associated
with negative, law-breaking actions such as drug dealing and socially
irresponsible behavior like excessive alcohol consumption. These responses
imply that the wider problem of Estonian and Russophone identity is interpreted
through urban space, and that urban space comes to signify understandings of
belonging and exclusion.
These negative mental images not only sub-divide the Russophone
population in Tallinn, but also identify an Other type of Russophone that lives
outside the bounds of proper citizenship. In this respect, I argue, the Russophone
students’ conceptualization of citizenship is working as what Secor (2004, 354)
calls “a hegemonic strategy” that “defines these groups or localities, to fix the
power differentials between them.” These perceptions of Kopli and the “bad
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Russians” that inhabit it demonstrate what Kay Anderson (1987, 584) calls the
“remarkable social force and material effect” of social imaginings of urban space.
These students’ social imaginings of Kopli illustrate that the interaction between
discursive “complexes of meaning” and “specific spatial arrangements” (Farrar
2000, 4–5) not only work to reinforce unequal social relations between
ethnolinguistic groups, but also within them. The Russophone population as a
whole is most often subject to an Estonian hegemonic strategy. But in this
instance the Russophone community is being sub-divided according to an intragroup hegemonic strategy defined by the Russophone student participants. This
further illustrates that the contested nature of citizenship and belonging in
Estonia is much more complex than a linear discrimination of the Russophone
minority by the titular majority. The urban spaces of Tallinn, as with the linguistic
spaces of Tallinn, are tools for negotiating and performing citizenship within the
Russophone community by excluding those Russophones deemed to be outside
the bounds of citizenship.
The other Tallinn district that is frequently mentioned and clearly mentally
defined by all of the student focus groups is Pirita. Pirita is located in the northern
area of Tallinn and is separated from Lasnamäe by the Pirita River. Although all
students have the same mental boundaries for Pirita and speak of it as a safe
area, the mental images are again skewed according to ethnolinguistic group.
The Estonian-heritage students, as well as outlier student O-Koidula Girl
5, talk about Pirita in positive terms, such as being “safe” (Koidula Girl 1), and
aesthetically pleasing (O-Koidula Girl 5). When the Estonian heritage students’
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assertions that the beautiful, safe area of Piritia is filled with Estonians is
compared to their mental images of the crime ridden, unsafe, and Russophone
populated district of Lasnamäe, it is clear that they are using the “logics of
alterity” (Isin 2002, 4) and the “spatialized strategies of differentiation to
segregate and distinguish cultural difference within the city” (Secor 2004, 358).
As the Estonian heritage students describe the city of Tallinn as segregated
along ethnolinguistic lines the urban geography becomes a tool for marking
where the Estonian, legitimate citizens live and where the Other, illegitimate
citizens live, thereby reinforcing the socio-spatial boundaries that exclude the
unassimilable from the space of substantive citizenship.
Pirita is one of the most prestigious districts of Tallinn, noted for its private
houses, beach scenes, and yacht club. It is one of the wealthier districts of
Tallinn, a fact that plays into the Russophone students’ mental maps and images
of Pirita. These characterizations of a wealthy Pirita are folded into their
contestations of belonging and exclusion in society:
O-Pushkin Boy 1: Pirita is a part of the city where usually the
richest people of Tallinn live, because there are some private
houses, and usually most people who live there are Estonians.
Pushkin Boy 3:
Pushkin Boy 2:
Pushkin Boy 3:
live.

This part of Tallinn is—
Estonians.
There is private houses [sic] here where they

Pushkin Boy 5:
The place where we live [Lasnamäe], we feel
quite comfortable. But in the richest places of Tallinn we can feel a
little bit uncomfortable because the atmosphere of the richest
places…
Interviewer:
There’s an area of the city where rich people
live? Where?
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Pushkin Boy 6:
Pushkin Boy 5:
Interviewer:
Russian?
Pushkin Boy 6:
people.
Pushkin Boy 5:
in houses.

Upper Tallinn [pointing to Pirita on the map].
Upper Tallinn. The ritzy suburb of Tallinn.
So the wealthy people—are they Estonian and
Russians and Estonians, but more Estonian
Yes. There [in Pirita] are living rich Estonians,

Tolstoy Boy 1:
Definitely it [Pirita] is more Estonian populated
[sic], because that’s where there is more expensive housing. There,
Estonians live.
The Russophone students’ class-based distinction of Pirita as both wealthy and
almost entirely Estonian is a twist on Secor’s (2004) observation that areas
described as places of comfort and community become ethnically homogenized.
In this particular case, these students are ethnically homogenizing a district that
they do not feel comfortable in and feel excluded from due to their Russophone
identities (which are associated with lower socio-economic standing, because,
according Tolstoy Boy 1’s frank appraisal, “This is not a big secret that Estonians
live better than Russians”).
While Pirita is heavily dominated by ethnic Estonians (79 percent of the
population) there is still a significant minority of Russophones (18 percent)
(Tallinn City Office 2012) that the many of students do not even acknowledge.
Their attitudes toward Pirita are directly tied to their impressions of discrepancy in
socioeconomic status between Russophones and Estonians. O-Pushkin Boy 1
and Pushkin Boy 2, for instance, connect the contours of the city’s
socioeconomic landscape to language skills and education, pointing out that
some older Russophones, who never learned Estonian in school, have had
considerable trouble adapting to the Estonian language environment since the
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early 1990’s. These older Russophones’ lack of Estonian skills puts limitations on
what level or style of education they received and, subsequently, what jobs they
work in. As manual labor and low skill service jobs (which provide few prospects
for career advancement) are less likely to require Estonian language skills, they
are often filled by Russophones12. Moreover, because there are Russianlanguage dominated spaces of Tallinn, Russophones without Estonian language
skills are able to move through their everyday spaces easily without great need
to speak Estonian
What is revealed in the student participants’ discussions of their mental
maps and images of Tallinn is the crucial role that the city’s divided landscape
works to reinforce existing striations in access to full rights and equal opportunity.
The city’s sociolinguistic and ethnocultural landscapes perpetuate divisions and
do not incentivize meaningful contact between Estonians and Russophones. In
fact, the Russophone student respondents seem to view “their” spaces as
protective, sheltering areas, again suggesting that socio-spatial divisions are both
a cause and a symptom of the politics of identity in Tallinn. In this regard, the city
and Estonian citizenship are mutually reinforcing processes that draw lines of
belonging and exclusion, reify identities, and define the performance of
citizenship in social spaces (Secor 2004; Painter and Philo 1995; Painter 2006;
Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003).

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
12 In an effort to relax citizenship laws because of pressure from Brussels, Estonia has made
Estonian-language classes available for free or for very low cost to non-Estonian speakers.
However, the financial assistance for language classes has not been a great incentive for older
Russophone populations in Estonia to study Estonian. As a result, the number of Russophones
without Estonian citizenship remains high in older generations.
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Kesklinn: The City Center as a “Neutral” Space
Tallinn’s city center district, Kesklinn, is spoken of and ascribed positive
meaning among all of the student focus group participants, regardless of
background. The city center is a place where the Estonian heritage,
Russophone, and “outlier” students feel comfortable and enjoy being. Kesklinn is
always noted directly after the home district as the place where the students’
lives are located, and as such, the students’ initial comments on the district are
quite similar.
Kesklinn holds Tallinn’s Old City (a UNESCO heritage site and popular
tourist attraction), the skyscrapers of the fast-growing business district, the port of
Tallinn, and the largest shopping malls. The chief leisure space in Kesklinn is the
Old City, where shops, quaint cafés and restaurants, historical sites and
museums, and nightclubs are mingled together. The Old City is also where
multiple nationalities and languages exist side by side on a daily basis, not only
due to the presence of tourists but also because both Estonians and
Russophones use it as a space of leisure and entertainment.
All of the students’ mental images of Kesklinn portray it as a space where
they can spread their wings, as it were, away from the constraints feel in their
other everyday geographies. Moreover, the congruency of the students’ feelings
about Kesklinn confirms that their socio-spatial mental maps of the city as a
whole are very similar:
Tolstoy Girl 3:
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Koidula Boy 1:
central Tallinn.

Well, [I am] comfortable, I would say, in all

Tolstoy Boy 2:
The district I like the most is the center of
Tallinn, and I think that this is the space where we can feel
ourselves like “European,” that it is alike to Europe the most.
O-Koidula Girl 5:
a lot of people.

I like Old Town because it’s bright and there’s

Tammsaare Girl 2: [I like] to discover Old Town…Mostly when I
come to Old Town, I find something new always, like whose house
was that, or something. Its very interesting.
While the tenor of the students’ responses about the city center are
positive, it is worth noting the distinctions between the Estonian and Russophone
students’ perceptions. Estonian students often connect the city center with
Estonian history and culture as demonstrated by Tammsaare Girl 2’s love of
“discovering” Old Town. The city center is not only a place where Estonia’s
heritage is celebrated but also where Estonia’s innate Europeanness is
emphasized and any Russianness is de-emphasized or removed. Tolstoy Boy 2
likes the city center because it is where he can “feel European,” folding the
discourse of Europeanness into his experience of a place that is central to the
Estonian nation-building process. Paradoxically, he associates Kesklinn with a
broader pan-European feeling rather than a Europeanness that is attached to
Estonianness, The varied ways that the students ascribe meaning to the city
center and, subsequently, how those ascriptions mediate their sense of
belonging in wider Estonian and European societies illustrate the complex
coexistence of national and post-national citizenship discourses in their everyday
geographies.
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Even though the students have positive mental images and speak about it
in the focus groups as if it’s an area that’s relatively “mixed” between Estonians,
Russophones, and foreigners (mostly tourists), a closer look at their comments
exposes that spatial division in this ostensibly “shared” space. The students’
experiences in Kesklinn remain divided by their ethnolinguistic identities. The
students’ broad initial statements about the universal appeal of Kesklinn are in
reality underpinned by an ethnolinguistically specific topography. The students’
responses are uneven and sometimes contradictory, indicating that social
divisions are present in the city center:
Interviewer:
And you said everybody in Tallinn goes to the
city center, is that right?
Pushkin Boy 7:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 5:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 4:
There are clubs only for Russians.
Pushkin Boy 7:
No.
Pushkin Boy 6:
No.
Pushkin Boy 4:
There is Russian music in some places.
Interviewer: There’s Russian music in some places? So [to the
other boys] were you disagreeing?
Pushkin Boy 7:
I think that if some Estonian wants to go there
[to the Russian] club he will go. But if he doesn’t want to go he
won’t go there. But there is no rule that this place is only for
Russians.
Interviewer:
There’s no official rule, but do Estonians and
Russophone young people—do a lot of young people hang out together?
Pushkin Boy 5:
Only in clubs, in nightlife… Estonians prefer some
little bit expensive clubs. But Russians use such popular clubs which are
not very expensive.
Pushkin Boy 4:
Not so expensive.
The young men in this focus group are attempting to smooth out the “shared”
leisure space of Kesklinn but finding it difficult to reach a consensus. There is, on
the surface, disagreement over whether there are Russian areas in Kesklinn. For
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Pushkin Boy 7, at least, the absence of an official or formal rule delimiting
Russian-only places is his argument for the neutrality of the city center. However,
it is clear from his classmates’ comments that the unofficial dividing lines that
separate Estonians and Russophones operate more or less constantly, even in
Kesklinn.
The tension that exists in students’ narrations of their time in the city
center is not limited to the Russophone students. The Estonian heritage students
make the same types of general statements about Kesklinn’s appeal to
everyone. For instance, a few Estonian heritage girls admit that meaningful
interaction is limited, but they seem uncomfortable with leaving the narrative
there and instead end on a contradiction:
Interviewer:
So you’re saying that Estonians and Russians
don’t hang out at the same places?
Tammsaare Girl 1: They are quite divided.
Interviewer:
Really?
Tammsaare Girl 2: Yes. Maybe they hang out at the same place,
but you won’t go to a stranger and just start talking. “You’re
Russian, I want to speak with you.” That is weird.
Tammsaare Girl 1: The Russians are together and the Estonians
are together.
Tammsaare Girl 3: Yes.
Interviewer:
So you might all be at the same club, but the
Russians congregate and hang out together, and then the
Estonians hang out together?
Tammsaare Girl 1: Yeah.
Tammsaare Girl 2: It’s quite logical, if you think about it.
Tammsaare Girl 1: There are some few places which are still
named Russian, or something, so the Russians go there, and they
have their own favorite places. [pause] I think it’s quite mixed,
mostly.
This part of the conversation takes place not long after the girls had described
the sociocultural contour of Kesklinn as mixed between the two groups, as
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compared to Lasnamäe or Pirita. Like the conversation between the Russophone
boys mentioned above, there is a certain amount of chaos in the girls’ narratives
of Kesklinn. They are describing a socially segregated leisure landscape that is
“quite logical,” but Tammsaare Girl 1 tops off the conversation by describing the
Kesklinn nightclub scene as “quite mixed.”
This seesawing discourse, like the Russophone boys’ conversation,
demonstrates that even the city center—the one place in Tallinn that the student
respondents characterize as a shared space of multicultural character—is not
home to meaningful experience and contact between Estonians and
Russophones. The students’ propensities to describe Kesklinn as a place where
everybody goes, yet also where everybody stays with their own culture group, is
indicative of the limitations of multicultural discourses and policies that have been
observed elsewhere in Western liberal democratic societies (Wood and Gilbert
2005). This weak multiculturalism is practiced through superficial contact with
other groups in urban spaces rather than through interactions that contend with
entrenched prejudices and stereotypes (although it must be noted that such
interactions do not always produce positive outcomes). The mere presence of
more than one cultural group in Kesklinn seems to pass for multiculturalism in the
students’ minds, which allows them to classify the city center as a shared space
instead of the microcosm of socio-spatially divided Tallinn that it really is.
Movement through a space of leisure such as Kesklinn connects in
important ways with wider negotiations of citizenship rights and reveal patterns of
identity performance (Desforges, Jones, and Woods 2005). The focus group
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conversations that I have discussed in this section expose the subtle connections
between banal identity performances and access to the space of rights within a
society. The apparently “multicultural” character of Kesklinn covers a larger
reluctance of Estonians and Russophones to integrate in everyday movements
through space. This suggests that the everyday politics of citizenship reflect the
(often uneasy) coexistence of multiple citizenship discourses in wider society.
The tension between the universalisms and particularisms that exists in national,
multicultural, and post-national configurations of belonging are played out by
individual performances of identity in everyday, urban spaces. These students’
actual movements through and within Kesklinn, for instance, belie their
characterization of the city center as a “mixed” and “multicultural” space where
ethnolinguistic particularisms fade, or are at least ignored. The everyday politics
of citizenship, then, inform and are informed by everyday spaces and the multiscalar discourses that circulate within them.

Places of Memory in the City: The Bronze Soldier Memorial as a Metaphor for
Who Belongs
In 2007 the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier
Memorial, a Red Army WWII memorial, away from central Tallinn, sparked two
nights of intense protests, riots, and fights between Russophones and Estonians.
Although the student participants, who are 18 or 19 years of age, were young
adolescents when the Bronze Solider crisis took place, the event played and
continues to play a significant role in how they spatially enact and negotiate
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identity and belonging in Tallinn. Furthermore the students’ recollections and
negotiations of the Bronze Soldier crisis demonstrate that young people actively
negotiate and contend with adult discourses of belonging and citizenship rather
than passively absorbing them. This section examines the students’ passionate
narratives of the Bronze Soldier crisis and reveals how they use Tallinn’s
landscapes of public memory to contest, negotiate, and define belonging in
Estonia. Moreover, their conversations expose the ways that space, power, and
social memory interact to provide context for the contestation of national identity
and to mediate access to full and equal citizenship in the nation-state (S.
Hoelscher and Alderman 2004; Price 2004; Falah 1996; Massey 1995; Mills
2006).
As chapter one explains, the immediate post-Soviet years were times of
intense de-Sovietization and reclamation of national identity, history, and territory
in Eastern and Central European nation-states. One of the most vigorously
pursued avenues of identity reassertion by titular majorities was reclaiming the
national landscape from Sovietized history, and Estonia was no exception. The
Estonian nationalist discourse of territoriality has been made material through
myriad processes of place transformation, from re-naming city streets from
Soviet icon names to more acceptably Estonian ones, removing statues of Soviet
figures like Vladimir Lenin, and suppressing any spatial representation of SovietRussophone dominance (D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).
The relocation of the Bronze Soldier memorial is the most recent and
arguably most controversial alteration to public memory in Estonia. The Estonian
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government made the decision to remove the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet WWII
memorial for war dead, in the early morning hours of April 27, 2007 from a
Kesklinn square called Tõnismägi (Figure 5.2) to the Defense Forces Cemetery
of Tallinn (Figure 5.3), located several miles from the city center (Figure 5.4).
The relocation of the statue had been an issue in recent elections, but
preparations to move the memorial, which began on April 26, were a shock to
Tallinn. Mass protests between Russophones, who vehemently opposed to the
move, and Estonians, who strongly supported it, erupted in Kesklinn and shortly
turned into riots. Two nights of riots led to massive looting, the death of one
Russophone protester, several arrests, and international media coverage. The
events, known in Estonia as “The Bronze Night,” intensified inter-ethnic tensions
between Estonians and Russophones.
Since 1992, the simultaneous acts of preserving and emphasizing
Estonian history while ignoring and erasing Soviet Russian history have been a
key to bolstering Estonian nationalist agendas. An interpretation of history that
labels the Soviet Union as occupiers of a formerly free Republic, combined with
factual narratives and evidence of brutal Soviet domination, deportations, exiles,
executions, and suppression of Estonian culture has coalesced into the framing
of Estonia’s post-Soviet years as a “decolonization” period (Hughes 2005). After
roughly five decades of living in and around Soviet performances of history,
Estonia embarked on a project of re-constructing displays of public memory to
establish the “correct” version of history. The process of public memory in
Estonia was and is a crucial part of changing the conception of the nation-state
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Figure 5.2: Tõnismägi Square, Kesklinn District,
Tallinn. The Bronze Soldier Memorial was located in
Tõnismägi Square until 2007, which has since been
landscaped with shrubs, flowers, and trees.

Figure 5.3: Bronze Soldier Memorial, Defense
Forces Cemetery of Tallinn. The Bronze Soldier
Memorial is currently located in the Defense Forces
Cemetery of Tallinn, two miles from its previous
location in the city center.
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Figure 5.4 Former and Current Locations of the Bronze Soldier War
Monument, Tallinn Estonia. In 2007 the Bronze Soldier was moved from
Tõnismagi Square in Old Town to the Defense Forces Cemetery, several
miles from the most frequented parts of Tallinn’s city center.
from a Russified, Soviet one to an Estonian one (K. Mitchell 2003; Forest,
Johnson, and Till 2004; D. J. Smith and Burch 2012).
The ongoing process of changing the landscapes of memory in Tallinn are
extremely important to my student respondents because the urban spaces that
are inscribed with (now) Estonian cultural understandings of national history are
spatial reflections of what it means to be Estonian. For my student participants,
the Bronze Soldier crisis represents the larger issue of belonging and meaningful
citizenship in Estonian society. A dominant group’s constructions,
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deconstructions, and/or changings of monuments, memorials, and museums are
material actions of remembering specific versions of history (Till 1999; Hay,
Hughes, and Tutton 2004; K. Mitchell 2003). Importantly, these acts of
remembering always involve acts of forgetting, which at the national scale will
emphasize one group identity while ignoring and delegitimizing the
commemoration of an Other identity (S. Hoelscher and Alderman 2004). It is this
tension that underscores the passionate feelings of the students throughout the
focus groups. The issue of how universal Estonia’s national history actually is
compels my student respondents to couch legitimate citizenship in Estonian
society in terms of very particular understandings of the country’s history.
Along with the issue of language, the public expression of social memory
is central to the student participants’ conceptualization of the terms of citizenship
in Estonia. Both Estonian and Russophone students use the “correct” version
and representation of history to Other who do not subscribe to it. The main theme
that girds the students’ attitudes towards the Bronze Soldier relocation, as well as
wider social memory in Estonia, is the interpretation of Estonian history during
the Soviet era. It is during the conversations about the Bronze Soldier that the
issue of occupation versus liberation enters into their narratives as proof of
legitimate or illegitimate Russophone presence in Estonian society.
Each of the 13 Russophone students, as well as three of the four “outlier”
students, were firmly against the relocation of the Bronze Soldier memorial, even
several years after the event. The unexpectedness of the removal, as well as the
disrespect to the soldiers buried with the memorial, caused several students to
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frame the relocation as a deliberate insult toward Russians and Russophones by
the Estonian government. These students characterize the relocation of the
monument as disrespectful to Red Army soldiers who died fighting Nazi forces
rather than as an attempt to remove a reminder of the harsh realities of the
Soviet era from a central public place:
Pushkin Boy 3:
I think it was an insult, but maybe not for the
Russians here. But mainly for the Russians whose relatives died
during the war.
O-Pushkin Girl 2: I think they [the Estonian government] wanted
to offend Russians.
Tolstoy Boy 3:
I am clearly against that decision made by our
governors. I think that this is immoral to transfer the ancient
memorial.
Tolstoy Boy 2:
It is the right way to show that there is
discrimination [against Russophones], when something is done like
that.
Pushkin Boy 4:
I think that it was a plan, a provocation. For
Russians, it was a very important issue because a lot of people lost
their relatives during the War. For example both of my grandfathers
died during the War.
O-Taamsaare Boy 1: It [the Bronze Soldier] harmed no one when it
was there [in Kesklinn]. The whole event was political, actually. Just
100 percent political.
In these students’ narratives there is a focus on specific moments in
history (a tactic that Estonian heritage students engage in as well). The
Russophone students, as well as the “outliers” who disagree with the
monument’s relocation, draw on the victories of the Red Army against Nazi
forces to legitimize the right of Soviet history to exist in the urban landscape.
While there is considerable criticism of the Estonian government’s tactics during
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the Bronze Soldier crisis, there is no mention or consideration that public displays
of Soviet history may be deeply troubling to Estonians whose families
experienced great brutalities at the hands of the Soviet Army. These students’
arguments for the appropriation of urban space for Soviet Russian history is
ultimately grounded in the belief that each group’s historical memory is legitimate
and has the right to be displayed:
Pushkin Girl 1:
We should respect what was in the past, and
now we can live to see a new future… you can’t go away from [the
Soviet era], it’s history.
Tolstoy Girl 3:
They [the government] should have practiced
tolerance, and they should respect the people who live here
[because] maybe they have different opinions.
O-Pushkin Boy 1: Why they [the government] wanted to move it,
actually, is because, as we know, the city center and the Old Town
is the center where all foreigners come, tourists and everything.
Maybe they wanted to move the Russian history a bit away from
the center of Estonian history. So for them it’s better [for the city
center] to hold most of the Estonian history, not Russian.
In an effort to give Soviet history the same legitimacy as Estonian history, these
students are once more appealing to the principles of equality and tolerance that
put Russophones on an even playing field with Estonians. The students’
discussions of the Bronze Soldier and Soviet history in Estonia implies belief that
their membership in Estonian society entitles them to their own understandings
and negotiations of the past. Moreover, in maintaining opposition to the removal
of Soviet history, these students are creating a contested place identity to use as
a method of resisting what they see as the ideological hegemony (Larsen 2004)
of the Estonian nation-building project.
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All but one of the Estonian heritage students (as well as O-Koidula Girl 5)
engage in a similarly selective reading of history to assess the Bronze Soldier
crisis and which version of history should be remembered. Not surprisingly, most
of the Estonian heritage students’ reading of the Bronze Soldier crisis is that any
legitimacy the Soviet Union may have had by “liberating” Estonia from the Nazis
was comprehensively dismantled when the Soviets stayed to occupy the country
for five decades. As such, the Estonian heritage students that agree with the
government’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier deflect any argument that
the Soviet era is part of Estonian history. By frequently using the phrases “our
history” and “they were occupiers,” the Estonian heritage students project a
narrative of territoriality that locates Russophones outside of the nation-building
project because of their ethnolinguistic association with the illegal occupiers of
the historical Estonian homeland. Positive material representation of the
occupation or occupiers is couched as offensive to the Estonian collective
memory of brutality and repression at the hands of the Soviets. For instance,
Tammsaare Girl 2 argues that Soviet history should not be prominently and
publicly displayed in the city center, and Tammsaare Girl 1 notes that “[the
Bronze Solider] is Estonian history, but it’s not a positive thing to make a
monument out of that.”
For the Estonian heritage students the Russophone community’s opinions
on the Bronze Soldier crisis, both in 2007 and today, are indicative of a wider,
disturbing Russophone mentality that does not respect the Estonian people and
their historical right to their homeland. As an example, a part of one focus group
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with Estonian heritage students uncovers the underlying resentment about
Russophone attitudes to Estonian history is present:
Koidula Boy 1:
What I think about [the Bronze Soldier crisis]
now is that, well, its… it’s still a little scary because the people—the
mentality is still here, if not more…
Interviewer:
What mentality?
Koidula Boy 1:
The mentality—well, the one thing is the все
находится наши mentality.
Interviewer:
What is that?
Koidula Girl 1:
Like, “everything is ours”… like they own
Estonia.
Koidula Girl 3:
They’re the bosses.
Koidula Girl 1:
And they are destroying shops [during the
riots], and like “everything is ours!”
The Estonian student respondents throughout the study tend to treat the
Russophone community as a homogenous unit that acts and thinks the same
way about Estonian history and territoriality and that is, by its very nature,
domineering, insensitive, disrespectful, and ultimately illegitimate. I argue this in
spite of the fact that comments are occasionally made about the Russophones’
right to their own interpretation of history because even after these comments are
made the conversation immediately reverts to a consensus that “its just not right”
to have Soviet history in Estonian spaces, which belies these students’
understanding of Russophone identity as fundamentally illegitimate. Through the
very real urban spaces of memory in Tallinn, the Estonian heritage students are
conceptualizing spatial parameters of citizenship that coincide with the spatial
parameters of the Estonian nation’s historical narrative, thereby excluding
anyone with alternative perceptions of history from equal access to substantive
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citizenship in society and the sociopolitical and economic resources that
accompany it.
The student participants’ conflicting conceptualizations of which version of
history is universal to the “ideal” Estonian citizen stems from the refusal to
recognize the legitimacy of the other group’s historical narrative. Using the
Bronze Soldier crisis to frame a larger discussion about whose representations of
history are appropriate, tolerant, and accurate, the student focus groups
demonstrate that “social memory and social space join together to provide
context for modern identities and their contestations” (S. Hoelscher and
Alderman 2004, 349). For my student participants, performing and/or contesting
Estonian citizenship involves engaging a selective historical narrative that is
based on competing definitions of justice, oppression, discrimination, and
marginalization throughout the last 70 years of Estonia’s history.
Both Estonian heritage and Russophone students ground their competing
opinions on the relocation of the Bronze Soldier (and the greater interpretation of
Estonian history) in terms of what history applies to all Estonian citizens. Again,
but this time in terms of landscapes of memory, each student group is couching
the defining traits of the citizen in terms of historical narratives that are ostensibly
universal to the population at large, but that are actually shot through with
selective and particular readings of history. The Estonian heritage students
locate Soviet Russian history as outside the realm of a legitimate citizen’s history
by characterizing of Russophones—and their Other historical narratives—as
remnants of an illegal occupation. The Russophone students, by contrast, appeal
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to the equality-as-sameness discourse of liberal democratic citizenship by
arguing that their particular readings of history include what is common to all
Estonian citizens, neglecting to realize that they themselves are insisting upon a
particular narrative of history.
It is my argument that in the lives of these young people in Tallinn, the
intrinsically political historical memory of Estonia is a crucial part of the spatial
strategy of citizenship. The students’ chaotic negotiations of the Estonian
citizenry’s history involve Tallinn’s urban landscape and how it should (or should
not) be utilized to establish the “topography” of the Estonian people (Till 2003,
294). The students’ strong feelings about the Bronze Soldier indicate that
Tallinn’s places of memory are crucial sites for their negotiations of the terms of
belonging and exclusion in Estonian society. For the students, social memory,
like language, is a both medium of communication and identity performance that
demarcates the parameters of citizenship. These students are bounding the
Estonian nation-state, and membership in it, by defining how exactly the nation
has “stretched through time” (B. Anderson 2006) and how the state should
embed the nation’s history in the landscape.
	
  
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the ways in which the students in this study
actively negotiate citizenship and belonging in Tallinn. The narratives analyzed
illustrate the ways in which students both encounter and use spatial strategies to
delineate the bounds of meaningful citizenship and belonging in society. The
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spaces of language, historical memory, and city life discussed in this chapter are
analyzed together as a framework within which to uncover the multiple and
varied ways that these students arbitrate belonging and ascribe identities to
themselves and to the Other.
Although general patterns emerge amongst students of different
ethnolinguistic groups, they do not represent unilateral, fixed modalities of how
young people produce and reproduce conceptualizations of citizenship. Rather,
they suggest that while the conceptualizations of citizenship of young people in
divided societies can and do reflect socio-spatial divisions along ethnocultural
lines, the diversities of their personal geographies, past experiences, and
movements in and through everyday spaces will produce varying narratives and
understandings of belonging. As this chapter has illustrated, the spatial
delimitations of citizenship and multiple discourses of belonging inform and are
informed by the ways that the students enact their identities in the city. In this
sense, young people’s negotiations of citizenship in divided societies cannot be
compartmentalized into discrete spaces or homogenized across ethnolinguistic
lines, but must be understood as a constant, active process in which they
configure and reconfigure their understandings of identities and belonging in
Tallinn.
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Chapter 6
Positionality in the Nation-State and Deployment of EU
Citizenship
I have argued thus far that the universalisms through which citizenship is
constituted exist in contention with the particularisms through which citizenship is
equally constituted. This chapter extends that argument by exploring the
particularisms and universalisms that influence the conception, experience, and
performance of supranational citizenship. A consideration of supranational
citizenship is particularly relevant to any discussion of Estonian young people’s
conceptualizations of belonging, identity, and entitlements because European
citizenship formally guarantees rights outside the domain of the nation-state and
provides a layer of identity beyond that of the national community. The student
respondents’ experiences, negotiations, and performances of European
citizenship are multi-layered and context dependent. European citizenship can be
described as multi-layered because youths conceive of it not only in strictly
politico-legal terms, but also in economic and socio-cultural terms. I characterize
European citizenship as context dependent because despite its situation at the
supranational level, it cannot be easily detached from circumstances at national
level. European and national citizenships are not discrete, nested entities that
exist on separate levels of a scalar hierarchy, but rather are institutions that
interact complexly with multiple notions of identity and belonging. Therefore my
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argument here is that students’ conceptions of European citizenship and identity
are significantly influenced by their positionalities within the Estonian nation.
The concept of a European citizenship whose meaning shifts according to
experiences at the national level problematizes two themes that often appear in
the literature. The first is that contrasting experiences of citizenship by and large
take place at the national level. Many pieces in citizenship literature focus on
disparate experiences of national citizenship (Secor 2004; Wemyss 2006;
Aasland and Flotten 2001; Bollens 2007). The results of my research suggest
that supranational citizenships are experienced differently as well, and that those
divergent experiences depend upon a citizen’s positionality within the nation. The
student responses indicate that conceptions of European citizenship are
informed by an individual’s positioning in the Estonian nation. The dichotomy in
attitudes towards European citizenship between Estonian and Russophone
students, I will demonstrate, is grounded in the socio-spatial divisions between
the two groups in Estonian society. This runs contrary to what might be expected
of European citizenship, which is presented as an overarching citizenship and
identity that supersedes narrower considerations of nationalism (Reed-Danahay
2007; Delanty 1997). In fact, European citizenship is experienced and mediated
by social and political dimensions within the nation-state, much the way national
citizenship is.
The second assumption problematized by the idea of European
citizenship is that “being European” has one meaning, and that meaning is
internalized by all Europeans (Soysal 1997). In the vein of Sidaway’s (2006, 10)
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assertion that “there is no single, stable, hegemonic understanding of the EU,” I
argue that there is no single, stable understanding of what it means to be
European. My student respondents characterize “Europeanness” in widely
varying terms and levels of enthusiasm, indicating that claims of a homogenous,
overarching conception of what it means to be European are dubious at best.
The interaction between supranational and national citizenships produces
a multi-layered European citizenship that is much more than a singularly defined
community membership. My student interviewees couch European citizenship
and Europeanness in politico-legal, economic, and socio-cultural terms,
indicating that they conceive of their supranational citizenship as a multifaceted
community membership that offers them the opportunity to acquire multiple types
of capital. In this discussion, capital is understood to take both monetary and
nonmonetary forms. As such, human capital is used to denote “nonmonetary…
sources of power and influence” (Portes 1998, 2) that are perceived to be
available in the supranational space of Europe and that will enhance the
students’ ability to succeed in life.
Furthermore, the manner in which the Estonian and Russophone students
characterize the benefits of European citizenship vary according to their
differentiated experiences of it. This supports Kolossov’s (2003, 252) argument
that “identities are multiple and ‘negotiable,’ and the same individual or the same
group may privilege one identity over another according to the situation and the
moment.” These differentiations in experience, as stated above, are dependent
upon Estonian and Russophone students’ positionalities in national society.
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Young people in Estonia are included in or excluded from spaces of belonging
and rights in the national arena on a daily basis through identity politics that
involve everything from language to school curricula. However, the responses of
the study population indicate that young people are actively creating their own
European identities while concurrently negotiating their Estonian identities.
Drawing on the focus group data collected, this chapter investigates the
asymmetrical ways that European citizenship is experienced, enacted, and
characterized by Estonian and Russophone youths in Tallinn. The first section
briefly discusses the connections between ethnolinguistic identity and
positionality within Estonia, and how positionality at the national level affects
conceptions of the supranational. The second section discusses how Estonian
students’ positionalities within Estonia’s titular majority inform their conceptions of
European citizenship and the types capital they associate with it. The third
section discusses how Russophone students’ positionalities in Estonia’s
Russophone minority affect their conceptions of European citizenship and the
types of capital they associate with it. The fourth section discusses the uneven
nature of attitudes towards European citizenship from “outlier” students, those
students whose heritage, mother tongue, and school language medium do not
neatly overlap like those of their contemporaries13. The last section addresses
the potential effects that these students’ conceptions of Europe and European
citizenship will have on Estonia in the future. These potential ramifications are

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
13

Please see Chapter 3: “Methodology” for a detailed explanation of student respondent
identifiers and labels.
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addressed by comparing the students’ plans to migrate out of Estonia for study
and work.

Positionality, the National, and the Supranational
As discussed in the previous chapters, there is a large overlap between
the students’ mother tongues, school language mediums, and self-ascribed
national identities (which I have referred to by the more accurate term of
ethnolinguistic identity). The following sections discuss student attitudes about
Europe based on their self-identifications with the Estonian majority or the
Russophone minority. The responses of the “outlier” student participants resist
grouping within the Estonian majority or Russophone minority, and are therefore
addressed in a separate section.
Feelings of belonging and loyalty to Estonia are markedly higher in
Estonian students, and subsequently their perceptions of opportunity in the home
country are positive. In contrast, Russophone students articulate both feelings
and experiences of exclusion in everyday life in Estonia. By and large, the
Russophone students expect that their opportunities in Estonia will be limited
because of their Russian last names or use of the Russian language, and that
even Russian-accented Estonian will single them out as targets for discriminatory
practices.
At first glance an individual’s positionality within their home country’s
society may seem to have significance only for how he or she moves in and
negotiates national society. However, the evidence gathered in focus groups
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indicates that the politics of identity in Estonia enter into students’ conceptions of
Europe and Europeanness, as well. Also, the student respondents do not present
identical levels of enthusiasm about the EU or being European, showing that
European citizens do not think “one way” as a group. But the ways in which the
students articulate the value of European citizenship, the rights that it affords,
and how European identity is performed (or not) is shaped by their ethnolinguistic
identity and, subsequently, their positionality in the Estonian nation. It should be
noted that the students use “Western Europe” and “Europe” to mean the
European Union.

Europeanness as Additive to National Identity: Estonian Student
Perspectives
The focus groups I conducted uncover a persistent association between
the Estonian nation-state and the EU by Estonian student respondents. However,
there is a marked hierarchy to the identities in these students’ responses, with
Estonian identity generally being privileged over the European identity. Estonian
student interviewees overwhelmingly characterize the European Union in terms
of how it strengthens, protects, and legitimizes Estonia, and how Estonia’s EU
membership confirms that it is not a “Russian” country. Moreover these students
mobilize their personal European identities (via the opportunities it affords them)
as a means of supplementing their Estonian identities.
The primacy of Estonia and Estonianness is evident from the students’
responses. The majority of the Estonian students only identify themselves as
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European after first asserting their Estonian identity. The Estonian students
describe more than one reason for identifying as Estonians versus Europeans:

Interviewer:
Do you identify as Europeans at all?
Tammsaare Girl 1: No, it’s more just geographic… I don’t know if
it’s like a “big union” and so on.
Interviewer:
So if someone asks you “Where are you from?”
do you mention Europe?
Tammsaare Girl 3: If they don’t know where Estonia is!
Tammsaare Girl 2: Yes!
Interviewer:
Would you identify yourselves as Europeans?
Koidula Girl 4:
First as an Estonian, for me… I mean, for me,
it’s [Europe] not important in the way that Estonia is important for
me. For me, Estonia is more like a close to heart thing. But Europe
is… when I say that I feel that I am a part of the European Union, or
Europe—what do I actually mean by it?
Interviewer:
It’s a bit harder to define?
Koidula Girl 4:
Yes.
The Estonian students also mention being “patriotic” Estonians and having
feelings of loyalty to the nation-state. Students see the emphasis on their
Estonian identity as crucial to preserving an Estonian culture that has been
historically threatened by various politico-cultural interlopers and to solidifying a
bond between the Estonian people that is already tenuous because of their small
numbers. These students by no means classify Europe in malicious terms, but
neither do they regard it as an institution under which they are willing to subsume
their Estonian identity.
Different responses regarding other-than-national identities in the Estonian
student focus groups came from two boys from Koidula School. Demonstrating
that students do not think “one way” about Estonia and Europe based on their
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ethnolinguistic group, the two boys describe the importance of situating oneself
within the human race or, at the very least, at a level beyond the nation state:

Koidula Boy 1:
I think throughout history, people have started
to think more of themselves as part of bigger things. Firstly, it was
“me” or “my family,” then it was the community, then it was the
country—now its Europe. Someday it’s going to be the world, and
universe—I hope.
Koidula Boy 2:
For me, it’s of course the planet Earth first—
that we are citizens of the world and everything… I do have a
cosmopolitan world view, and I feel myself as more a part of that
[than anything else].
These students approach the cosmopolitan community as the primary or most
desirable form of human association. Rather than classifying European
citizenship as coexisting equally with cosmopolitan citizenship, it is described as
a stop along the way to the telos of global citizenship (Koidula Boy 2) or at the
very least a substratum community to be identified with secondarily (Koidula Boy
1). These responses indicate the influence of cosmopolitan discourses that
encourage youth to think of themselves as belonging to the “world” and
demonstrates that the promulgation of those ideals is substantial enough for
some young people to verbally espouse them.
What can be gleaned from the Estonian students’ ideas about how and
when to identify as European—if at all—is that while Estonian students may
claim a European identity, there is no indication that it supplants national (or
cosmopolitan) identity as the primary identity. To these students, the significance
of “being European” derives partially from the added benefits that come with their
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home country’s membership in the EU. Estonian students ground the importance
of Estonia’s membership in the European Union in the legitimacy it gives to
Estonia as a “European” (read: not Russian) nation and the support that will
come from the EU if Estonia faces trouble. For instance, this exchange between
students from Tammsaare School indicates the importance of Estonia being
recognized as European:

Tammsaare Girl 4: …and since we’re in the EU, I think that
Estonia gets a lot of… support.
Tammsaare Girl 5: We want to move more to the Western side.
We don’t want to be next to Russia. And every time people talk
about Estonia, they’re like, “Oh yes, the little country next to Russia.
It was in Russia,” and so on. We don’t want to be focused on only
that part. We want to be the modern country with good technology,
and move a little but more to the Western side.
Interviewer:
To have a Western European style?
Tammsaare Girl 5: Yes.
The students also characterize the significance of Estonia’s European
identity as a kind of “back up plan” if Estonia cannot get itself out of a
troublesome situation. Koidula Girl 1 expresses comfort in the economic safety
net of Europe, noting, “the economy—we’ll get help like Greece, maybe if
someday we will be in a bad situation.” However, eight out of the 14 Estonianmedium school students interviewed explicitly stated that the military/security
support that Estonia would receive in defending itself from Russian aggression is
the most important type of European assistance:

Interviewer:
So the EU makes you feel secure?
Tammsaare Girl 4: Yeah!
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Tammsaare Girl 5: Yes.
Tammsaare Girl 6: Yeah!
Interviewer:
Whom do you feel the need to be protected
from?
Tammsaare Girl 5: Russia.
Tammsaare Girl 6: Terrorists.
Interviewer:
Terrorists—what kind of terrorists?
Tammsaare Girl 6: Everyone.
Interviewer:
Do you still see the Russian Federation as a
threat?
Tammsaare Girl 6: Yes.
Tammsaare Girl 5: …after what happened with [the Republic of]
Georgia in 2008—that was the moment when I realized that a war
actually could happen to us, too. That Russia really is an
aggressive country and they really could attack us.
Interviewer:
Do you think being part of the EU is a good
thing?
Tammsaare Girl 2: Probably, because Russia is on the other side,
very close, and better in the EU than in Russia. And you see what’s
going on in Russia right now. Its good to be in Europe.
Interviewer:
So maybe the EU gives you a little feeling of
security?
Tammsaare Girl 1: Yes.
Tammsaare Girl 2: Yes.
Tammsaare Girl 3: Yes.
Interviewer:
Does being an [EU citizen] matter to you?
Koidula Girl 1:
It makes me feel safer, [because Estonia is] so
close to the big Russia.
These conversations signify that protecting the Estonian space from nonEuropean aggression is a pronounced concern for these students. They explicitly
categorize the importance of Europeanness in terms of the security and
protection that it adds to Estonianness. Rather than replacing or supplanting the
identity of their home country, (or of themselves as citizens), the Estonian
students describe the “supranational European” trait as independent from but
additive to Estonianness. Moreover, the students’ responses reveal that Estonian
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space is seen as also being European space when the security—whether
economic or military—of that space is threatened. These responses depict the
nature of the relationship between supranational and national citizenships as fluid
and side-by-side rather than fixed and nested.
The data gathered shows that the majority of the students who explicitly
identified the EU as a guarantor of security from Russian threats are from
Tammsaare School. However, when interviewing the teachers from Tammsaare
School and learning about its background, there were no indicators that the
‘threat of Russia’ was a discourse that the students would encounter. The
emphasis on the EU’s potential contribution to Estonian national security by
students of a school that does not take pains to stress a Russian threat suggests
that the school is not the only space where young people encounter and
negotiate discourses of the politics of identity. The argument here is that young
people are not solely influenced by discourses they encounter in school. Parents
and peers are also significant actors outside of the school that affect the ways
that youths negotiate, synthesize, and internalize discourses of belonging,
identity, and citizenship. The consequences of the multiple discourses that young
people negotiate may be narratives that do not harmoniously align with the ideas
advanced in their school curricula.

Adding a European Dimension to Estonianness
The presence of extra-scholastic influences in shaping young people’s
biographies becomes very clear when the Estonian students describe their
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conceptualizations of Europeanness on a personal level. The Estonian students
define the meaning of their personal European identity in the context of the space
of rights afforded to all EU citizens. The primary value of European citizenship to
these students is the access to opportunity that will help them write their own
successful biographies. Many of the students connected a successful or enriched
life to the acquisition of not only economic capital, but also human capital.
Europe is seen as a place to acquire economic and human capital that is not
available in Estonia, but that will enrich their national identities by adding the
“developed” and “modern” traits of Europe while retaining traditional, patently
Estonian traits.
These students often spoke of the value of being European in utilitarian
terms devoid of romantic notions of membership in a pan-European community.
Many of the interviewees spoke plainly about using their rights as Europeans for
gain without expressing hopes that the opportunities could forge deeper ties with
other Europeans. But their European citizenship is certainly seen as the vehicle
for accessing the opportunities to acquire capital that may not be available in
Estonia. For instance:

Interviewer:
Is your EU citizenship important to you?
Koidula Girl 6:
Yeah, it gives us a lot more opportunities.
Koidula Boy 2:
Yes, it’s very useful. I have to admit that I do
think that it’s useful even though I may not think that the EU is such
a great institution… but I would say that having an EU passport is
really useful. Working opportunities, travelling opportunities and
what have you—everything.
Koidula Girl 6:
I mean, for me, it’s not important in the way
that Estonia is important for me. But yeah, exactly what [Koidula
Boy 2] said—it’s useful.
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Interviewer:
You’re EU citizens. Is that something important
to you? Do you identify as Europeans?
Tammsaare Girl 1: No, it’s more just geographic… I don’t know if
it’s like a “big union” and so on. It’s all about money, euros. Nothing
else.
Koidula Boy 1:
I like the economic union. I kind of like the
euro, the currency. I like that there’s not much borders and we can
do business in this way—the economical [sic] union. But I don’t like
political union…
There is a tenor of pragmatism and instrumentalism to the initial discourse about
the EU from the students. The students speak of the economic opportunities first
and as if they are obvious, demonstrating that the union of Europe is often
couched in terms of being a means to occupational and, subsequently, financial
security. According to Tammsaare Girl 3, “many people think that living abroad”
in Western Europe is better because it is “quite developed…in the economic
sense.” The pervasiveness of this impression is demonstrated throughout the
focus groups, such as when Tammsaare Girl 6 states “I think that it’s just easier
to be successful” in Western Europe, prompting Tammsaare Girl 5 to agree that
the job opportunities in Western Europe are much more plentiful.
As the conversations progress past basic value assessments about
Europe and into exactly why European opportunities are better than Estonian
ones, these students’ responses take on more nuanced appraisals of those
opportunities. My Estonian interviewees distinguished European education as
higher quality and on-the-job training and experience as more available. The
acquisition of European education and jobs can therefore be classified as both
economic/career-related and human forms of capital. Furthermore, many of
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these students want opportunities to experience other cultures and “see how
other people live” before returning to Estonia. Cultural experience in Europe is
seen as a type of human capital that is not ubiquitous in Estonia.
An interesting reason given by a few students as to why European
opportunities are valuable is that Western Europe is a space of tolerance, human
rights, and democratic ideals. Given the sharp contrast between levels of
freedom and human rights in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and democratic
Western Europe, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Estonian students perceive
Western Europe as a place where one can live and experience democratic
ideals. Even if the students seem to be unable to articulate the exact nature of
the “high ideals” that are held in Europe, there is still a general sense:

Koidula Girl 2:
For me, I like to travel, its easier—and also,
more good comes from there.
Interviewer:
More good comes from Western Europe and
the European Union?
Koidula Girl 3:
Yeah, something like that.
Koidula Boy 1:
The Western ideals—
Koidula Girl 3:
Yeah, yes.
Koidula Boy 1:
The democracy—
Koidula Girl 1:
And the freedom and the—
Koidula Boy 1:
Yeah, the human rights. They are more
respected in the West than in The East.
Koidula Girl 3:
Yes, that’s right.
From this exchange it is evident that these students identify the European space
as a repository of progressive, democratic ideals and that moving through this
space is an opportunity to acquire the cultural capital of having lived in a
“tolerant” place. Through interviews with teachers and NGO officials and study of
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EU policy documents I learned that discourses of the “Western” ideals of
tolerance and open-mindedness are present in the Estonia’s education curricula.
I would suggest that these discourses of “Western” or “European” ideals in the
classroom are discursively associated with economic and material development
in Europe, which may explain why these students are eager to gain the cultural
capital of living in a tolerant European space. These Estonian students perceive
that the social hallmark of economically successful European member-states is
the acceptance of democratic ideals and liberal value of tolerance.
Furthermore, this conversation intimates that the students understand the
espousal of human rights and tolerance to be part and parcel of European
citizenship. But while the discourses of tolerance and respect are present, my
observation is that they are used in an instrumental way to demonstrate a proper
appreciation of what it means to be European rather than meaningfully applied in
the students’ everyday lives. For instance, several of Estonian students convey
interest and excitement in the opportunities to learn about and experience other
cultures in Europe, and express no anxiety about potential threats to their
national identity or the identities of the peoples whose cultures they want to
experience. But there is a tacit understanding that the cultures to be explored,
respected, and tolerated are not Russophone. As demonstrated in the previous
chapter, there is little evidence in the Estonian students’ focus group
conversations that they perceive Russophone culture in Estonia as worthy
subjects of the “European” respect for tolerance.
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This section has evaluated the perceptions of Europeanness and
European citizenship in Estonian students. These students’ attachments to
Estonia and their Estonian identities are apparent from their comments about
where their national identities rank in comparison to their supranational identities.
This is demonstrative of two key points. First, the simultaneous but independent
existence of the supranational European identity and the national Estonian
identity is demonstrated by the students’ use of one identity to define or
contextualize the other, i.e. “I’ll identify myself as European if someone doesn’t
know where Estonia is,” or “since we’re in the EU, people notice Estonia.”
Second, their loyalty, attachment, and sense of belonging to the Estonian
nation-state informs the perception that European identity and citizenship—and
the opportunities it affords—are avenues through which to augment their
Estonian identity. This “additive” quality of European citizenship and the desire to
enhance Estonian identity is being articulated by students who are part of the
titular majority, and therefore are on the dominant side of the politics of identity in
Estonia. This positive positionality in national society influences the conceptions
of supranational citizenship and identity in Estonian students.

Europeanness as an Alternative to “Otherness” in Estonia: Russophone
Student Perspectives
All but two of the Russophone student participants hold Estonian and
European citizenships. The Russophone students’ experiences of citizenship and
identity in Estonian society affect their conceptions of Europeanness and EU
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citizenship, just as with Estonian students. However, conceptions of
Europeanness and the value of the opportunities afforded by EU citizenship
contrast starkly between Estonian and Russophone students because of the
differences between the two groups’ positionalities in Estonian society.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of Russophone students hold formal
Estonian citizenship, they repeatedly articulate feelings of unease or
displacement (if not outright exclusion) in Estonia, which they attribute to actual
or de facto discrimination because of their Russophone identity. The
Russophone students’ positionalities in Estonia are ones of “outsider,” effecting
feelings of various degrees of exclusion. As a result, these students characterize
Europeanness and the opportunities afforded by their European citizenship as
viable alternatives to their identity as the “Other” in Estonian society.

The Russophone Identity and European Identity
Chapter Four discussed Russophone students’ awareness of their position
as part of the unwelcome “Other” in Estonia. The disenfranchisement of these
Russophone students at the national level is crucial to understanding why
supranational European identity is often seen as a viable alternative to these
students’ identities at the national level. Due to the socio-political alienation that
the Russophone students feel in Estonia, Europe primarily becomes a space
where they can re-classify themselves. Some Russophone students view Europe
as a space where they can claim a European identity and access rights and
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opportunities. Others view Europe as a space where they can reject associations
with Estonia and access rights and opportunities.
It is important to note is that the students who enthusiastically claim a
European identity and the rights afforded to them by being European citizens are
all students at Pushkin School. This school is an active participant in EUsponsored projects and grant competitions. Several of the student participants
from Pushkin School bring up their experiences on school trips to Western
Europe for EU projects, participation in competitions for recognition and funding,
and in-class engagement with EU policies, values, and ideals. These positive
experiences with EU topics, combined with their self-awareness of being part of
the Other group in Estonia, explain the propensity for these students in particular
to eagerly claim Europeanness as an alternative to an Estonian Russophone
identity:

Interviewer:
What do you think about national identity? How
do you identify yourself?
Pushkin Boy 2:
I’m European.
Pushkin Boy 3:
I’m also European, because I have different
nationalities in my history.
Interviewer:
If someone asked you, “Who are you?” what
would you say? Would you say, “I am Estonian,” “I am Russian,” or
a mix of those?
Pushkin Boy 6:
I would say that I’m European. That’s the best.
Students at Tolstoy School exhibit fewer tendencies to assert a
Europeanness of any kind. One student (Tolstoy Girl 2) jokingly points out that it
was hard to feel European while living in Estonia because “according to the
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documents [Estonia is part of Europe], but really it’s like the third world.” The
responses from Tolstoy School students are consistent with Pushkin School
students, however, in identifying multiple possible definitions of Russophone and
in failing to constitute being “Estonian” beyond legal citizenship:

Tolstoy Girl 2:
I can say that I am mostly Russian. I don’t have
any Estonians in my family, and we have also some members of
the family who are from Kazakhstan.
Tolstoy Girl 1:
I am also mixed. I have my father’s family from
Ukraine and my mother’s family from Ukraine and Russia.
Tolstoy Girl 3:
For me it’s a very difficult question, because I
have two different fathers, and also have grandmothers from
different places. But I am Russian. I can clearly state it.
Tolstoy Boy 1:
I can clearly say that I’m not Estonian. I don’t
have any family members who are Estonians. I have some relatives
from Russia, from Ukraine, from Poland, and even from Mongolia.
These students reject an Estonian national identity but do not eagerly emphasize
a distinct Europeanness. However it does not automatically follow that their lack
of eagerness to identify as European means that they do not interpret being
European as an attractive alternative to being Russophone in Estonia. The
students from Tolstoy School explicitly expressed a desire to use their European
citizenship to harness opportunities outside of Estonia. For the students at
Tolstoy School, performing and experiencing Europeanness through the exercise
of the rights afforded by EU citizenship is regarded as a legitimate and welcome
alternative from performing and experiencing Estonian citizenship, even if they
do not eagerly embrace a European identity.
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Practicing European Citizenship as an Alternative to Estonian Citizenship
The Russophone student interviewees actively view the value of European
citizenship in terms of their right to access European (read: non-Estonian)
spaces of opportunity. This is apparent regardless of whether the student
espouses an explicitly European identity or not. Like Estonian students, they are
interested in gaining economic and human capital via the rights afforded to them
by European citizenship. But the types of human capital that Russophone
students allude to are different than that spoken of by Estonian students. I argue
that this results from the Russophone students’ positionalities as the Other in
Estonia.
The Russophone students with Estonian/EU citizenship are unsurprisingly
concerned with their future financial successes, which influences much of their
plans to practice European citizenship via the right to move for work and study.
They largely perceive Europe as a place of opportunities to acquire more
economic capital and financial security than Estonia:

Tolstoy Girl 1:

The economies are more developed there.

Tolstoy Boy 3:
Conditions for future life in our country are,
roughly speaking, terrible. Small wages, high prices and so on—it
just drives you away from here.
Interviewer:
So you think Estonia is less developed than
[Western Europe]?
Pushkin Boy 4:
Of course.
Pushkin Boy 6:
Yes.
Pushkin Boy 7:
I also think this.
Pushkin Boy 5:
Let’s just say Estonia is not the richest country
of the European Union.
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Comparing these responses to those of the Estonian students, it appears that
young people, regardless of ethnolinguistic identity, make the assumption that
economic and human capital is more readily available in Western Europe in
general. This is a worthwhile observation to make because it calls attention to the
fact that while many of the student respondents’ perceptions are dependent upon
their ethnolinguistic group (and positionality in Estonian society), there are
assessments of the EU that are common across ethnic boundaries. The
increased opportunity for financial and economic success in Europe is one such
perception.
Russophone students also perceive Europe as a space in which to attain
human capital because of the variety of educational opportunities in European
institutions, high level of societal development, a “prestige” associated with
Europeanness, and the low(er) cost of tuition. For example:

Pushkin Boy 3:
I think its good to be a European citizen
because it gives the possibility to study in the EU.
Pushkin Boy 2:
When I was in the Ukraine this summer, I just
told everyone, “Oh, you know, I’m a European citizen.” I boasted a
little…and I think, for example, if you go to Ukraine or Russia you
would get better opportunities with a European diploma…
Pushkin Boy 7:

I want to go to Denmark to university.

Tolstoy Girl 1:
I have already tried to enter into university in
Western Europe. I still have options here [in Estonia] as well, but
still, I want to go abroad.
While there are similarities in Russophone and Estonian students’
conceptions of European citizenship as a path to accumulating human capital,
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the subtle difference between how the students plan to use such capital is an
important element in this discussion. The Russophone students do not classify
the value of European human capital in terms of how they can use it upon their
return to Estonia, or to improve Estonian society upon returning home. This
distinction and its implications will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s
section regarding migration.
Significantly, Russophone students speak about acquiring a type of
human capital that Estonian students never mention. Russophone students
speak explicitly about performing and experiencing their European citizenship as
a means to escape the discrimination and/or disadvantages they encounter in
Estonia. The Russophone students’ perception that opportunities to succeed in
Europe are not limited because of Russophone identity reveals that there is a
human capital available to them in Europe that is not available in Estonia. The
perception is that this human capital available to them in Europe will allow them
to circumvent the politics of identity in Estonia that put them in a disadvantaged
position in the nation. This is demonstrated by their characterization of life in
Estonia versus life in Europe:

Tolstoy Girl 3:
It’s valuable to me that I have European
citizenship. That means that I can leave Estonia at any time… I
want to leave here and I want to live in another country. I think we
[Russophones] can only vacation in Estonia. But we can’t really
study or work here. It’s still very different from Europe.
Pushkin Boy 6:
We are Europeans. If you compare the living
conditions [in Estonia], for example, to France or Germany, you
maybe want to go there because it is now like one big country, the
European Union.
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Tolstoy Girl 1:
We [Russophones] don’t have any prospects
here. We can study, but we don’t have a really clear future. We can
study here, but we can’t find any work…when I leave Estonia, I
won’t miss this country. I will only miss my family and friends.
Pushkin Boy 3:
…[Estonia] is still some kind of post-Soviet
society. It’s only developing into the European way, and you have
[learn] to survive here.
The Russophone students do not speak about encountering ethnic identity based
barriers in Europe. They speak about going to Finland, or to Denmark, or to the
UK, and they do so without any reservation about the prospects for their success.
Several of the students state how “many,” “most,” or “almost everyone” in the
Russophone minority thinks about or plans to go abroad, indicating that (to the
students at least) the general wisdom in Tallinn’s Russophone community is that
Europe holds the opportunities for a successful future. Pushkin Boy 5, who was
formerly stateless, frankly describes the magnitude of Europe’s appeal for him:
“For me [being European] is important. And that’s why I applied for Estonian
citizenship: to go to Europe.”
The ability to access and move through the European space of rights
without being hampered by the identity politics in Estonia is thus transformed into
a unique type of human capital for these Russophone students: European
identity and citizenship is a viable, legitimate, and prestigious alternative to
Estonian citizenship and the unstable identity of “Russophone in Estonia.” Again,
we see how conceptions of the national affect conceptions of the supranational in
the preceding instance by a Russophone student’s use of national citizenship as
a means to the ultimate end of accessing European citizenship rather than as a
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vehicle to participate in Estonian society. The utility of the unique human capital
of Europeanness as alternative to Estonianness is useful to, and therefore
desired by, Russophone students because of their marginalized position at the
national level.
As with the Estonian students, the Russophone students’ positionalities
within Estonian society have a great impact on how they perceive and conceive
of Europeanness and European citizenship. Importantly, however, the
Russophone students’ perspectives produce radically different characterizations
of Europe in focus groups. Russophone students candidly describe their chances
for advancement in Estonia as limited at best, and make no mention of loyalty to
the Estonian nation-state or attachment to the “Estonianness” of their national
citizenships.
Consequently, this data indicates that the dynamics operating between
Estonian and Russophone students’ national and supranational citizenships differ
based on their positionalities within Estonian society. Furthermore, these
Russophone students’ experiences in and movement through Estonian society
have affected multi-layered characterizations of European citizenship in
economic, social, and cultural terms. Russophone students recognize and speak
to the greater economic development of Europe and the subsequent financial
success that can be derived from that space. But there is no conveyance of
loyalty to Estonia or desire to better the nation-state with economic and human
capital acquired in Europe. Because European citizenship grants them access to
greater economic, educational, and socio-cultural opportunities than they would
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have access to in Estonia, it is couched as an attractive alternative to Estonian
citizenship and its limited opportunities.

“Outlier” Students’ Views of Europe
The “outlier” student respondents have perspectives on and experiences
in Estonian society that are distinct from young people situated wholly within the
ethnic Estonian or Russophone communities, which in turn affects their
perceptions about Europeanness and the value of European citizenship. It is
necessary to specifically address these students’ perceptions of Europeanness
and European citizenship because although their numbers are few, they
represent a growing segment of Tallinn, Estonia’s youth population.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the outlier students’ positionalities at the
national level are unique because they cannot be put into neat associations
between mother tongue, school language medium, and ethnolinguistic identity.
Given the unevenness of their positionalities in Estonian society, it is unsurprising
that each of the “outlier” students speaks about Europe and their European
citizenships in ways that are distinct from each other. Furthermore, these
students’ responses about European citizenship do not necessarily match the
tenor of the responses of Estonian-only students, who view Europeanness as
additive to Estonianness, or Russophone-only students, who view Europeanness
as an alternative to Estonianness.
Like the other student respondents, the “outlier” students speak about
European citizenship in terms of opportunity to enhance economic mobility
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through educational attainment and the acquisition of cultural capital. The
“outlier” students value higher education in Europe is because it provides a more
well-rounded study course and the economies are better developed and offer
more opportunities for career advancement. But the “outlier” students each
articulated interest in a different type of human capital that could be acquired in
Europe. For instance, O-Pushkin Boy 1 notes that, in addition to having access to
higher salaries and good work experience from European jobs, he values his EU
citizenship because “it’s really cool to be a part of something so big, and also it
connects many people and it’s easier to cooperate with different European
countries.”
O-Pushkin Boy 1 demonstrates an affinity for the pan-European
atmosphere and identity that Brussels has tried so hard to engender. This
attitude is similar to some of his classmates at Pushkin School. However, OPushkin Boy 1 also decisively states that he plans to return to Estonia after
gaining some work experience in Europe because “I love my country… Estonia
will stay in my heart forever,” which is an attitude that only students at Estonianmedium schools A and B exhibit.
O-Koidula Girl 5’s responses also have unique elements, some of which
are voiced by her ethnic Estonian classmates at Koidula School, others of which
are voiced by Russophone students at Russian-medium schools. For instance,
O-Koidula Girl 5 speaks in the following manner about how her identity,
citizenships, and opportunities in Europe are bound up together:
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When somebody asks me what nationality I am, I say Estonian, but
half Russian as well. But when I am approached, and somebody
asks who I am, I say Estonian, and Russian, and a little but
German, and a little bit Polish… Ok, it has affected me a lot that I
have lived in Estonia, and for three weeks in Russia every year. But
still, I have an [Estonian] national identity. At the same time, I would
say that I am a European as well. I like how it has given me many
opportunities, and I know that I will use them a lot. For example, in
the next year I want to go abroad… But I want to go abroad and
stay there. Because in Estonia, there are not so many opportunities
for me—Estonia is too small for me. I want to get connections and I
want to live somewhere else. I will travel to Estonia to see my
friends and family and so on, but I don’t want to live here.
Her identification as an Estonian and explicit espousal of an Estonian national
identity echo the views of her Estonian classmates. But her low assessment of
Estonian opportunities and intentions to perform her supranational identity by
living in Europe rather that in Estonia are more in line with those of Russophone
students.
For these two students, the language medium of the school they attend
and their self-identification as Estonian are not accurate indicators of their
perceptions and conceptions of Europeanness. O-Koidula Girl 5 and O-Pushkin
Boy 1’s responses indicate unique positionalities within Estonian society that are
neither wholly characterized by the assured confidence of the ethnic Estonian
students or the political and social alienation of the Russophone students. This
demonstrates the complex interaction of their positions in both Estonian and
Russophone spaces and how that complexity extends to their conceptualizations
of supranational citizenship.
However the situation is again different for O-Pushkin Girl 2. She identifies
as Estonian although her mother tongue is Russian and her poor Estonian
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language skills affect her positionality in Estonian society. Subsequently, this
affects her characterization of the principle value of European citizenship,
particularly with regards to educational opportunities. As of 2012, the higher
education instruction in state-funded Estonian universities is no longer offered in
Russian. As such, O-Pushkin Girl 2 interprets her educational opportunities in
Estonia to be next to nothing because of her language skills and plans to use the
right to movement within Europe to go to a university in Finland where programs
are available in English:

From this year, all [higher] education would be transferred to the
Estonian language… my mother thinks that we should study in
Estonian in university. But she knows that I don’t learn [speak]
Estonian…I want to go to Finland [for university] because English,
for me, it’s more easier to speak than Estonian.
Her attitude towards studying in an Estonian university is pessimistic because of
the difficulty she has with the Estonian language. That being said, her tone and
general countenance denotes a socio-cultural alienation stemming from the lack
of educational opportunities for someone without high quality Estonian skills. Her
European citizenship thus becomes a vehicle for circumnavigating a
disadvantaged position in her home nation.
O-Taamsaare Boy 1, whose marked conflictedness about his identity
within Estonian society was discussed in the previous chapter, speaks about his
European citizenship in terms of the opportunity it gives him to find where he truly
belongs. Interestingly, he does not tie his feelings of unease regarding his
position in Estonian society to discrimination, as do the Russophone students.
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But neither does he express feelings of belonging or attachment to Estonia like
the Estonian students. This lack of attachment, however, is

not because my parents are Russian. It’s just I have never really
felt like I’m… not that I’m not welcome here. But I’ve not really felt
like I belong here. I don’t think that I belong in Russia, either, or the
Ukraine. I just think that’s not my place. [Estonia] isn’t my place
either. I need to find my place.
O-Taamsaare Boy 1 has set his sights not only on Western Europe, but also the
USA, for his future prospects. This analysis of his responses indicates that his
uneasy positionality in Estonia, which results from having Estonian and
Russophone spaces as part of his daily personal geographies, affects a
conceptualization of European citizenship as a means to discover a place of
belonging.
The responses of the “outlier” student respondents show that a students’
positionality within the nation affects their conceptions of their supranational
citizenship, which is consistent with the conclusions drawn from the responses of
the Estonian and Russophone students. The interactions between these
students’ national and supranational citizenships are unique because “outlier”
students’ positionalities in Estonian society are uneven—their mother tongue,
school language medium, and ethnolinguistic identity do not form neat
associations. Because of these uneven positionalities in Estonian society, their
conceptualizations of European citizenship may echo those of both their Estonian
and Russophone peers. As such, the “outlier” students’ responses show both
additive and alternative ideas about their European citizenship, but the additive
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or alternative conceptions do not line up clearly with their school language
medium as they do with their peers who have uniform Estonian or Russophone
heritages.
O-Pushkin Boy 1 embraces both a pan-European identity and a love for
Estonia, which is not exhibited by any other student respondent. O-Pushkin Girl 2
says that she feels Estonian, like the students in Estonian-language schools, but
values her European citizenship because it provides opportunities for her to
circumvent the linguistic challenges she faces in Estonia, like the students in the
Russian-medium schools. O-Koidula Girl 5 specifically states that she is
Estonian, Russophone, and European, which is not stated by any other student
respondent. But she also views European citizenship as a tool for
circumnavigating the limited opportunities she perceives to be in Estonia, an
attitude expressed by the students in Russian-medium schools. O-Taamsaare
Boy 1 describes his desires to go to Western Europe as a means to find his place
of belonging, like many Russophone students, but does not cite instances of
discrimination or marginalization in his responses as the Russophone students
do.
My observation from analyzing the responses of the “outlier” students is
that it is difficult to make generalizations about the attitudes Europeanness and
European citizenship because these students’ responses do not exhibit clear
patterns of thinking in the way that responses of Estonian or Russophone
students do. The results of my analysis suggest that while there may be broad
patterns in the dynamics between national and European citizenship within
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ethnolinguistic groups, there are many more variations in the dynamics amongst
young people with less stable, more heterogeneous identities. This observation
further supports the argument that the oscillations between national and
European citizenships hinge upon postitionalities within the nation. European
citizenship must be understood as a highly contextual institution that may have
been intended to foster a pan-European community that transcends
nationalisms, but that in reality is engaged with within the framework of national
considerations.

Impact of Student Perceptions of Europe in the Real World: Youths’
Intentions to Migrate
The European integration process is on a timeline of increasing mobility.
In its earliest days of the post-World War II era, European integration focused on
increasing the ease and flow of the mobility of goods and services across
borders. In the decades since the mobility of workers in an integrated Europe has
been an increasingly significant issue. While the elimination of impediments to
physical mobility across borders has been successful, the issue of worker
mobility remains a contentious topic. Globalization and the westward
enlargement of the EU have fostered critical changes in the philosophy of EU
governmentality, specifically in the centralization of neoliberal ideals “premised
on a mantra of market rationality and on the active encouragement of laissezfaire economic systems” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 389; Favell 2008; Favell and Hansen
2002). For “ordinary” Europeans, cross-border mobility is the marker of EU
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citizenship. The preponderance of labor mobility is evinced by the codification of
the free movement of persons as a fundamental part of the European fabric
(Treaty on European Union 1992).
In the past two decades in particular, successive EU treaties, policy
frameworks, and initiatives have situated the future of Europe within the global
economic markets and equated a successful, peaceful, and cohesive Europe
with citizens who have the “occupational mobility… skills, and adaptability ”
necessary to compete in globally competitive markets (“European Year of
Worker’s Mobility” 2006; European Commission 2013). Intra-European migration
is seen as an indispensable process for both ensuring the EU’s place in the
global markets and providing economic security within the EU (Favell 2008).
Therefore, mobility plays a key role in the imaginings of EU citizenship because
worker adaptability and the ability to operate profitably in multiple environments is
“implicitly associated with successful citizenship” (K. Mitchell 2006b, 397).
As is evident from the tenor of the vast majority of EU policies and
discourses, mobility is understood primarily through the lens of employment and
wage markets. To be sure, the economic disparities between the EU’s Eastern
and Western member states have precipitated observable East to West labor
migration flows due to wage levels. But data from this project reveals
nonmonetary motivations and noneconomic dynamics are also components that
set intra-EU mobility in motion, suggesting that understanding mobility requires
looking beyond employment and wage markets. Furthermore, the evidence
suggests that mobility can signify not only increased opportunities for economic
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advancement, but also increased opportunities for the negotiation of identity,
belonging, and socio-cultural enrichment.
This section explores the potential real-world impact of students’ varying
attitudes toward Estonian and European citizenships in the context of students’
intentions to migrate out of Estonia for study and work. Exploring the students’
intentions to be mobile in the European space is important because it shows how
their positionalities within Estonian society can affect real changes in the
Estonian nation-state and the European Union through east-to-west migration.
The students’ perceptions that the high quality educational, career, and social
opportunities are in Western Europe mean that they are going to migrate out of
Estonia to access them. Mobility therefore becomes an asset to young people
(Cairns 2008) because they value their ability to move freely within Europe for
the access it gives them to better education, better jobs, higher wages, and
prestigious human capital.
The previous sections demonstrate that Estonian and Russophone
students conceptualize European citizenship in very different ways based largely
on their positionalities as part of the titular majority or Russophone minority.
Although all student respondents view European citizenship as a vehicle for
accessing better education, career, and economic opportunities, the Estonian
students describe the human capital to be gained from European citizenship in
very different ways than the Russophone students do. This distinction becomes
even clearer when the students’ conceptions of European citizenship are
compared to their plans to migrate to Europe for school and work.
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This analysis is not aimed at making actual predictions of the student
participants’ mobility. Rather, it is aimed at evaluating how their desires to
migrate reflect varying notions of belonging in Estonia and in the EU. Just as
there is a difference between whether the students view European citizenship as
an additive or alternative to national citizenship, there is a difference in students’
plans to migrate for work and school. The Estonian students, who position
themselves positively in Estonian society, and Russophone students, who
position themselves negatively in Estonian society, describe their migration plans
in very different ways. The remainder of this section analyzes these differences.

Intentions to Migrate
The student respondents’ intentions to study and work abroad are broken
down by school language medium because, as previously demonstrated, there is
a high correlation between students’ ethnolinguistic identification with the titular
majority or Russophone minority and the language of instruction at their schools.
The data in Table 6.1 shows that the intentions to migrate do not vary between
the students at Estonian-medium and Russian-medium schools. This finding is
consistent with the perception by all of my interviewees that high quality
educational and career-related opportunities exist outside of Estonia.
The other characteristic that does not vary highly between the Estonianmedium and Russian-medium school students is intended destination. The
evidence in Table 6.2 shows that the vast majority of my student participants
specify Western Europe as their intended destination. While this can be argued
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as a function of geographic proximity, relative location cannot wholly explain the
prevalence of Europe-oriented aspirations, especially in world where
advancements in transportation technology have compressed space-time. The
significant changes in political geography effected by the creation of the
supranational space of the EU have introduced convenience, ease, expanded
labor rights, and increased accessibility into the mobility equation for European
youths via European citizenship.
Table 6.1. Intentions to Study and Work Abroad by School Language Medium
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Table 6.2. Intended Destination Abroad by School Language Medium
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Total	
  

Intended	
  Destination,	
  Raw	
  Number	
  (%)	
  
Western	
  Europe	
  
World	
  
Undecided	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
13	
  (93%)	
  
1	
  (7%)	
  
0	
  (0%)	
  
10	
  (71.5%)	
  
3	
  (21.5%)	
  
1	
  (7%)	
  
23	
  (82%)	
  
4	
  (14%)	
  
1	
  (4%)	
  

Length of Stay
The divergence in my student participants’ migration plans appears when
lengths of stay and reasons for lengths of stay are interrogated. Although it must
be acknowledged that intention to go and stay abroad (or not) is different from
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actual movement (Cairns 2008), students’ responses demonstrate that most plan
to leave Estonia with a timeline for their stay in mind. Whether students actually
move in the future is not entirely relevant because this analysis is interested in
how the students’ senses of belonging or exclusion in Estonia relate to their
stated intentions to be mobile. My research yielded evidence that among the
student interviewees planned length of stay varies between the students in
Russian-medium schools and those in Estonian-medium schools.
As shown in Table 6.3, half (7 of 14) of the students from Russian-medium
schools plan long term stays abroad, compared to the students from Estonianmedium schools, among whom only three out of 14 plan long term stays. This
comparison becomes even more significant when the students’ reasons for longterm departure are examined. The students from Estonian-medium schools
spoke about the value of long-term stays abroad in terms of diversity of choice,
personal growth, and stability that could be gained from Western Europe’s
opportunities. The students from Russian-medium schools, however, spoke
about the value of long-term stays abroad in terms of escape from Estonia, a
place where they had little or no opportunities because of their ethnolinguistic
identity, as evidenced by the following exchange:

Interviewer:
Do you think there’s less discrimination there
[in Western Europe] and that’s why you want to go get a job or go
to school? Or do you think there’s more money there and that’s why
you want to go?
Tolstoy Girl 2:
I think its both, discrimination and money.
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Tolstoy Girl 1:
We [Russians] don’t have any prospects
here… we don’t have a really clear future… we can’t find any work.
When I leave Estonia, I won’t miss this country….
Interviewer:
You can’t find work here? Why?
Tolstoy Boy 2:
This is not a big secret that Estonians live
better than Russians.
This pattern amongst the responses speaks to James Hughes’ (Hughes
2005, 742–3) theory that “an ethnic minority that out-migrates because of
opposition to a discriminatory ethnic hegemony, from a state where they have
weak historical roots, and where they are not wanted by the majority, are not
likely to return if they can find better prospects elsewhere, even if discrimination
stops.” The Russophone students’ responses reflect the multiple and crosscutting concerns that influence intentions to migrate. Moreover, their responses
show how the act of migration—or the act of talking about migration—is
mobilized by Russophone youths as a vehicle for negotiating the politics of
identity and citizenship in Estonia.

Table 6.3. Intended Length of Stay by School Language Medium
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
School	
  Language	
  Medium	
  
Estonian	
  
Russian	
  
Total	
  

	
  

Intended	
  Length	
  of	
  Stay,	
  Raw	
  Number	
  (%)	
  
Long	
  Term	
  
Short	
  Term	
  
Undecided	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
3	
  (21%)	
  
11	
  (79%)	
  
0	
  (0%)	
  
7	
  (54%)	
  
7	
  (46%)	
  
0	
  (0%)	
  
10	
  (36%)	
  
18	
  (64%)	
  
0	
  (0%)	
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Table 6.4. Intended Destination and Length of Stay by School Language Medium
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Russian-‐Medium	
  
Long	
  Term	
  
Short	
  Term	
  
Estonian-‐Medium	
  
Long	
  Term	
  
Short	
  Term	
  
Total	
  

Destination,	
  Raw	
  Number	
  (%)	
  
Western	
  Europe	
  
World	
  
Undecided	
  
10	
  (71.5%)	
  
3	
  (21.5%)	
  
1	
  (7%)	
  
5	
  
2	
  
0	
  
5	
  
1	
  
1	
  
13	
  (93%)	
  
1	
  (7%)	
  
0	
  (0%)	
  
2	
  
1	
  
0	
  
11	
  
0	
  
0	
  
23	
  (82%)	
  
4	
  (14%)	
  
1	
  (4%)	
  

Table 6.3 also shows that the number of students intending to return to
Estonia after short term stays abroad was much higher in Estonian-medium
schools. While 11 of the 14 students from Estonian-medium schools indicated
they wished to return to Estonia, seven of the 14 students from Russian-medium
schools planned to return. All of the student respondents who planned short-term
stays abroad mentioned the importance of family and friends as a key factor in
wanting to return to Estonia. But there is a deviation in some of the reasonings
for planned short-term migration based on responses, or lack thereof, about
patriotic feelings towards Estonia.
Estonia is spoken of in neutral terms, if spoken of at all, by 13 of the 14
Russian-medium school students who plan to go abroad. (The only student from
a Russian-medium school that articulated nationalist feelings as part of his desire
to return to Estonia was O-Pushkin Boy 1, who is of mixed heritage.) But
students in Estonian-medium schools who are planning short-term stays abroad
frequently cite patriotic reasons for wanting to return as well as for family and

	
  

268

	
  
friends. For instance, these students from Estonian-medium schools speak about
a deep connection to their homeland:

Tammsaare Girl 4: I’m a patriotic person, and I’d really like to
[return to] Estonia.
Tammsaare Girl 2: I want to travel just to see how people live
elsewhere and you can bring it back to Estonia and make things
here better.
Koidula Girl 4:

For me, Estonia is like… a close to heart thing.

These responses indicate that nationalist politics are also interwoven into
Estonian students’ intended mobility practices in the EU, but in a starkly different
manner than in Russophone students’ motivations. The act of migration is
certainly bound up with the politics of identity for ethnic Estonian students, but is
cast as a contribution to the vitality of their Estonian citizenship rather than a
means to reject Estonian citizenship.
Russophone students’ responses, in contrast, indicate that feelings of
exclusion and a lack of connection to Estonia underlie their motivations for
migration:

Tolstoy Girl 3:
I feel independent… I will leave here and I
won’t miss it—this country—a lot.
Pushkin Girl 1:
…for Estonian people, I’m Russian. But my
friends from Russia, they say that I am Estonian. For me, I don’t
know who I am… I’d like go study [abroad], and then maybe, who
knows?
Pushkin Boy 7:
Since my childhood I really couldn’t define who I am
[nationally], and maybe that’s why I want to go [abroad].
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Tolstoy Girl 2:
When I leave Estonia, I won’t miss this country.
I will only miss my family and friends.
These responses intimate that the politics of identity at work in the lives of the
Russophone students operate to alienate rather than validate. These politics
have worked unevenly, demonstrated by the fact that in some cases students’
identities are defined by an explicit sense of discloation from Estonia, while
others’ express nebulous and uncertain identities that will achieve solidity and
definition outside of Estonia. Regardless, mobility’s link to the politics of identity
for Russophone students is assembled within the context of rejecting Estonian
space.
This discussion of the differences in driving forces behind intentions to
return to Estonia reveals the political and socio-cultural motivations that animate
student migrants in Tallinn. I argue that the lack of national pride or connection to
the homeland in Russian-medium school students could make them more likely
to be influenced by experiences abroad to stay out of Estonia for a longer period
of time. A planned short-term migrant youth may be more likely to become an
actual long-term migrant youth as a result of the interplay between multiple
determinants, such as national identity politics and economic desires.

Conclusions
This chapter has presented evidence that national and supranational
citizenships relate to each other in varying ways because an individual’s
positionality at the national level will directly affect his or her conceptions of

	
  

270

	
  
supranational citizenship. Estonian and Russophone students’ experiences of
European citizenships are different because their experiences in Estonian society
are different.
The contrasting positionalities of Estonian and Russophone students
result in highly differentiated conceptualizations of Europeanness and European
citizenship. The Estonian students view being European and having European
citizenship as attributes that are additive to their Estonian national citizenship that
enhance their Estonianness. The Russophone students, however, articulate
Europeanness and European citizenship as alternatives to an Estonian national
citizenship, and as tools for circumnavigating the disadvantages that they
encounter because of their minority membership.
The analysis of the data gathered from the student participants indicate
that national and European citizenships exist simultaneously but independently
and interact complexly. The complexity of this interaction is subject to the
vagaries of the students’ positionalities at the national level. The focus group
conversations suggest that European citizenship is not a monolithic, static
modality of belonging, but one of diverse conceptualizations of inclusion and
exclusion that emerge from varying experiences at the national level.
Consequently the meaning of and potential for mobility, a core tenet of European
citizenship traditionally cast as an economically motivated act, varies across this
group of students. The Russophone students, who have negative positionalities
in Estonia, tend to plan to long-term stays abroad, whereas the Estonian
students, who have positive postitionalities, tend to plan short-term stays abroad.
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Significantly, this demonstrates that students’ European citizenships are multilayered because it is not only economic considerations that are affecting the
students’ plans for short-term or long-term stays abroad, but also socio-cultural
considerations stemming from the politics of identity in Estonia. As such, for the
young people in this study, there is no one definition of “Europeanness” and what
it means to be a European citizen.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
	
  

This dissertation has explored the ways in which young people in a

divided society conceptualize, negotiate, and contest citizenship, identity, and
belonging in national, post-national, and urban spaces. Using focus groups from
students in their final year of secondary school in Tallinn, Estonia and in-depth
interviews with their teachers, this study has illustrated the ways in which young
people contend with and mediate varying discourses of citizenship and identity
within and through everyday spaces, particularly the space of the school. While
this study is not large enough to be generalizable to all young people in divided
societies, its value is its ability to engage with and interrogate theoretical
approaches to citizenship, identity, and belonging and to explore the political
agency of young people in the context of their everyday geographies.
This study has focused specifically on examining the key spaces of young
people’s personal geographies, including the school and the urban landscape, in
order to illustrate the complex ways that young people encounter multiple and
sometimes competing discourses of citizenship and identity in national and postnational communities. By focusing on how young people negotiate different
citizenship discourses, this study has attempted to show that although the liberal
democratic discourses of “universal” citizenship in Western nation-states extend
formal citizenship to all members of society, substantive citizenship is delineated
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by the particularisms of the dominant group, leaving some individuals and
groups socio-politically marginalized.
In addressing the complexities of youth narratives of belonging and
identity, this dissertation has suggested that approaching various citizenship
discourses as separate entities fails to produce a comprehensive understanding
of the ways that individuals conceptualize and experience citizenships at different
scales. Current discussions of citizenship focus on particular elements of
citizenship transformations—for instance, the decoupling of ethnicity and
citizenship or the decoupling of rights from citizenship (Wylie 2004; Hahn 1998;
Marston 1990; Soysal 1997; Soysal 2000; Delanty 1997). In focusing on
particular kinds of transformations, these literatures often fail to account for the
simultaneity of citizenship modalities in contemporary nation-states. Postnational citizenship, for instance, has not replaced or superseded national
citizenship; rather, it interacts with national citizenship, creating overlapping
systems of rights, responsibilities, privileges, identities, and exclusions. What has
not been thoroughly examined, however, is how citizenship discourses coexist
and interact and, therefore, inform and are informed by each other. Considering
the simultaneity of multi-scalar discourses allows citizenships to be viewed as
amalgamations of political identities, relationships, and experiences that are
produced and reproduced at multiple sites.
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Citizenship Discourses: Simultaneity and Interaction
This study addressed multiple modalities of citizenship and the scales at
which their discourses are encountered, negotiated, and understood. Rather than
rejecting any specific theorizations of citizenships in contemporary scholarship,
this study has considered citizenships as institutions that incorporate practices
and processes addressed by many different citizenship theories. This approach
involves refocusing the discussion of citizenship away from narrow assessments
of separate discourses, instead interrogating the ways that multiple discourses
interact and influence each other and, subsequently, conceptualizations of
citizenships.
The findings in this study suggest that the tensions between the
universalisms that define the ideal liberal democratic citizenship and the
particularisms that ultimately delineate societal belonging undergird the complex
coexistence and interaction between multiple citizenship discourses. For
instance, the students in this study negotiate belonging and citizenship in Estonia
by contending with both the particularisms of the Estonian nation-building project
and the universality of liberal democratic citizenship. This tension is particularly
acute in divided societies, such as Estonia, that remain socio-spatially polarized
along ethnocultural lines. As discussed in Chapter 4, both Estonian and
Russophone students attempt to reconcile the tension between nationalist
particularisms and liberal democratic universalisms by incorporating discourses
of multicultural and post-national citizenship into their narratives of belonging in
Estonia.
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Multicultural and post-national citizenship discourses aim to address
cultural diversity and alleviate tensions between majority and minority groups.
But the narratives of the student participants illustrate that the particularisms that
delineate belonging and citizenship are actually complicated and multiplied by
multicultural and post-national discourses. The students often frame the terms of
belonging in Estonia within multiculturalist rhetoric that permeates both Estonian
national and European post-national discourses. Both Estonian and Russophone
students deputize “tolerance” of cultural difference and diversity into their
narratives of citizenship. A common theme running through the student
narratives of citizenship is that being “tolerant” of cultural difference in Estonia is
important because it is the “European” way of treating nationalities or because it
is how different groups in a democracy make integration a “two-way street.” The
students’ references to multicultural, non-assimilatory integration practices and
“Europeanness” in their narratives about national citizenship demonstrate that
their conceptualizations of citizenship at one scale intersect with the discourses
of citizenship at other scales.
The coexistence and interaction of multi-scalar citizenship discourses was
also demonstrated by the student participants’ conceptualizations of their
European citizenships. Patterns emerged amongst how students perceived EU
citizenship based on their positionality in the Estonian majority or Russophone
minority. The students’ experiences of and encounters with citizenship, identity,
and belonging in the national community affected the ways in which they
engaged with their Europeanness and the opportunities afforded to them by EU
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citizenship. The Russophone students, for instance, tended to understand
European citizenship as an alternative to Estonian citizenship that offered them
better opportunities and a freedom from the social marginalization and political
alienation they experience in Estonia. Estonian students, in contrast, were more
apt to conceptualize European citizenship in additive terms—i.e. a useful, but
secondary, citizenship that augments their Estonian citizenship. These students’
broadly differing perceptions of European space suggest that Sidaway's (2006)
reflections on the diverse understandings of the EU at the macro level could also
apply to young people’s understandings of it.
The complex interaction of national and post-national citizenship
discourses is evident in the ways that the students used national identity politics
to narrate and negotiate their European citizenships. So while Soysal’s (1997)
observations of a shift in the nature of claims-making and narratives of belonging
is valid, addressing citizenships as discrete entities that exist on different levels
of a scalar hierarchy will yield a fragmentary account of how individuals and
groups conceptualize, negotiate, and contest them. Considering the coexistence
and interaction of various modalities of citizenship will render a more complete
understanding of how individuals and groups conceptualize belonging and
citizenship.
Further analysis of the students’ narratives of belonging revealed that in
spite of their espousals of the values of tolerance and acceptance of cultural
diversity, the politics of identity are still central to the way that these young
people experience, negotiate, and practice their citizenships. In fact, the post-
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national and multicultural discourses that are aimed at alleviating conflicts
between majority and minority groups actually serve to complicate and multiply
the identities that the students ascribe to legitimate citizens and those deemed
“unassimilable.” The narratives of the Estonian and Russophone students
exposed a fundamental disagreement on what identities and practices should be
tolerated, which is indicative of a wider conflict over what multiculturalism actually
is and how it should be practiced. The students’ varying opinions on what
qualifies for tolerance and how cultural difference should be addressed reflect
ongoing debates in academic and political circles. The lack of consensus in
theoretical and policy discussions about whether multiculturalism is best
practiced by recognizing difference (Kymlicka 2007) or emphasizing commonality
(Balint 2010) seems to have trickled down into the ways that cultural diversity is
talked about on an everyday basis.
A holistic assessment of the students’ narratives of their citizenship
practices ultimately revealed that “tolerance” is a mere keyword used to mask
exclusionary conceptualizations of belonging with a multicultural citizenship ideal
that they perceive as the “correct” way to address cultural difference in a liberal
democratic, European Estonia. The varying ways that the students mobilize
tolerance in their narratives further demonstrates the pervasiveness of the
tensions between the universalisms and particularisms that are used to define
citizenship. For instance, the Estonian students tended to tolerate Russophone
identity up to a certain point as long as the Russophone individual in question
made efforts to assimilate and adopt Estonian cultural norms. The Russophone
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student participants, in contrast, conceived of tolerance as way to maintain
and/or assert their Russophone identities. Some Russophone students spoke of
the importance of tolerating Estonian culture as a means to acquire the
Estonians’ tolerance of their Russophone culture. Other Russophone students
mobilized tolerance as a means of classifying themselves as properly respectful
of cultural diversity and Estonians as intolerant and, subsequently, not
multicultural enough.
This finding indicates that the mobilization of tolerance in discourses of
citizenship merits further study. Examinations of tolerance and its uses in
contemporary liberal democratic societies should build on the works of Brown
(2008), Forst (2003), Dobbernack and Modood (2011), and Gill, Johnstone, and
Williams (2012), interrogating the ways in which “multicultural” ideals and values
are deployed in everyday spaces. Divided societies that are situated within liberal
democratic frameworks, such as Estonia and Northern Ireland, could provide
particularly fertile ground for researching the ways in which tolerance has
become depoliticized and, subsequently, used as a means for legitimizing the
exclusion of individuals and groups deemed “too different” from the dominant
cultural norm.

Youth Conceptualizations of Citizenship: Encountering, Experiencing, and
Navigating Spaces of Belonging
The narratives of the student study population revealed that young people
encounter, negotiate, and navigate multiple discourses of citizenship on a daily
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basis in the everyday spaces of their personal geographies. As expected, the
school was a key site where the young people encountered and contended with
varying ideas about citizenship, identity, and belonging. By comparing the data
gathered from student focus groups and teacher interviews I found that teacher
attitudes and classroom climate served to mediate the manner in which
discourses of nationalism, multiculturalism, and post-nationalism are presented
to young people. Although the teachers in this study operate with the same
formal curricula objectives their personal narratives and attitudes had noticeable
impact on how the formal curricula relating to citizenship and identity circulated in
the classroom, a circumstance that has been observed elsewhere (E. Doyle
Stevick 2007; McGlynn et al. 2004; Michaels and Stevick 2009). These findings
indicate that the narratives that circulate within and through the space of the
school are subject to the politics of identity and citizenship in wider society
through the attitudes and teaching styles of teachers.
The results of this study suggest that the school, although a crucial space
in which these young people develop understandings of citizenship and identity,
is simply one space among many in youths’ everyday, personal geographies
where they encounter citizenship discourses and practices. This finding supports
Holloway and Valentine’s (2000) argument that young people’s geographies are
complex and that the school should be viewed as one space situated within a
larger network of spaces that youths’ move through and within on a daily basis.
The discourses and experiences that young people encounter in their everyday
personal geographies, such as homes, neighborhoods, and city landscapes are
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equally influential to their conceptualizations of citizenship and the terms of
belonging.
Urban space was found to be particularly significant to the student
participants’ delineations of belonging, identity, and citizenship in Tallinn. The
findings in this study suggest that young people’s daily citizenship practices work
to inform and are informed by the various discourses of belonging and identity
that they are exposed to in the everyday spaces of the city. Estonia’s sociospatial divisions reflect and are reflected by Tallinn’s landscapes and the way
that these young people navigate urban spaces. The student respondents
consistently ascribed meanings to particular parts of the city and used these
“mental maps” to locate particular identities within certain urban spaces. The
students’ ascriptions of meanings to particular neighborhoods tended to
perpetuate and mediate the projection of hegemonic narratives and identities and
the marginalization of minority narratives and identities. Contestations over
Tallinn’s Bronze Solider memorial, for instance, revealed that the students used
the city’s memorialized landscapes to conceptualize citizenship through the
“correct” retelling of history, and to legitimate the exclusion of individuals and
groups that subscribed to the “wrong” version of history.
The young people in this study also negotiated and contested the terms of
citizenship and belonging by navigating language spaces in Tallinn. The
students’ descriptions of the city indicated that language usage was a common
means of determining the identities and meanings ascribed to particular
neighborhoods of Tallinn, a practice that featured heavily in their
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conceptualizations of citizenship. Estonian student respondents tended to view
spaces where Russian was spoken most often as representative of the
Russophone community’s disloyalty towards Estonia and their unwillingness to
integrate properly into Estonian society. Furthermore, the Estonian students
conceptualized meaningful access to the space rights as something available
only to individuals who speak Estonian, and that those without proper Estonian
language skills are, in fact, excluding themselves from substantive citizenship
because of their intolerance of Estonia’s national language. Conversely, the
Russophone students described Tallinn’s Russian-speaking neighborhoods as
comfortable, safe spaces where Russophones were simply claiming the human
right to identity. This finding indicates that future research on how language
becomes spatialized in the city and subsequently folded into the spatial
strategies of citizenship may deepen our understandings of how citizenship is
practiced on a daily basis.

Implications for Future Research
This study has been instructive in explaining how young people
understand, conceptualize, and negotiate multiple discourses of citizenship,
identity, and belonging. Although the findings in this study are not generalizable
across large populations, their engagements with theoretical concepts produce
important questions about the way that scholars conceptualize the complex
interactions of citizenship modalities and the politics of identity and how those
interactions are spatialized on an everyday basis. The most important
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implications of this study suggest several research pathways for future research
that may deepen our understanding of youth geographies, citizenship, and
divided societies.
One of the most significant implications of this finding is that the complex
interaction of multiple citizenship discourses (re)produces multiple
understandings of identities, belongings, and citizenships. Post-national and
multicultural discourses of citizenship, for instance, are aimed at addressing
cultural diversity and alleviating the tensions between the universalisms of liberal
democratic citizenship and the particularisms of nation building projects.
However, the results of this study imply that these discourses only serve to
reinforce the particularisms that delineate belonging in society, thereby
reproducing the ethnonational and ethnocultural boundaries in society.
The implication of this finding is particularly important for how we view
divided societies at a broader level. Post-national and multicultural discourses
aim to destabilize the boundaries that divide societies. But this research has
demonstrated that they serve to reinforce those boundaries. What requires
further investigation is the extent to which societal divisions can be destabilized
at all and how the boundaries acquire fixity despite very conscious efforts to
destabilize them. It’s important not to naturalize group boundaries or to fall upon
notions of deep, inherent, age-old differences while also recognizing that it’s not
easy to fully undermine entrenched differences. There’s fluidity, but there’s also
fixity, and the question for those studying divided societies is how, and under
what conditions, one seems to overtake the other.
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This study also revealed the importance of everyday, lived geographies
and urban spaces to young people’s experiences, negotiations, and
understandings of belonging and citizenship in Estonia. This finding is important
because it suggests that active processes of citizenship formation at national and
post-national levels take place in spaces and places that are distinctly mundane,
and therefore may not seem relevant to citizenship research at first glance. Such
everyday, mundane spaces of young people’s personal geographies can play
central roles in future research by revealing the seemingly banal ways in which
the particularisms that delineate citizenship and belonging are reinforced and or
reinterpreted, thereby giving a more comprehensive understanding of the
processes and practices of contemporary modalities of citizenship.
The methodological limitations of this study present opportunities for future
research to explore whether the findings here are consistent across larger
populations of young people in Estonia. Because of the relatively small study
population this project’s analysis contains gaps and absences that can be
addressed by increasing the number of participants and study sites involved in
the research. Future research projects that expand the study population control
for variables such as gender and class will increase the reliability of the data and
validity of results. Furthermore, increasing the number of study participants and
study sites will provide the opportunity to apply quantitative research techniques
to investigate the statistical significance and implications of youths’ responses
and identity traits such as mother tongue, ethnolinguistic heritage, and legal
citizenship status. Employing qualitative and quantitative techniques will provide
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the opportunity to deepen the richness of the analysis and perhaps to increase
the generalizability of the study results not only within Estonia, but also to other
divided societies.
In sum, the findings of this study suggest that, at the broadest level,
scholars need to examine how multi-scalar discourses of citizenship coexist and
interact and how everyday spaces and places implicate and are implicated in
those processes. If citizenships are amalgamations of multiple political identities
and relationships, scholars will need to develop more nuanced understandings of
how multiple citizenship discourse circulate within and through everyday spaces
to influence the way that individuals interpret and assemble those multiple
political identities and relationships. Conceptualizing citizenships as dynamic,
multi-sited processes will allow scholars to better understand how individuals and
groups delineate the boundaries of spaces of belonging and mediate access to
spaces of rights.
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APPENDIX A – STUDENT PARTICIPANT INTAKE SURVEY
Name: _______________________________
Age: ____________
Please circle your answers to the following questions:
1. Are you male or female?
Male Female
2. Are you a citizen of Estonia?

Yes

No

If ‘no’, what is your legal status in Estonia?
3. What is your nationality?

Estonian

4. What is your mother tongue?

_____________________

Russian

Estonian

Russian

English

5. What other languages do you speak? (circle all that apply)
None

Estonian

Russian

English

Other: __________

Please answer the following questions:
6. Where were you born?
City and country: ________________________
7. Where were your parents born?
Mother’s city and country of birth: ________________________________
Father’s city of and country of birth: ______________________________
8. Where were your grandparents born?
Mother’s parents’ places of birth:
Grandmother: __________________________________
Grandfather: __________________________________
Father’s parents’ places of birth:
Grandmother: _________________________________
Grandfather: _________________________
9. How long have you lived in Tallinn? _________________________________

	
  

299

	
  

APPENDIX B – FOCUS GROUP QUESTION TEMPLATE
1. As a geographer, I’m interested in the ways people use cities. Could you
tell me about the parts of Tallinn where you feel comfortable, or not very
comfortable?
a. Are there parts of Tallinn that are “Russian” and other parts of the
city that are “Estonian”? What are those places?
b. Are there parts of Tallinn that are “neutral,” where everyone hangs
out?
2. How are Russian-speakers and Estonians different? How are Russianspeakers and Estonians similar?
a. Do you have many Estonian friends?
3. What makes someone “Estonian”?
a. Is it possible for a Russian-speaker to be Estonian?
4. What is your national identity—do you feel Estonian? Why or why not?
a. If you do not feel “Estonian,” what country do you identify with?
5. Do you learn about Tallinn’s national landmarks, memorials, and
museums in school? Did you visit them on school trips?
a. Have you ever visited the Museum of Occupations? Do you agree
that Estonia was “occupied” by the Soviet Union?
6. When the Bronze Soldier statue was moved 5 years ago, it was covered
heavily in the newspapers and on TV. How did/do you feel about the
Bronze Soldier controversy? Do you think that the monument should have
been moved from the park to the war cemetery? Why or why not?
7. Estonian joined the EU 7 years ago, when you were about 11 or 12. Does
being “European” matter to you now? Do you think of yourself as
Estonian, or European, or something else?
8. What do you learn about national identity in your school classes? What do
you learn about citizenship? Have your classes influenced how you think
about your identity, or does your life outside of school matter more to who
you are?
9. When Estonia regained independence in 1991, not everyone who lived in
the country was given citizenship—a lot of Russian-speakers were left
without any citizenship, and had to pass Estonian language and history
exams in order to get citizenship. Do you think this was fair, or do you
think that everyone who lived in Estonia in 1991 should have automatically
gained citizenship? Why do you feel that way?
10. Should people in Estonia all speak the same language and have the same
culture?
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APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW QUESTION TEMPLATES
A. History and Civics Teacher
1. Please tell me about the subject(s) that you teach. Do you have only
Russian-speaking students, or only Estonians? Or both?
2. What would an Estonian say as the most important event(s) in Estonia’s
history? What would Russian speakers say?
3. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about Estonia’s
history?
4. How do you teach your students what national identity is? About what it
means to be a citizen?
5. What does it mean to be an Estonian?
6. What does the city of Tallinn mean to an Estonian? Is it different for an
Russian-speaker living in Tallinn?
7. What is a patriotic person? Are Estonians patriotic? Are Russians?
8. How are Estonians and Russian speakers similar? How are they different?
9. Do your students ask many questions about sensitive topics, such as
Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions between
Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their questions?
10. What do you think the students should learn from their civic education
curriculum, i.e. when they graduate from secondary school, what should
they know about themselves as residents of Estonia? As citizens (or not)
of Estonia? What should they think about living alongside other
ethnicities?
11. What parts of your classes interest your students the most? What do you
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students?
12. If you could change things about the civic education curriculum, what
would you add and what would you take away?
13. What kinds of European Union educational topics do you teach in your
class?
14. Do you make it a priority to address civic education topics that come from
the EU?
a. If so, how do you balance it with the Estonian civic education
curriculum?
b. If not, why?
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B. Geography Teacher
1. What types of geography do you teach during the school year—is it only
physical geography, or do you also talk about human geography?
2. What makes Estonia unique? How do you teach that to your students?
3. What role does the land play in Estonians’ lives? When you think of a
typically Estonian place, what is it?
4. What does the city of Tallinn mean to Estonians? To Russian speakers?
What does the city of Narva mean to Estonians? To Russians?
5. How do you describe Estonia’s place in the world to your students—is it a
European country? A Nordic country? An “Eastern European” country?
6. What topics does the Ministry of Education require to be part of the
geography curriculum?
7. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about the
human/political geography of Estonia, and how it has changed in the past
100 yearsDo your students ask many questions about sensitive topics,
such as Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions
between Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their
questions?
8. Why do your main goal in teaching your geography classes?
9. What do you think the students should learn from their geography lessons,
i.e. when they graduate from secondary school, what should they know
about Estonia’s place in the world? What should they know about the
human geography of Estonia, i.e. the different ethnic groups that live
here?
10. Which geography lessons interest your students the most? What do you
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students?
11. What kinds of European Union educational topics do you teach in your
class?
C. Language Arts Teacher
1. Please tell me about the subject(s) that you teach.
2. What is the importance of teaching students about the [Estonian/Russian]
language? Do you also discuss literature?
3. Do you think that language is an important part of identity?
4. Do your students think that [Estonian/Russian] language is an important
part of their identity and who they are?
5. What is the greatest challenge in teaching your students about citizenship
and national identity issues? Why?
6. How important do you think school classes are to teaching young people
about their identity? Why?
7. What do you want students should learn from this language class, i.e.
what is the most important thing that they should know after finishing this
class?
8. What parts of your class interests your students the most? What do you
do to make the curriculum interesting and important to your students?
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9. How do you feel about the Integration Laws that require 65% of school
classes to be taught in Estonian?
10. What topics are required by the national curriculum that is set by the
government?
a. What lessons would you add to the curriculum for your class?
b. What lessons would you take away from the curriculum?
11. Do your students ask many questions about sensitive topics, such as
Estonia’s Soviet historical legacy and/or the social divisions between
Estonians and Russians? If so, how do you address their questions?
12. Do you think it is important to observe Mother Tongue Day? Why or why
not? How do you observe Mother Tongue Day in your class?
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